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On 23 July 2019 Boris Johnson’s became leader of 
the Conservative Party, meaning the man who had 
led the campaign towards Brexit was now to be in 
charge of its delivery. His first short term as Prime 
Minister may be remembered for him losing the 
most votes of any UK Prime Minister, being found 
to have illegally prorogued Parliament, in doing 
so misleading the Queen. But he also succeeded 
in spearheading a renegotiation of the agreement 
by which Britain would leave the EU, removing 
the ‘Irish backstop’ that ardent Brexiteers argued 
locked the UK forever under EU control. Yet 
there was little chance of this deal getting through 
Parliament. After a Conservative backbench 
rebellion in September 2019 to prevent a no-deal 
exit from the EU Johnson expelled 21 of his own 
MPs, he had no majority at all. The partners in a 
supply and demand agreement, the DUP, withdrew 
support due to the likelihood of a formal border 
between Northern Ireland and the UK. The rest of 
Parliament arraigned against him. 
Despite calls from within his own party for 
Labour to oppose Johnson’s call for a general 
election, Corbyn succumbed. The result was a 
thumping win for Johnson’s Conservatives with an 
80 seat majority, the largest since 1987. Labour fell 
to its worst showing since 1935. But this was not 
a ringing endorsement for Johnson, his personal 
approval ratings were a net -14% on the eve of the 
election, rarely having a positive rating. Corbyn 
however had net approval ratings of -30%, Liberal 
Democrat leader Jo Swinson -44% and Brexit’s 
Farage -36%. The result of this battle of unpopular 
political leaders was the Conservatives vote share 
increased only by 1.2%, Labour’s fall of 7.9% being 
the significant statistic. Increases for the Liberal 
Democrats of 4.2% and the Brexit Party’s 2% put 
paid to Labour’s chances in many seats. Johnson 
won 56.2% of seats from 43.6% of the votes. 45.6% 
voted for parties standing clearly on a platform to 
Brexit, raising some questions about the mandate 
that Johnson enjoys despite his now iron grip on 
his party and Parliament. The somewhat equivocal 
actual vote shares of course cannot take into 
account tactical votes.
This election has raised countless questions and 
talking points, which pollsters, journalists, academics, 
commentators and politicians alike are all busy 
analysing. This project, and report that follows, is 
our collective contribution to making sense of the 
2019 election. To do this, we have again turned to 
leading academics in the UK and beyond – a mix of 
world-leading experts and early career researchers – 
to offer their reflections, analysis and early research 
findings on the election campaign.
For election analysts, the talking points of 
this campaign offered continuities from recent 
campaigns but will also be remembered for the 
central role of truth and lying in electoral politics. 
Accordingly, we devote Section 1 to discussions 
of the (increasingly uncivil) nature of political 
discourse during this campaign, the role of misin-
formation, lies, and the possible consequences for 
our civic culture.  
In Section 2 we turn to voters, polls and results. 
After a run of difficult elections for pollsters, it 
seems that 2019 was a better year, with most of them 
performing well. Turnout, however, was marginally 
down from 2017, and the supposed ‘youthquake’ of 
2017 failed to decisively turn the election this time. 
Nevertheless, the generational divide between young 
and older voters is increasingly evident and may 
shape future elections to come.
Much debate centred on the nations (Section 
3). Would Scotland deliver a further boost to the 
SNP and the campaign for independence? How 
would Northern Ireland respond to the uncertainty 
of relations with the Republic, the rest of the 
UK and the EU post-Brexit? Would Wales reject 
Labour and would England’s red wall hold up? The 
election outcome leaves the future of the union in 
serious question in the coming years. 
Sections 4 and 5 draw attention to the 
campaign strategies the parties pursued and their 
policy platforms. Here, unlike 2017, Brexit did 
appear to significantly shape the election outcome, 
and was the central pillar of the Conservatives’ 
campaign. As in 2017, Labour tried to shift 
discussion to ending austerity and investment in 
public services, but this time it failed to resonate in 
ways that shifted voting behaviour.
Digital (Section 6) was a major battleground, 
with Full Fact’s finding that 88% of Conservative 
Facebook adverts online contained at least some 
misleading information a stark warning of the 
dangers that this space poses to democracy. Relatedly, 
news and journalism (Section 7) came under fire 
continuously. 2019 saw a record number of televised 
leader debates. While they are finally now a central 
staple of election communication in the UK, their 
formats and organisation are still work in progress. 
Meanwhile, the right-leaning press intensified its 
assault from 2017 on Jeremy Corbyn.
Finally, in Section 8 we capture perhaps one of 
the most interesting dynamics of the election: the 
interplay between politics and popular culture and 
the role personality played in the outcome.
Published within ten days of the result, these 
contributions are short and accessible. Authors 
provide authoritative analysis - including research 
findings and new theoretical insights - to bring 
readers original ways of understanding the 
campaign. Contributions also bring a rich range 
of disciplinary influences, from political science to 
cultural studies, journalism studies to geography. 
We hope this makes for a vibrant, informative and 
engaging read.
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General elections with multiple parties contesting 
seats are supposed to be a key indicator of 
democracy in action. But the simple existence of 
elections does not make a democracy. Elections 
must also be free and fair. In a democracy 
‘the people’ are the overseers of government. 
Democracy requires that each individual be 
free to participate in the political community’s 
self-government. Thus political freedom lies at the 
heart of the concept of democracy. As overseers 
of government, the people must have alternative, 
trustworthy sources of information in order to 
exercise their freedom to participate fairly. Not 
just during an election period but constantly, as 
knowledge is cumulative. 
So let’s put GE2019 to a simple test: was it free 
and fair?
Fair elections means elections that are 
fundamentally honest. But in an age of social 
media, honesty is far from straightforward. Tweets 
purporting to come from Corbyn were sent from 
fake accounts and First Draft found that 88% of 
Conservative Facebook campaigning ads were 
deemed by Full Fact, the UKs leading fact checking 
organisation, to be misleading. The BBC also stood 
accused of dishonesty through misleading editing 
(and later apologised – twice). Rather than honesty 
being the driver of content, this election, more 
than any other, felt like it was fuelled by a political 
economy of lies. Lies are simply more crowd 
pleasing, circulate rapidly, are based on intensely 
affective responses, are mood inducing and 
therefore are often more commercially attractive. 
But lying also erodes trust and so it is telling that 
the Ofcom news consumption survey for 2019 
notes that in age of distrust ‘word of mouth’ is now 
considered a legitimate source of news.
Fair means everyone gets a vote yet we know 
that the electoral register is far from complete. In 
September 2019 research by the Electoral Com-
mission noted that 17% of eligible voters in GB, 
as many as 9.4 million people, were either missing 
from the electoral register or not registered at their 
current address with stark differences between 
younger people, renters, low-income and BME 
people compared with older white people who 
own their own homes. On the 18 November the 
Electoral Commission warned that 25% of black 
voters in Great Britain were not registered to vote. 
There was a voter registration surge but even this 
only saw an additional 3.2 million applications to 
register. In addition, many migrants who live, work 
and pay taxes in the UK are not eligible to vote 
because they have not gone through the extensive 
and expensive process of gaining citizenship.
Fair also means everyone has equal opportu-
nity to get their point across. This election has seen 
lack of clarity about who bankrolls the politicians. 
Billionaire donors have been shown to protect 
the position and interests of those with wealth 
and power. Money in politics and campaigning 
has corrupted the electoral system turning the 
digital landscape into a playground for the elite. 
New techniques of digital manipulation give 
rise to sophisticated propaganda that is only just 
beginning to be understood.
Being free to participate fully requires being 
well informed – this relies upon the adequacy 
of processes, institutions and organisations of 
knowledge production. Yet this election saw unprece-
dented levels of misinformation, obfuscation and bias 
across most mainstream media that are well docu-
mented in this volume. The Conservatives changed 
their Twitter account to look like a fact checking 
service; Johnson refused to be interviewed by Andrew 
Neil on the BBC and clumsily hid a reporter’s phone 
in his pocket, rather than respond to questions about 
the NHS. The study by Loughborough University 
showed that the press were overwhelmingly negative 
about the Labour Party.
Lack of freedom to participate is also 
connected to inequality. The poor have less 
influence over policies and politicians and vote 
less. Voter participation increases with income 
and age because the wealthier are more likely to be 
listened to. Inequality is not a condition conducive 
to a sustainable democratic politics. In the UK, 
from 1980 to 2016, the share of total income 
going to the top 1% has more than doubled. After 
allowing for inflation, the earnings of the bottom 
90% in the UK have barely risen at all over the past 
25 years.
Fairness and freedom are about the ability to 
hold power (including media power) to account. Yet 
both have been in short supply during this election. 
The Conservatives have been elected on a mandate 
to drop the second stage of the Leveson inquiry 
and repeal Section 40 of the Crime and Courts act 
(the final and integral part of the Royal Charter 
Framework of Press Regulation). There is no sign 
that they intend to regulate the tech giants to make 
elections and electioneering any fairer or freer. Quite 
the opposite. Democratic delusions abound. 
Delusions of democracy
12
Prof Em. Jay Blumler
Emeritus Professor of 
the Social and Political 
Aspects of Broadcasting 
at the University of Leeds.
Email: J.G.Blumler@leeds.ac.uk
What's the election communication system like now?
Faults are usually found in election campaigns 
afterwards. This time criticism morphed into  
widespread condemnation. Why? I answer by 
considering how election communication had 
evolved in four systemically important areas.
Parties’ campaign strategies: Building on 
their 2017 campaign, the Conservatives compre-
hensively applied a consultancy-led model (based 
predominantly on simple slogans, etc.). Ethically 
relatively unconstrained, the objective was to 
win – full stop! Labour followed a movement-led 
model, much more policy-heavy. The purpose 
was to educate people of the need for radical 
anti-austerity, anti-inequality change. In 2017, 
I declared the consultancy model `wounded’, in 
2019 it seemed to be alive and kicking (literally!). 
Equally I surmised in 2017 that exposure to 
Jeremy Corbyn’s ideas and personality in BBC 
news and current affairs had `probably’ explained 
much of Labour’s campaign-period surge, in 2019 
no similar boost occurred. 
How come? Labour’s ambitious proposals 
opened a `credibility gap’ over their funding 
and practicality, which opponents frequently 
attacked and journalists incessantly probed. Its 
more nebulous position on Brexit continually 
deflected attention away from its core domestic 
policy themes. And on charges of anti-Semitism, 
Labour was continually given a `when did you 
stop beating your wife’ treatment! Labour, seemed 
to have failed to fully anticipate the onslaught – 
unlike pre-1997 when, according to Philip Gould, 
Labour had `set up rebuttal and attack teams, 
backed up by computerised research systems 
reporting to a unified command’.
Journalists’ strategies: Elections are 
increasingly characterised by what academics 
term `journalistic interventionism’ (alternatively 
`interpretive journalism’) - in 2019 to a greater 
extent than 2017. 
Tabloids’ attacks on Jeremy Corbyn were 
more virulent. Even the BBC Director of News 
and Current Affairs Fran Unsworth endorsed this 
approach, maintaining that, `due impartiality 
means understanding that not all issues are “on the 
one hand, on the other hand”. We don’t support 
“false equivalence”.’ Apparently BBC policy encour-
aged journalists to vigorously challenge politicians’ 
claims. And those challenges often seemed particu-
larly aggressive (e.g. accusing politicians of denying 
and misrepresenting the facts and misleading 
voters) and threatening the parties trustworthyness. 
Andrew Neil’s relentlessly fierce gutting of Nicola 
Sturgeon’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s credentials were 
examples of which the Corporation was evidently 
immensely proud. Whatever the revelatory merits 
of this approach, its potential downsides should not 
be ignored: keeping party spokespeople on the back 
foot; over-confidence in journalists’ news-value 
determined articulations; indiscriminateness in 
lines of attack, some forensically effective but others 
trivial; and reinforcement of ordinary voters’ disen-
chantment with politics, fostering what academics 
term an all-round `media malaise’. 
The BBC’s Role: The BBC has come under 
unprecedented attack. During the 2019 campaign 
the integrity of its commitment to public service 
fairness was severely challenged. In its defence, 
the Corporation may point to its extensive 
campaign coverage throughout its numerous news 
programmes, much of it substantive. BBC 2’s 
lunch-time Politics Live programme, with panels 
of fresh faces encouraged to engage in civil and 
respectful discussion, was a welcome innovation. 
That acknowledged, independent commentators 
accused the BBC of `behaving in a way that favours 
the Tories’, `letting the people down who believe in 
it’. Examples: editing out Question Time audience 
members’ laughter at Boris Johnson; replacing his 
clumsy laying of a wreath for the unknown soldier 
in 2019 with his more assured 2016 performance; 
Laura Kuenssberg’s over-reliance on Dominic 
Cummings’ briefings; a tendency to treat Johnson 
and Corbyn as equally untrustworthy; and its 
U-turn over the terms of Johnson’s interviews. As 
a critic concluded: `It is time for the BBC to regain 
its confidence as a fair-minded news organisation 
admired throughout the world.’ 
The Fragmentation of Almost Everything: 
The most fundamentally transformative of all, 
manifest in the following:
•  the communication system’s ever greater 
abundance, with more – and more diverse 
– media outlets, channels, news providers, 
reception devices, augmented latterly by popular 
streaming services;
•  people’s different repertoires for navigating this 
fragmented information environment
•  the onset of identity politics;
•  the fracturing of intra-party ideologies and support;
•  a public sphere, with entries to it of think tanks, 
official domestic and international bodies, 
charities and activist groups, all campaigning to 
attract media and public attention
•  issues competing for public consideration – e.g. 
national security, climate change, housing and 
homelessness, child poverty, social care, Isis 
refugees, mental health, youth unemployment, 
the future of the Union, BBC finance, etc.
Future Questions: Will the government fall back 
on simplistic messages whenever challenges arise? 
Can Labour eventually produce a policy programme 
that combines radicalism with feasibility? Can the 
BBC reconsider its public service role, invigorating a 
more distinctive one? How will the new government 
be held to account? In 2017 I thought the `crisis of 
public communication’ had `eased a bit’. But this time 
it had demonstrably intensified.
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The rules of the campaign found wanting
The months preceding this election campaign saw 
publication of a slew of reports from respected or-
ganisations – including the Electoral Commission, 
the Association of Electoral Administrators, and 
the Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
and Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs committees – calling for urgent reform of 
our electoral rules.
Many of the key demands related to campaign 
regulation. The current rules were enacted in 
2000, before online campaigning had gained any 
significance. There is general agreement on the 
urgent need to update them. At the very least, as 
the Electoral Commission has argued since 2003, 
digital advertising should be required, like print 
advertising to include an ‘imprint’, showing who 
has produced and paid for it. Online advertising 
should also be visible to all, so that misleading, 
contradictory, or pernicious messages cannot 
be targeted at particular groups without any 
opportunity for others to know what is happening. 
Some have proposed more radical measures: for 
example, one international think tank called in 
November for a ban on all personalised political 
advertising online. Other proposals would improve 
the transparency of campaign finance, constrain 
interventions from overseas, and increase the 
sanctioning powers of the Electoral Commission. 
No such reforms were introduced before the 
election. Theresa May’s government said it would 
publish proposals for digital imprints, and the first 
Johnson Queen’s Speech, in October, reaffirmed 
that commitment. But parliament was dissolved 
without receiving any such proposals.
How, then, did this creaking regulatory 
structure perform during the campaign? In one 
sense, the lack of action from government made 
little difference, for the large internet companies 
themselves stepped in. Facebook and Google, for 
example, required all political advertising to carry 
an imprint (or ‘disclaimer’) and provided search-
able ad libraries. Twitter went further, banning 
paid political advertising worldwide. Independent 
fact-checkers and some journalists also contribut-
ed to transparency, drawing extensively on the ad 
libraries to inform voters on what was going on.
For three reasons, however, such interventions 
proved insufficient. First, it is in principle inappro-
priate for the rules of political campaigning to be 
decided by the bosses of multinational companies 
rather than through democratic processes. This 
point was acknowledged in October by Facebook’s 
Richard Allan (a Liberal Democrat peer), who 
wrote that ‘it’s simply not appropriate for a private 
company like Facebook to be setting the rules of 
the game or calling the shots’.
Second, the information provided by the tech 
giants in their ad libraries is limited. Most notably 
in the context of an election under First Past the 
Post, where the overall result is the aggregation 
of 650 separate contests across the country, those 
libraries give no information on constituency 
targeting. The true nature of the campaign on the 
ground therefore remains opaque.
Third, even if the tech companies introduced 
exemplary rules, this election illustrated the fact 
that transparency regulations alone cannot deliver 
healthy democratic discourse. Misinformation was 
rampant throughout the campaign, from all sides. 
Boris Johnson’s core promise to ‘get Brexit done’ 
by 31 January 2020 was well known to be a gross 
simplification, while Conservative promises on 
new hospitals and extra nurses were found wanting 
by independent fact-checkers. So were Labour’s 
claims that 95% of people would pay no extra 
tax under its plans and that the average family 
would save over £6,000. The Liberal Democrats 
were criticised most for misleading bar charts 
and sometimes manifestly false claims about their 
own electoral prospects. Conservatives, indeed, 
went further at times than simple misinforma-
tion, apparently seeking to undermine sources 
of independent, impartial analysis: their press 
office masqueraded on Twitter as a fact-checking 
organisation during the first leaders’ debate; and 
they threatened both the BBC and Channel 4 with 
punitive measures.
While transparency remains important, this 
experience demonstrates the need for more. There 
are three other possible approaches, as set out in a 
report I wrote earlier this year with Michela Palese: 
first, to ban misinformation; second, to make 
high-quality information readily accessible; third, 
to shift our wider political culture.
The first of these in fact operated to some 
degree during the campaign: for the first time 
since current legislation was introduced in 1983, a 
court issued an injunction preventing a party (the 
SNP) from distributing campaign material that 
made false claims about another candidate (Liberal 
Democrat leader Jo Swinson). Yet the provision in 
question (section 106 of the Representation of the 
People Act) is very narrowly drawn. Furthermore, 
for the courts to police truthfulness in policy 
disputes would be intolerable for free speech.
Only the remaining approaches could possibly 
succeed. It was striking, therefore, that no party 
made any mention of them in their manifestos. 
Those working for richer democracy – including 
scholars, journalists, independent organisations, 
and campaigners – still have a major job to do in 
developing proposals and demonstrating their 
potential efficacy.
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Sorry, not sorry: hubris, hate and the politics of shame
In the early days of the election, I was struck by the 
number of MPs who were standing down this time 
round and the different reasons that women and 
men gave: a number of men were standing down 
because of party differences around Brexit and 
the withdrawal of the whip (eg Ken Clarke, Oliver 
Letwin, Phillip Hammond) while women spoke 
of trolling, intolerance and abuse (eg Gloria de 
Piero, Caroline Spelman). Nicky Morgan cited the 
toll her life as an MP had taken on her family and 
“the other sacrifices involved in, and the abuse for, 
doing the job of a modern MP”. Similarly, in the 
letter of resignation she sent to her constituents, 
Heidi Allen said, “You are attacked on a daily basis, 
on email, on social media, people shout at you in 
the street”.
Although reasons for standing down could be 
about agency – men going because of the principled 
things they did, women resigning because of the 
unprincipled things done to them – there is a larger 
point to make about sex, abuse and politics. Some 
of the other retiring male MPs were standing down 
for altogether less honourable reasons including 
inappropriate conduct in both words and deeds. 
As I read through the reasons why so many men 
were no longer standing – either pushed or jumped 
- I realised that I was looking at a taxonomy of 
testosterone. Men who had been under investiga-
tion for sexual misdemeanours whilst insisting on 
their innocence were now standing down to spend 
more time with their families (Kelvin Hopkins) or 
retiring early (Keith Vaz). 
Those resignation stories echoed many others, 
including those about a whole slew of Prospective 
Parliamentary Candidates, as one story after 
another piled up in my notes, stories of men whose 
past had finally caught up with them but who 
often claimed their words or actions were those of 
a younger, sillier, less self-aware self. Sometimes, 
rather extraordinarily, they were given grace to 
continue. Ian Byrne was allowed to remain as a 
Labour PPC after he apologised for making and 
sharing “unacceptable” social media posts describ-
ing women MPs as c**ts and b**ches, insisting that 
he was a “very different person now”. Well, that’s all 
right then.
Ian and some of his fellow hopefuls are 
men who wished that the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
really was a thing, a handy tool for erasing some 
inconvenient truths. Their post-hoc justifications 
echo the sorry excuses which tumbled out of the 
mouths of so many sympathisers during the Jimmy 
Saville enquiry, claiming that sexual mores were 
‘different’ back then and shouldn’t be judged by 
today’s standards. In 2014, Nick Conrad said that if 
women didn’t want to get raped they should “keep 
their knickers on”. Admittedly, he was a BBC local 
radio jock at the time and he did apologise a few 
days later saying that his words were ill-judged and 
that he was sorry to anybody who was offended. 
This was a prescient apology as it contrasted rather 
spectacularly with comments made by Boris 
Johnson during the BBC’s first Question Time 
election special of this election, on 22 November, 
when he said that (when writing as a journalist), 
he had the right to speak out even if his words 
could have been seen as offensive to some people: 
he resolutely did not say when asked, that he was 
sorry for causing offence. The column inches and 
screen space which were subsequently devoted to 
lambasting Johnson’s casual arrogance did finally 
push him to articulate contrition, albeit rather too 
late for many of us to believe he really meant it. 
On the other hand, despite his apology five 
years earlier, Nick Conrad decided to stand down, 
as did two other men whose past deeds rather 
than words resurfaced around election time, both 
sitting Conservative MPs, one accused of sexual 
harassment (Andrew Griffiths) and the other of 
sexual assault (Charlie Elphicke). In one of those 
odd little election quirks, their wives, Kate and 
Nathalie respectively, were subsequently selected to 
replace them on the stump, both going on to win 
their (relatively safe) Tory seats.
We should not expect our politicians, the 
women or the men, to be more moral or up-
standing than the rest of us and we shouldn’t be 
surprised when our unrealistic expectations are 
then unmet and we find that this or that poli-
tician has feet of clay: women were de-selected 
over accusations of anti-Semitism, men resigned 
because of racist tweets. But we surely can expect 
them not to be stupid or think that we are. We are 
mired in a post-truth political landscape where 
we can find out almost anything online, including 
evidence of past indiscretions and accusations. 
Despite efforts to expunge them, they leave 
sufficient trace to tantalise the newshound and 
netizen alike, both seeking stories which are 
absolutely not about Brexit. 
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The “coarsening” of campaigns  
The number of MPs who stood down prior to the
GE2019 campaign may not have been above 
average, but the reasons given by MPs were 
noteworthy. According to one report by Euronews/
Institute for Government, 14 of the 74 who 
announced they were not standing in the election 
cited abuse as the cause of resignation or abuse 
was referenced in resignation statements. In a 
29 October 2019 letter to her constituents, MP 
Heidi Allen cited “threats, aggressive emails, 
being shouted at in the street, sworn at on social 
media” as the reason for her departure. Longer 
serving MPs, such as Alan Duncan, claimed the 
job of an MP was “coarser and ruder” than when 
he had entered politics in 1992. According to the 
Euronews story, abuse was more commonly cited 
by women than men as a reason for standing 
down: 25% of female MPs standing down, 
compared to 17% of their male counterparts, 
referred to the hostile environment. Men made 
reference to today’s politics being a “coarser” 
(Nicholas Soames and Alan Duncan) or a “dis-
turbing” place (Norman Lamb) with women MPs, 
having entered Parliament more recently, more 
likely to directly reference threatening behavior 
(both online and offline). 
These stories of abuse-related resignations 
were preceded by a 2017 report by the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life detailing issues relating 
to abuse and harassment in campaigns. The work 
on this report was spurred by the murder of MP 
Jo Cox, who served as a Labour Party MP from 
May 2015 until her death in June 2016. The written 
submission to the committee provided by the team 
who conducted the Representative Audit of Britain 
suggested that one third of candidates surveyed 
had experienced inappropriate behavior during the 
2017 campaign.
Between the release of the report on “Intimi-
dation in Public Life” and the 2019 election, there 
were a number of public reports on the hostile 
environment in the House of Commons. A House 
of Commons report released in July of 2019, led 
by senior lawyer Gemma White, spoke of bullying 
and harassment of MPs’ staff.  Coming at the same 
time was a report based on an inquiry conducted 
by Naomi Ellenbogen QC, that staff in the House 
of Lords were also bullied and harassed. Both of 
these followed a 2018 independent report by Dame 
Laura Cox which claimed that abuse was tolerated 
and the system for dealing with abuse complaints 
was insufficient. 
The evidence of an environment of harass-
ment and bullying would lead one to conclude 
that politics has become toxic.  Expressions 
of concern about incivility in politics are one 
dimension of a popular recognition that democ-
racies across the globe are “going through difficult 
times”. On the one hand, politicians suffer abuse 
from constituents and the public; on the other 
hand, politicians also use fearmongering, often 
times inciting incivility among political elites. 
These transformations in the landscape have 
lead scholars to claim that politics has become 
“coarsened”, polarized, detached from the truth 
and, above all, “uncivil”.  By these measures of 
incivility, the relationship between and among 
elites and the public has been compromised.
There are at least two questions we can address 
about incivility in political life that are relevant 
when analysing GE2019. First, to what extent has 
the digital transformation in campaign commu-
nication impacted on the tone of political debate? 
Second, what are the implications of the coarsened 
debate on citizen engagement?
As noted, in the 2017 Public Life report, social 
media has changed the conduct of elections and 
how the public engages with candidates. Candi-
dates must be on social media to win votes - social 
media campaigning can influence candidates’ 
and parties’ electoral fortunes. Yet, according to 
Delmar and Hudson, attacks on social media were 
the most common form of harassment reported by 
candidates. A report on Twitter abuse in the 2019 
campaign by PoliMonitor, suggests an increase 
in problematic tweets, with women candidates 
receiving only slightly more abusive tweets than 
male candidates. 
In addition to concerns about the safety of 
political candidates, online attacks can also have 
corrosive effects on citizen engagement. We asked 
1,277 respondents who participated in a voting 
advice application whether they agree that “Seeing 
politicians get attacked on social media makes 
me less likely to participate in politics”. Overall, 
approximately 28% agreed with the statement with 
women more likely than men (33% to 28%) and 
Remainers more likely than Leavers (36% to 18%) 
to agree. This implies the coarsening of politics 
is limiting political engagement for a substantial 
portion of the public, potentially skewing partic-
ipation in political campaigns, and even voting, 
to those who enjoy or are mobilized by this style 
of politics. Given that much of this appears to be 
driven by social media, getting Brexit done appears 
unlikely to improve the situation.
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Online hate and the “nasty” election
The 2019 election may be remembered as much 
for the historic Conservative victory and the 
collapse of the Labour party as for being the “nasty 
election”.  Here we offer an assessment of that 
epithet, including a rapid analysis of how candi-
dates were targeted by toxic content on Twitter in 
the final week of the campaign.
Rising levels of hate and aggression have been 
observed in politics for several years, particularly 
since the 2016 referendum. They risk creating a 
toxic atmosphere, silencing dissenting voices and 
marginalising whole communities. Women MPs in 
particular have cited astonishing levels of misogy-
nistic hate and rape or death threats,  
These issues bedevilled both main parties 
from the start of the campaign, when Heidi Allen 
stood down citing “nastiness and intimidation“. 
Accusations of prejudice and harassment were 
levelled at the parties and candidates themselves. 
The UK’s Chief Rabbi denounced Labour over 
anti-Semitism and one Labour MP claimed that 
Corbyn’s “inaction on anti-Semitism had turned it 
into the ‘nasty party’”. The Conservatives received 
accusations of Islamophobia from their own 
politicians, such as Baroness Warsi, and made 
constant references to Boris Johnson’s racist and 
Islamophobic use of language.  Conservative, 
Scottish Labour  and Lib Dem candidates were 
investigated or expelled for anti-semitism, while 
the Brexit party expelled activists for “hideous” 
racist abuse. As anti-racist organization Hope Not 
Hate claimed in the aftermath, “Among marginal-
ized communities, there is a real angst and fear….It 
was a really ugly campaign.”
Here we investigate the last week of the 
campaign, a period often associated with greater 
vitriol as parties make their final pitch, by 
examining tweets sent to candidates. Our dataset 
comprises 5.1 million tweets, analysed using 
Perspective, a tool to identify ‘toxic’ comments 
developed by Google Jigsaw. 103,837 (2%) tweets 
were identified as toxic, which were sent to 939 of 
the 2,620 candidates. The remaining 1,681 did not 
receive any toxic tweets. 
We see a high variation in the levels of toxicity 
received by candidates, even amongst the top ten 
most targeted (Table 1). Conservatives and Labour 
party leaders received the greatest number of toxic 
tweets, Johnson received most, 36,967, one-third 
of the total. Nearly 4% of his tweets were toxic, 
compared with 1.6% of Corbyn’s. The distribution of 
the percentage of toxic tweets across all candidates 
exhibits even larger variations. Figure 1(a) shows 
a fat-tailed distribution (typical of internet-based 
phenomena) with a small number of candidates 
receiving high proportions, for the majority less 
than 2% of tweets were toxic.  
Party affiliation captures some key differ-
ences in the level of toxicity, as shown in Figure 
1(b). Conservative candidates received a larger 
proportion of toxic tweets (3.5%), compared with 
1.5% for Labour. This finding is robust whether 
party leaders are included or not. There is a 
strong positive relationship between the total 
number of tweets that candidates received and the 
number of toxic tweets, holding across all parties. 
However, this relationship is sublinear: the more 
tweets that candidates received, the smaller the 
proportion that were toxic, with notable excep-
tions (e.g. Boris Johnson and Johnny Mercer), 
the result of which makes it difficult to generalize 
about candidates’ experiences.
Finally, the volume and proportion of toxic 
tweets which were sent varied hugely over time 
across the last week. For volume, there were three 
clear spikes related to key campaign events: the 
Johnson-Corbyn BBC debate (6th Dec), Question 
Time (9th) and election day (12th). However, 
accounting for the total number of tweets sent to 
candidates each hour, only the day of the election 
is still a large spike (Figure 2), when toxicity levels 
were highest. For some candidates the over-
whelming majority of abuse they received was on 
election day; Diane Abbott, for example, attracted 
media attention for wearing two left shoes when 
going to vote, accounting for 63% of the toxic 
tweets she received.
In a time when so much of politics is 
organised, mobilized and discussed online, hate 
speech and interpersonal aggression on social 
media pose huge problems which need to be 
effectively countered.  If not, we risk discouraging 
whole generations of young women, or people 
from religious or racial minorities, from political 
participation. As our recent Turing policy briefing 
shows, collating the necessary evidence to assess 
the prevalence and impact of online abuse is 
difficult, but essential. Here we have provided 
initial insight into how candidates received online 
abuse in the last throes of the election campaign. 
This will be explored in future work as part of our 
ongoing efforts to better detect, understand and 
counter online hate. To this end, we are creating a 
real-time ‘Online Hate Monitor’ for online abuse, 
including hate directed against elected politicians, 
which will be publicly available for all to use.
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Figure 2: Percentage of all tweets received by candidates which are toxic each hour
Figure 1: (a) Distribution of the percentage of candidates’ tweets which are toxic, (b) The number of  
toxic tweets versus  the total number of tweets for each candidate. 
Table 1: Ten candidates targeted by the largest number of toxic tweets.
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GE2019 was not a Brexit election: trust and 
credibility, anti-politics and populism
One of the most influential pieces of scholarship 
I have ever read was written by the Nobel Prize 
winning economist Elinor Ostrom and warned 
against ‘the danger of self-evident truths’. In this 
short and accessible article she made the simple 
argument that ‘the fact that something is widely 
believed does not make it correct’ and combined 
this with a plea to scholars to constantly challenge 
and disrupt dominant assumptions and beliefs. 
The belief that GE2019 was ‘a Brexit election’ 
has arguably  emerged in the post-election 
analyses and commentary as ‘a self-evident truth’ 
and there is little doubt that the mantra of ‘get 
Brexit done’ was highly influential. However, the 
danger of this ‘self-evident truth’ is that it risks 
veiling the existence of a more troubling series 
of underlying issues that all revolve around the 
existence of a growing gap between the governors 
and the governed. 
GE2019 was not a Brexit election but a 
disaffection election.
As the Hansard Society’s 2019 Audit of 
Political Engagement revealed, the public’s attitude 
to politicians, political institutions and political 
processes was far from positive before the election 
was even called. Three-quarters of those surveyed 
believed that the main political parties were too 
divided to serve the best interests of the country, 
and the same proportion lacked confidence in the 
confidence of MPs to cope with Brexit. The 2019 
Future of England survey made for uncomfortable 
reading as it suggested that a majority of people 
on either side of the Brexit debate said that the 
break-up of the union, undermining faith in 
democracy, protests in which members of the 
public get badly injured and violence directed 
towards MPs were ‘worth it’ to achieve their 
desired Brexit.  
This may explain why ‘get Brexit done’ proved 
such a seductive commitment, but it might also 
explain why GE2019 was mired in concerns 
regarding aggression, abuse and victimization. As 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights reported 
in October 2019, ‘The level of abuse faced by 
elected representatives and others in public life is 
now so great it is undermining their engagement 
with constituents, how they express themselves 
on social media, and carry out their democratic 
duties.’ Post-election concerns about the need 
to ‘dial down the heat’ in political debates is a 
reflection of the concern that matters nearly boiled 
over in GE2019. 
But, at base, this was an election born through 
political frustration, that fuelled anti-political 
sentiment and was almost defined through a 
constant focus on two key themes: trust and 
credibility. As the various leadership debates 
underlined, the public did not trust Boris Johnson, 
and they were equally dubious as to the credibility 
of Jeremy Corbyn’s plans for public spending. In 
this context what GE2019 evolved towards was a 
form of ‘pitchfork politics’ fueled by an acceptance 
of anti-political context and therefore a shift 
towards increasingly populist positions. Populism, 
however, of very different kinds. For Boris it 
was a strong form of political populism defined 
through the lens of ‘the people’ versus ‘politicians’, 
‘parliament’, ‘judges’ and just about anyone that 
challenged the ‘self-evident truth’ that he knew 
what was best for the country. Corbyn, on the 
other hand, adopted a form of economic populism 
in which the age of austerity was replaced with a 
new age of financial exuberance. Jeremy Corbyn 
may have offered a very distinctive style of 
populism-in-a-cardigan but he, like Boris, knew 
exactly who he was against,
“So we’re going after the tax dodgers. We’re 
going after the dodgy landlords. We’re going 
after the bad bosses. We’re going after the big 
polluters. Because we know whose side we’re on … 
You know what really scares the elite? What they’re 
actually afraid of is paying their taxes. So in this 
election they’ll fight harder and dirtier than ever 
before. They’ll throw everything at us because they 
know we’re not afraid to take them on.”
So in some ways GE2019 was defined by 
Brexit but it’s also possible to suggest that it 
reflected the latest stage in a far-longer and 
highly-worrying decline in public confidence in 
politics that has been building-up, like pressure in 
a volcano, long before the UK suffered its Brexis-
tential crisis. Brexit provided the lightning-rod, it’s 
vented frustrations but many of them have little 
to do with the UK’s membership of the European 
Union and more to do with deeper and more 
profound frustrations concerning the evolution 
and future of democracy. To define GE2019 simply 
as ‘a Brexit election’ may well provide a short-term 
and relatively obvious interpretation of recent 
events but it might also distract attention from the 
deeper challenges regarding the health of British 
democracy that must at some point be addressed. 
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The online public shaming of political candidates 
in the 2019 General Election
Throughout the 2019 General Election the online 
public shaming of candidates became a regular 
event. There were common stories of aspiring 
politicians who had unwisely taken to Twitter or 
other social media feeds becoming unstuck as their 
misjudged comments from the digital past came 
back to haunt them. Candidates’ online contri-
butions ranged from sex texting to inflammatory 
statements about minorities in terms of their 
gender, race and religious creed. Most specifically, 
Conservatives were accused of being spitefully 
anti-Islamic, while Labour rivals were besmirched 
as being virulently anti-semitic. 
The online shaming of public and private 
individuals appears to be one of the unforeseen 
consequences of the increased centrality of the 
social media in our everyday lives. In 2015, the 
journalist Jon Ronson wrote So You Have Been 
Publicly Shamed which identified the escalation 
of shaming both in terms of its instigators and 
its victims. As he noted, unfortunate statements 
have become blurred with more provocative and 
outright vicious commentary within the digital 
commons. This suggests that what was once 
perceived as an electronic agora has demonstrated 
an innate duality wherein:
“(On the one hand it is) powerful and 
important (in establishing) a new civil rights 
battlefield.  (On the other hand it has created) ... 
a nasty imitation. … The great thing about social 
media was how it gave a voice to voiceless people. 
We are now turning it into a surveillance society 
where the smartest way to survive is to go back to 
being voiceless”.
Therefore, as social media has moved from the 
periphery to the centre of political campaigning, 
it is hardly surprising that the processes of online 
shaming have been replicated in the realm of 
modern day politics. Along with the weaponisation 
of information on Twitter and Facebook, the 
bully pulpit of the information superhighway has 
become the new campaign battlefront. Thus, prac-
titioners of the ‘dark arts’ such as Boris Johnson’s 
Chief Advisor Dominic Cummings can engage 
in an online version what was described by the 
disgraced President Richard M. Nixon’s operatives 
as ‘rat fucking’.
In the case of all of the political parties, a 
series of online rebukes were issued to catch 
out candidates for their previous indiscretions. 
Invariably, their social media pasts were subjected 
to ‘Tweet dredging’ – wherein teams of party 
workers go through their opponents social media 
history looking for incriminating posts. Therefore, 
respective Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat 
and Brexit Party members were unceremoniously 
withdrawn even before their campaigns had 
begun.While some indicated their stupidity in a 
throwaway remark or tweet, there were examples 
of the genuinely untoward and outright nasty 
forms of political intolerance.
However, it is interesting to note that as 
Johnson engaged in a campaign rampant with 
partial truths, misinformation and outright 
falsehoods, how little he was subjected to forms of 
online or conventional media shaming. Moreover, 
despite his avowed claims of a zero-tolerance of 
Islamophobia, The Guardian showed that he and 
several leading Conservatives actively backed 
anti-Islamic candidates who had posted racist 
comments on a variety of Twitter accounts. Here, 
“Incidents include one candidate who argued that 
Muslims have divided loyalties, as well as blaming 
immigrants for bringing HIV to Britain, and 
another who retweeted posts from former English 
Defence League leader Tommy Robinson.”
Conversely, the media happily engaged in 
the online hybridisation of untruthful memes 
which circulated in cyber-space about Jeremy 
Corbyn. This was of little surprise to those who 
have studied the extensive bias of the UK press and 
broadcasting which has existed in light of Corbyn’s 
leadership of the Labour Party. 
Consequently, Johnson was allowed to engage 
in the casual proliferation of offensive racial 
epithets and populist policy contradictions. He was 
indulged in spite of being caught out on camera by 
a journalist showing him a picture on his mobile 
phone of a sick child lying on the floor of Leeds 
Infirmary. Moreover, he received little criticism for 
his exploitation of the deaths of the victims of the 
London Bridge terrorist tragedy or hiding from a 
GMTV journalist in an industrial fridge. As Peter 
Oborne commented, the BBC was at fault in its 
uncritical dissemination of his many lies. Yet, this 
eventuality may be seen to be less surprising when 
the oldest propagandist adage of them all – “the 
bigger the lie; the more people believe it” - is 
applied to the realm of the digital public sphere.
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Strategic lying: the new game in town
Accusations of lying against politicians, particu-
larly those involved in an election campaign, 
are far from new. Back in 1974 Hannah  Arendt 
reminded us that ‘”…..the deliberate falsehood 
and the outright lie used as legitimate means to 
achieve political ends, have been with us since the 
beginning of recorded history”. But in covering and 
researching more election campaigns than I care 
to remember, this is the first one that the notion 
of liars and lying has been so prominent. Nor can 
it simply be attributed to the particular character 
of Boris Johnson, whose relationship to the truth 
has been, to say the very least, casual. The lying in 
the 2019 election has been more systematic than in 
past campaigns where the problem was more one 
of voters trying to navigate a stream of spin rather 
than trying to swim through a torrent of lies. 
In fact the lies of 2019, particularly from the 
Conservative side had a particular character which 
I am describing as ‘strategic lying’ can be traced 
back to a the evolution of an environment in which 
politicians, who in the past if caught lying were 
obliged to resign, now appear to have gained a 
‘permission to lie’.
 Strategic lying involves, first, the telling a 
blatant untruth in the full knowledge that within 
minutes of its dissemination it will be called out 
as a lie, but for a number of reasons this doesn’t 
appear to matter. 
First, because the main function of the lie is 
not to communicate a message per se but to have 
impact. Writing after the EU referendum  Tory 
strategist Dominic Cummings said about that 
slogan -  “We send £350 million to the EU. Let’s 
spend it on the NHS instead” - it was intended to 
make an impact, not to inform the electorate. And 
because of its impact the strategic lie gets shared, 
tweeted and re-posted hundreds of thousands 
of times on publication and then again as it is 
rebutted. When ITV News covered the launch of 
the ‘Boris Bus’ during the Brexit campaign they 
devoted seven minutes to Mr Johnson refusing to 
accept the interviewer’s assertions that the figure 
was misleading. It didn’t matter if the audience 
doubted Johnson’s words – the subject of ‘our 
money’ going to Brussels when it could be better 
spent on the NHS, dominated the airwaves and 
remained in public consciousness.
But there is more to it than merely getting a 
message across. The strategic lie’s second function 
is to ensure that the subject matter of the lie 
stays at the top of the news agenda. And its third 
function is more generalised, it’s to sew confusion 
making audiences immune to messages from 
opponents that might cut through the misleading 
narrative – the post-truth environment incarnate.
The strategic lie first manifest itself in the 2019 
campaign with the release of the video doctored 
by the Conservative Press Office falsely  showing 
Labour’s Brexit spokesperson, Keir Starmer, 
apparently unable to answer a question about 
his Party’s stance on Brexit. The clip went viral 
on social media and then viral again when it was 
replayed for the purposes of rebuttal. The ruse had 
achieved its purpose. It was widely disseminated 
and, in the process, reinforced  the narrative that 
Labour’s Brexit policy was so confused that even 
their own Brexit lead appeared to not know what 
it was.
There were numerous other examples of this 
strategy in action – Mr. Johnson denying there 
would be any border checks between Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, despite the Treasury and his 
own Brexit Secretary saying there would be. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Sajid Javid claiming 
that Labour’s spending commitments amounted 
to an astronomical  £1.3 trillion - a gross exagger-
ation, made to sound seemingly credible by the 
figure £1.3 trillion rather than a more general £1 
trillion. The figure was demonstrably bogus but as 
the Chancellor toured the TV studios rebutting the 
rebuttals Labour’s claimed, over-spending stayed in 
the headlines. 
The media research literature demonstrates 
why strategic lying is such an effective tactic. 
First, because correcting inaccurate state-
ments, by either journalists or fact checkers, might 
persuade the uncommitted, but those sympathetic 
to the original message will reject the correction. 
Indeed it can actually increase the intensity of their 
belief in the original lie as a means of avoiding 
cognitive dissonance.
Second, for those sympathetic to, or neutral 
about, the original message, the memory of the 
correction fades rapidly but the memory of the 
original lie remains.
Third, because of the tried and tested power 
of repetition, if a lie is repeated often enough its 
content becomes easier to process and subse-
quently regarded as more truthful than any new 
statements rebutting it. 
So, in an age of ‘permission to lie’, it appears 
that the benefits of strategic lying far outweigh any 
costs which could well mean that soon enough all 
politicians will be doing it and the quality of our 
democracy will further decline.
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Fact-checkers’ attempts to check rhetorical 
slogans and misinformation
The Conservative Party’s decisive win has been 
widely attributed to simple, forceful rhetoric, 
online misinformation and dirty tricks that 
‘wrong-footed’ the mainstream media, although 
they were not the only party implicated. It was 
also an election where fact-checking was more 
prominently featured than in the past, albeit partly 
because its profile was raised by one of the dirty 
tricks. Fact-checking journalism originated in a 
desire to go beyond reporting claim and counter-
claim and examine how well-grounded politicians’ 
rhetoric was in evidence. However, both rhetoric 
and online misinformation present challenges to 
how fact-checkers have operated in the last 10-15 
years they have been with us.
Firstly, the practice has traditionally been 
focused on claims about policy pledges and the 
incumbent party’s record in government – and the 
three main fact-checkers have run over 50 checks 
between them on Conservative policy claims alone 
– but it can be difficult or contentious to identify 
the unstated factual claims behind a rhetorical 
slogan. In 2017, ‘Strong and Stable’ was largely (and 
fatefully) taken to be a personal credibility claim 
for Theresa May in contrast to Jeremy Corbyn, and 
therefore based primarily in subjective judgements. 
Having said that, connected claims about May’s 
record of successful negotiation were not checked, 
whilst claims about Corbyn’s popularity within his 
party, past voting record and personal associations 
were. The slogan that connects ‘Strong and Stable’ 
with ‘get Brexit done,’ however, is the contrast 
offered for both – a ‘coalition of chaos’, which 
perhaps resonated more after 30 months of a 
minority (and divided) Conservative government.  
Reality Check gamely had a go at fact-check-
ing ‘get Brexit done’, pointing out that Brexit 
wouldn’t be done and dusted on the day the UK 
exits the European Union, and that there will 
be years of negotiation and debate still to come. 
Although the article repeatedly says that Brexit 
won’t be done when the UK leaves, it takes the 
form of an explainer, with no ‘verdict’ section. 
However, it does indirectly address the implicit 
claim of the rhetorical slogan, which is the dubious 
assertion that the only thing making Brexit difficult 
and intractable is parliamentary deadlock.  
Although a distraction from policy substance, 
then, process – the horse-race, relative popularity, 
questions of who could win, and not only win but 
form an effective government – was a key part of 
the persuasive discourse, but the most contentious 
claims appeared not in the mainstream media but 
in targeted leaflets and Facebook adverts.  
The second challenge for fact-checkers is that 
they tend to focus on claims that politicians make 
in mainstream media appearances. Therefore 
fact-checkers do echo the news issue agenda, but 
they don’t follow it slavishly. As in 2017, attention 
to process claims in fact-checking was a fraction 
of that in the news media (about 8% compared to 
around a third) but there was a clear shift in focus 
from the accuracy of opinion polls to focus instead 
on parties’ dubious claims about tactical voting in 
campaign literature. 
In this though, the Conservatives were only 
picked up for a very minor miscalculation of 
required swing and for oversimplifying the effect 
of a vote switch, and it was the Liberal Democrats 
who were accused of the most egregious misuse of 
voter intention polls (by both Reality Check and 
Full Fact). However, it is not straightforward for 
fact-checkers to get access to these targeted and 
local materials, and they have to depend in part on 
the audience sending examples in or posting them 
to third party repositories.  
Fact-checkers also tried to address purposeful 
disinformation and more well-intentioned 
misinformation online, but they rarely detected the 
problematic material themselves. Full Fact was the 
only fact-checker to address material from social 
media in 2017, positively assessing a viral video. 
This time they were expecting to find deepfakes, 
but only found an obviously digitally manipulated 
video of Dianne Abbott superimposed with clown 
make-up, with sound removed and subtitles added 
to attribute different words (shared by a Facebook 
page dedicated to attacking ‘antifa’), but with 
obvious ‘satirical’ (or perhaps ‘shitposting’) intent 
rather than to deceive.  
It wasn’t just rogue partisans found circulat-
ing dubious material, of course – a misleadingly 
edited video of Jess Phillips that was circulated 
by the Conservative press office (@CCHQ) and 
main Twitter accounts “made it appear as if 
she said Labour couldn’t deliver the promises 
in its 2019 manifesto.” Full Fact clarified that it 
was on old clip of her talking about manifestos 
in general.  In this instance the fact-check 
forced a correction. However, corrections can 
be meaningless when the original posts have 
already been widely shared, and an unrepentant 
attitude can be detected in @CCHQ defiantly 
changing its Twitter name back to FactcheckUK 
to announce the Conservatives as the winner of 
the election, suggesting that negative verdicts 
and corrections are no longer feared or avoided.
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The election where British fourth estate 
journalism moved closer to extinction
Remarkably, many still labour under the impres-
sion that we have an independent, autonomous 
news media in Britain. Yet, following the 2019 
election, I think that assumption has no more 
validity here than it would in say Italy, Hungary 
or Poland. The Conservative-leaning press have 
always questioned Labour and favoured the Tory 
Party. Yet, as successive Loughborough election 
studies have shown, those differences have become 
ever more extreme since 2010.
Even so, 2019 reached levels I haven’t 
witnessed in some three decades of voting. Four 
previous years of culture wars aside, in this 
electoral period, the large majority of press outlets 
were relentless in their attacks on the Labour Party 
while minimising criticism of the Conservatives. 
This time round though, there were also serious 
failings in broadcasting, most concerningly in the 
BBC. Many were shocked at the multiple ‘mistakes’, 
dominant agendas and framing of the issues, 
leaders and parties by the Corporation’s leading 
reporters and editors. Others have already been 
documenting these failings in some detail. I agree 
with many of their analyses. The only question for 
me is how we best explain what happened. 
On the one hand, the classic political economy 
critique of British news media seems more in 
evidence than ever. A few billionaire media 
owners, with close Tory Party connections, saw 
their mutual interests threatened and joined forces 
as never before. The BBC, after years of intim-
idation, felt threatened by a ruthless, hard-line 
administration, and fell into line all too easily. 
Much of this makes sense yet we also need to look 
at other causal media factors. 
The one I want to focus on here is the 
long-term erosion of the dividing line between 
politics and journalism. Fundamental to our 
notions of ideal journalism in the UK and other 
‘Liberal’ media models of democracy is that there 
is such a line. It is a picture fleshed out in detail 
in Herbert Gans’ classic 1979 account of how 
reporters and their sources engage in a professional 
‘tug of war’. Both sides have to work with each 
other to achieve different goals and thus cooperate 
through gritted teeth. It is a perspective that has 
been applied to British journalism in multiple 
studies and professional biographies.
However, what was always downplayed in 
many of these accounts was the degree to which 
individual reporters and politicians were apt to 
work together; or the ways and means news media 
and political parties would converge around a 
mutually-beneficial set of agendas or objectives. 
Some of what happened in this election can also be 
seen as an extension of such trends, as highlighted 
in earlier media sociology studies.
For one, the revolving door between politics 
and journalism has spun ever faster with implica-
tions for both professions. The communications 
departments of political parties have become 
stuffed full of former print and broadcast 
journalists. So too, an increasing number of 
front-line politicians have had at least some prior 
professional experience in journalism or public 
relations. This time round, Boris Johnson and his 
key ally-frenemy Michael Gove, were first and 
foremost professional journalists who have become 
hybrid journalist-politician operators. Those 
cross-profession networks and know-hows have 
proved very useful to a Conservative Party weak on 
policy but strong on media management.
Second, studies of news sources have found 
two consistent things: journalists tend to gravitate 
towards powerful elite sources, usually favouring 
government politicians over their oppositions; and 
the more under-resourced a news organisation is, 
the more reliant reporters become on ‘information 
subsidies’ supplied by their regular sources. In 
recent years, the collapse of the business model 
of journalism has left correspondents far too 
dependent on political source (mis) information. 
The Conservative Party/Government has been able 
to take full advantage of an under-resourced UK 
media in their tactics, using their established lines 
to successfully influence media agendas and story 
frames on multiple occasions. 
Third, in the UK as elsewhere, both news 
reporting and politics have now converged around 
populist, personal and extreme content. In highly 
competitive times, both sides push for consum-
er-voter eyes whatever the reputational costs. For 
struggling newsmakers, competing with click-bait 
sites and distracted citizens, reproducing the 
extreme claims and lies of favoured politicians has 
thus become a win-win situation. For media-savvy 
political strategists, lies and fabrications, whether 
revealed or not, generate extensive online and 
off-line coverage. The Conservatives proved 
far more adept than Labour at exploiting these 
tendencies, both across legacy and social media. 
Ultimately, in these and other ways, the 
current interests of a predominantly right-leaning 
UK media and a right-wing political class have 
converged too much. The dividing line between 
sources and journalists, or parties and news 
organisations, has virtually disappeared. The 2019 
election starkly revealed what all of this implies 
for the future of British fourth estate journalism 
(spoiler alert, it’s terminal).
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Rethinking impartiality in an age of political 
disinformation 
Since 2010 political parties have stopped holding 
daily press conferences during election campaigns. 
Ahead of the last four elections, they have concen-
trated their efforts on carefully controlled events 
and rallies, along with more sophisticated online 
and social media campaigning.
This trend continued into the 2019 election 
campaign, but a more cynical approach to elec-
tioneering was evident, with parties pumping out 
disinformation to enhance their electoral prospects.
There were, of course, old-age disinformation 
techniques from all political parties, such as 
Liberal Democrat leaflets featuring highly mis-
leading opinion polls or exaggerated claims by the 
Labour party about the future costs of the NHS in 
a Tory post-Brexit US trade deal. 
But, above all, the Conservative party led the 
way in ruthlessly spreading disinformation, from 
repeatedly making dubious claims to avoiding 
scrutiny from particular news organisations, pro-
grammes and journalists. For example, a Full Fact 
study concluded that 88% of its Facebook adverts 
between 1 and 4 December were misleading. 
The Conservative party used the latest digital 
tools to mislead voters and undermine opponents. 
During the first televised leaders debate between 
Johnson and Corbyn, for example, the Conserva-
tives turned its Twitter profile into a fact-checking 
service, which undermined the impartiality of 
independent fact-checking sites. The party also 
bought websites – such as labourmanifesto.co.uk – 
which contained false information about Labour’s 
manifesto proposals. It forced Google to suspend 
eight websites set up by the Tories less than two 
weeks before election day.
While these new disinformation tactics have 
attracted some criticism, perhaps more significant 
was the party’s relentless use of misleading claims 
about their policy plans. On Brexit, for example, 
the likelihood of getting it done quickly was 
highly misleading since negotiations with the EU 
are likely to continue for years. Similarly, they 
promised to build 40 new hospitals when, in fact, 
funding was only available for six costing 2.7bn 
with £100 million for seed funding to explore 
building 34 more hospitals in the future. 
In the face of such brazen disinformation, how 
can broadcasters maintain their legal obligation to 
impartiality while also hold parties to account? 
The BBC, in particular, has been under 
sustained attack about its inability to stand 
up to the agenda-setting power of the Con-
servative Party. It has sought to feature Reality 
Check – its fact-checking service – more 
prominently in routine coverage. As I argued in 
the New Statesman during the campaign, while 
fact-checking is welcomed journalistic initiative, 
broadcasters – not just the BBC – need to be 
bolder and more strategically aware of how to 
effectively counter disinformation. 
Many journalists have attempted to challenge 
dubious claims, but found it difficult to do so 
in a sustained way. And yet, the democratic 
implications of not holding parties to account 
are profound. Focus group research during the 
campaign, for example, showed people were 
horrified when they learnt Brexit would not be 
achieved any time soon. Similarly, when voters 
heard Conservative candidates promising to build 
40 new hospitals, how many of them knew it was 
just six if only some outlets fact-checked the claim? 
This points to the limits of fact-checking news 
after it has been aired or published. When the 
BBC’s Reality Check corrected a Question Time 
audience claim that the Labour Party will increase 
income tax for people earning under £80,000 
per year the morning after the programme was 
broadcast – as it did during the campaign – the 
impact on the millions watching (and re-watching 
the clip later on social media) was almost impossi-
ble to counter.
So how can broadcasters effectively counter 
political disinformation? 
In my view, they need to be bolder in how 
they interpret impartiality. So, for example, rather 
than allowing politicians to freely repeat the phrase 
‘get Brexit done’, this could have been robustly 
countered on screen with a strap line. Rather than 
broadcast live interviews with leaders, they could 
have been pre-recorded and fact-checked during 
the programme. In live TV debates fact-checkers 
could have appeared in the programme in order to 
directly challenge claims.
There also needs to be greater sensitivity 
in fact-checking reporting because repeating 
claims may amplify disinformation. When the 
Conservatives’ claimed the Labour manifesto cost 
£1.2 trillion, for instance, fact-checkers contesting 
this figure may well have undermined Corbyn’s 
economic credibility by re-stating the eye-catching 
trillion pound figure. In other words, political 
parties could be making cynical assertations – 
alleging Labour spending will exceed a trillion 
pounds – knowing full well it will stick in voters’ 
minds more than the correction of it. 
No doubt broadcasters will face party 
political flak – notably the BBC – if they adopt a 
more adversarial fact-checking style in election 
reporting. But if they all signed up to it, this 
approach would soon become normalised in 
routine campaign coverage.
In my view, broadcasters need to be better 
prepared to combat party political disinforma-
tion if they want to more effectively serve their 
audiences. Over the next two years, Dr Maria 
Kyriakidou and I will be researching how political 
disinformation can be effectively countered as part 
of a new AHRC research grant.
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Fake news, emotions, and social media
When the dust settles, the 2019 General Election 
will likely be remembered as the first UK ‘fake 
news’ campaign. With the Conservatives investing 
particularly heavily in their digital campaign, the 
party engaged in a range of misinformation tactics. 
These included the doctoring of a video of Keir 
Starmer, the Shadow Brexit Secretary, to make him 
look “lost for words”, and the rebranding of the 
Conservative press office twitter account as UK 
FactCheck. The Liberal Democrats were criticised 
for distributing campaign materials resembling 
local newspapers, a strategy also used by local 
Conservative and Labour candidates.
In the era of social media, the extent to which 
misinformation gains traction depends largely 
on the emotional resonance of the narrative 
underpinning it. As Alfred Hermida put it in his 
book, Tell everyone,  “Emotions play a vital part in 
the social transmission of news and information. 
Interest, happiness, disgust, surprise, sadness, 
anger, fear and contempt affect how some stories 
catch on and travel far wider than others.” The fact 
that political behaviour is shaped by our emotional 
attachments is not a new phenomenon. What is 
new is our ability to widely share stories that feel 
true to us - what sociologist Arlie Hochschild has 
referred to as our “deep stories.” As numerous 
studies have found, the rise of social media has 
led to widespread sharing without verifying the 
accuracy of information. 
In the UK general election, the interplay 
between emotions, fake news and the “deep 
stories” about politics was perhaps most dra-
matically illustrated in the story of four-year old 
Jack on the floor in Leeds General Infirmary. On 
December 8, the Yorkshire Evening Post published 
a report detailing how Jack, under observation 
for pneumonia, “was forced to sleep on a cold 
hospital floor for more than four hours because of 
a shortage of beds.”  The story was accompanied 
by an image taken by his mother. It showed the 
four-year old, attached to a drip, lying on the floor 
on a red winter coat.  The story gained quickly 
gained traction across social media platforms, as 
Labour supporters urged voters to back the party 
to address the crisis in the NHS. 
Jack on the hospital floor swiftly became the 
Aylan Kurdi of the general election. By showing 
the plight of one individual, the image dramatised 
the larger “deep story” that resonated with so many 
voters: a story about how cuts to the NHS are en-
dangering the lives of ordinary people. While the 
Labour Party fought to place the NHS centre stage 
of the election debate throughout the campaign, 
the image of Jack did far more than any planned 
interventions to call attention to the health crisis. 
On December 9th, the story took another 
turn. In an interview with ITV’s Joe Pike, Boris 
Johnson repeatedly refused to look at the photo 
of Jack, ultimately pocketing the reporter’s phone. 
Subsequently, the Prime Minister was widely 
berated for his lack of compassion. Jeremy Corbyn 
suggested that the Prime Minister “just doesn’t 
care,” while Liberal Democrat Tim Farron raised 
concern about a “shocking lack of empathy.” The 
story of Jack came to fit into a deep story about the 
Prime Minister’s human failings, encapsulated in 
his inadequate emotional response to the tragedy 
of the sick boy on the hospital floor. 
Later that same day, however,  posts on Twitter 
and Facebook appeared, suggesting that the image 
of Jack was staged. The original post stated: ““Very 
interesting. A good friend of mine is a senior 
nursing sister at Leeds Hospital - the boy shown 
on the floor by the media was in fact put there by 
his mother who then took photos on her mobile 
phone and uploaded it to media outlets before he 
climbed back onto his trolley.” Identical messages 
were swiftly posted by hundreds of users, suggest-
ing an orchestrated misinformation campaign. 
However, the original source of the story came 
forward to say that her account had been hacked, 
while a hospital spokesperson confirmed that the 
incident had actually taken place. Nonetheless, the 
post was shared at least 200,000 times, including by 
high-profile journalists and politicians. 
In an investigation, the fact-checking organi-
sation FullFact found no evidence that the sharing 
was done by bots, suggesting instead that “what 
can appear to be bot-like behaviour is often carried 
out by real humans” – in this case, older and less 
social media literate users who simply wanted to 
share the news. If accurate, this indicates that Con-
servative supporters were keen to spread this story 
because it resonated with their deep story – the 
idea that the opposition might wilfully manipulate 
the news to influence the election.
More than anything, the controversy over Jack 
in Leeds General Infirmary dramatises the insta-
bility of truth claims in an emotionally charged 
social media ecology, and the continued vital role 
of conventional news media in their insistence on 
sticking to the facts. 
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Unleashing optimism in an age of anxiety
"Unleashing Britain’s potential” was a recurring 
message of the Conservative Party in the 2019 
General Election. Johnson’s use of this thumbs-up 
approach to electioneering represents a continu-
ation of his public image built up over the years, 
where his seemingly un-spun qualities as a fearless, 
positive, can-do politician have been key to his 
ability to connect with the public. In an age of 
precarity and social division, when so many feel 
bad, his recourse to the language of feeling good 
also reflects the close relationship between the 
performativity of celebrity politicians and the emo-
tionalisation of politics today, where the language 
of positive psychology is often deployed in the 
service of stretching the truth and denying reality. 
As Hannah Arendt argues, lies have always been 
part of the politician’s armory, and it is important 
to understand the affective dimensions of that 
process – especially in the current populist climate, 
where emotions such as ‘optimism’ or ‘positivity’ 
may be mobilised in an unthinking way to manage 
the tensions of complexity and relieve the pressure 
of having to make a thoughtful choice between say, 
leaving or remaining in Europe.   
The aggressive connotations of the term 
“unleash” is revealing in this context and it is 
worth noting that according to the British National 
Corpus, its use on the News on the Web (NOW) 
has increased from 897 in 2015 to 4071 in 2019.  
In its modern usage, it is often associated with the 
battle cry: “Unleash the dogs of war!”, which was 
a phrase used in relation to the aerial attacks of 
World War 2. However, its roots go back further to 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, when in Act 3, Scene 
1, following the murder of Caesar, Mark Anthony 
declares: “Cry ‘Havoc’ and let slip the Dogs of 
War!”. To unleash positive potential is therefore 
a sentiment that carries in its wake the drama of 
political betrayal, murder and revenge. The latter 
seems a far cry from the image of sunny optimism 
projected by Johnson in public appearances, where 
we see him grinning at the cameras with his arms 
outstretched and his thumbs turned upwards like 
a boyish Roman Emperor signalling for the games 
to begin. 
The message of unleashing optimism has 
a number of affective connotations which are 
symptomatic of the wider structures of feeling 
that operate in the current psycho-political 
landscape. During the election and in contrast to 
the apparently dour style of the Labour Leader, 
Jeremy Corbyn, Johnson’s up-beat performance 
seemed to tap into an unconscious register of 
desire associated with Freudian descriptions 
of the pleasure principle. The latter was also an 
important component of the carnivalesque Leave 
campaign, where fiscal concerns were swept aside 
as the leavers joyously stuck two fingers up to those 
in charge. The Conservative Party election focus 
on ‘unleashing Britain’s potential’ also signalled 
a similar attitude to that of the Leave campaign 
because of its inability to face the painful realities 
of both the present, and the past and the less than 
positive legacy of its own government with its 
policies of austerity. 
Much has been made of Johnson’s penchant 
for bending the truth in order to promote his 
version of events, and his capacity for disavowal 
and denial constitutes an extension of that 
deceptive practice. So what feelings are being 
denied and therefore managed by Johnson in 
his presentation of optimism and positivity? In 
an era of volatile emotional politics, Johnson 
manages to ward off any potential Nietzschean 
ressentiment of his position as a high-profile 
politician by representing himself as an un-im-
pinging figure that people can enjoy. As I and 
Lita Crociani-Windland argue in a forthcoming 
piece in Free Associations: “ressentiment, 
refers to a poisonous, but pleasurable form of 
resentment, that can be politically manipulated, 
amplified and given an object on which to 
discharge the unpleasant affect”. Johnson is 
skillful in mobilising this mode of affect to his 
own advantage by projecting it elsewhere. For 
example, he mocks the pomposity of those in 
the establishment and any notion of governance 
associated with his role as a senior politician is 
thus undercut and deflected onto what he sees 
as his dull and out of touch opponents, and the 
so-called “elite”, of which, of course, he is also a 
member. Those who oppose him and his party 
are labelled as traitors and former colleagues 
are purged. The scapegoating of women, EU 
nationals and ethnic minorities are part of this 
same affective process, whereby they and not 
he become the object of contempt and ridicule. 
Therefore, the so-called unleashing of optimism 
and of Britain’s new potential also lets slip a new 
form of dog whistle politics to great effect. 
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Boris’ missing women
Conservatives will undoubtedly be celebrating 
their victory. Yet, going forward, there is a group 
of voters they must make sure they do not forget – 
women, and particularly young women. Of course, 
we should always be cautious of rhetoric of the 
‘women’s vote’, not least because women are not 
a homogenous group. However, there are some 
differences in Johnson’s relationship with the male 
versus the female voter. Throughout the election 
campaign, polling showed that Johnson was less 
popular with women. In one YouGov poll there was 
a 10 percentage-point gap with 41% of men saying 
Boris Johnson was a good leader compared to 31% 
of women. There are several possible explanations.
Firstly, it could be further evidence of the 
beginning of a modern gender gap in the British 
electorate. Whereas women were historically 
more likely to support conservative parties, since 
the 1980s we have seen a reversal of this trend in 
many counties with the modern gender gap seeing 
women more supportive of left-wing parties than 
men. This trend begun to appear in the UK during 
the 2015 and 2017 elections. Anna Sanders and 
Rosalind Shorricks have shown how this gap was 
driven by younger women (under 35) who are 
more anti-austerity and thus less supportive of 
the Conservatives. YouGov polling suggest young 
women in particular dislike Johnson with 17% 
of women under 40 saying Johnson was a good 
leader compared to 30% of young men and 40% of 
women over 40.
These policy preferences could explain 
women’s lesser enthusiasm for Johnson. Compared 
to men, women are less supportive of spending 
cuts to public services, even among supporters of 
right-wing parties. Women also give priority to the 
NHS and healthcare. Johnson’s consistent message 
of ‘getting Brexit done’ at any cost may also have 
affected his favourability amongst women. Women 
are less likely to be hard Eurosceptic than men and 
are more concerned about the consequences of a 
‘No Deal’ exit. 
Further to this, the masculine imagery of 
Boris Johnson and his attitude to women should 
be considered. Since taking over the leadership 
there have been accusations of sexist language 
from Johnson. He called David Cameron ‘a girly 
swot’ and was reprimanded for sexist language 
in the House by Speaker John Bercow. Johnson’s 
bolshie masculine style in the election campaign 
included smashing through a wall on a JCB 
digger and being pictured in boxing gloves with 
‘get Brexit done’ imprinted on them. His overtly 
masculine style is similar to that of Nigel Farage, 
who is similarly unpopular amongst women. 
Amber Rudd, who said there was a ‘whiff of 
sexism’ around the willingness to back Johnson’s 
deal and not May’s pointed out how there are 
‘certain behaviours that particularly men in 
politics want to see, that women don’t do much, 
and that Boris did adopt’ which may have helped 
with Eurosceptic colleagues’ support. This kind 
of populist approach to politics seen on the right 
in Europe and US does tend to be more popular 
with men. 
To overcome his problem with women one 
of the first things Johnson could do is ensure 
his party catch up on female representation. The 
Labour Party now has more female MPs than 
men, as do the Liberal Democrats, the SNP have 
one-third women. The Conservatives still lag 
behind the other parties at 24% women. Whilst 
there is mixed evidence on whether women vote 
for women, having more female MPs has advan-
tages in symbolic and substantive representation 
and can result in more policies that benefit women. 
Addressing the female electorate’s concerns could 
cement Johnson’s electoral base in the future.  
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An expected surprise? An evaluation of polls 
and seat forecasts during the campaign
The election result came as a surprise to many 
people. Boris Johnson himself was reported to 
have been stunned by the scale of his majority 
as revealed by the 10pm exit poll, while John 
McDonnell  acknowledged that the same poll had 
come as a shock to him. The starkness of that 10 
o’clock prediction of 368 seats for the Conserv-
atives against a mere 191 for the Labour Party 
also caught the breath of members of the public, 
with The Telegraph posting a video capturing the 
“audible gasps” of onlookers in front on the big 
screen outside of BBC headquarters in London. 
This leaves us to ponder whether the election 
was well-predicted. Let’s begin by taking a closer 
look at the polls. We collected a total of 70 poll-
based vote projections, capturing what we believe 
to be all published, national-level polls reported 
during the campaign period. In order to evaluate 
these figures, we use a metric called Mean Absolute 
Error (MAE), which captures the extent to which 
polling figures deviated from the eventual result in 
terms of party vote shares.  
Overall, 2019’s polls produced an average 
MAE of 2.2%, representing a marked improvement 
on the equivalent 3.2% figure from 2017. Further-
more, the polls became noticeably more accurate 
as the election approached, in line with conven-
tional theory. If we look at the 20 polls released in 
the final week of the campaign, the average MAE 
lowers to just 1.4%. 
One of the most notable polling trends, 
discussed in detail by Fisher and Snow, was “the 
extent to which polls differ primarily between 
pollsters, with relatively little change over time for 
each pollster”. This runs contrary to previous UK 
elections where a phenomenon known as ‘herding’ 
saw pollsters reluctant to publish individual 
findings that deviated from aggregate patterns. In 
the final analysis, we can therefore see a significant 
divergence in accuracy from one polling company 
to another – with, for example, BMG more than 
twice as inaccurate (with an average MAE of 3%) 
as the top-performing major company: Ipsos 
MORI (with an average MAE of 1.4%). 
The strong performance of the pollsters 
provided a solid foundation for forecasters 
seeking to predict party seat shares. Because of 
the capricious nature of the UK’s electoral system, 
predicting seat distributions is not a straightfor-
ward enterprise. One common approach is to map 
between-party vote swings implied by a poll onto 
the previous constituency-level voting patterns 
(using the simplifying assumption that swing will 
be uniform across all seats). From this process, 
our 70 polls produced an average seat forecast 
of 350 for the Conservatives. The substantive 
political conclusion of a Conservative majority 
was replicated across 66 (or 94.3%) or our 70 polls. 
Applying the same procedure for 2017’s polls, only 
18.6% had suggested a hung parliament. 
This type of prediction was widely replicated 
across alternative methods – for instance Fisher, 
Kenny and Shorrocks noted that a combination of 
betting market forecasts and votes-to-seats models 
ranged between predictions of 343 to 351 seats for 
the Conservative Party. YouGov’s multilevel regres-
sion and post-stratification (MRP) model, which 
had been lauded for being ahead of the curve in 
predicting a hung parliament in 2017, forecast 
a slightly tighter outcome in its final iteration – 
landing on a Conservative seat prediction of 339. 
The most misleading major seat forecast came 
from members of the Political Studies Association, 
whose average prediction of 324 Conservative seats 
was well under most other forecasts and would 
have represented a radically different political 
outcome than the eventual result. 
As such, a substantial Conservative majority was 
a broadly well-predicted result. The polls were largely 
accurate (albeit with considerable deviation across 
polling companies) and an array of methods which 
set out to forecast seat shares also performed well, 
even if the eventual figure of 365 for the Conservative 
Party was slightly higher than most predictions. 
So, how do we explain the paradox of an 
expected surprise? To do so, we must consider the 
‘narrative’ element of how polls and forecasts are 
reported. Recent election shocks in the UK have 
led to greater caution in trumpeting results among 
experts, while a narrative of a close and/or tighten-
ing election in fact suited both main parties – with 
the Conservatives guarding against complacency 
and Labour seeking to maintain hope. Posts on 
social media showing large numbers of young 
people lined up at polling stations on election 
day fed into this pre-baked narrative. In the end, 
however, this was an election result that was in 
line with the reasonable expectations of those who 
followed the polls. 
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Figure 1: The average MAE of in-campaign polls during the 2017 and 2019 general elections.
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Unprecedented interest or more of the same? 
Turnout in the 2019 election
When Britain’s first winter election since February 
1974 (and its first December election since 1923) 
was called for 12 December 2019, there was some 
speculation that turnout would fall substantially. 
Would voters, already tired out by three general 
elections and one referendum in the space of four 
years, be willing to go to the polls on a cold, dark 
winter’s day  - potentially in bad weather – in the 
run-up to Christmas? 
On polling day itself, however, early reports 
seemed to belie those gloomy predictions. From 
quite early in the morning, stories began to 
circulate about unprecedented voter interest and 
of long queues forming outside polling stations. In 
some areas, pictures shared online showed these 
queues snaking round the block. Was the UK 
emerging out of a twenty-year period of relatively 
low electoral turnouts and heading back to 
participation rates more typical of the years from 
1945 to 1997? And, if this was happening, what 
might it mean for the election result?
In the event, however, expectations for 
either much lower or much higher than expected 
turnout proved misplaced. Far from heading 
sharply upwards, turnout, at 67.3%, was actually 
lower than in 2017 (when it reached 68.7%, the 
highest level recorded since 1997, though still well 
below the post-war average). This put an end to a 
4-election run of (slowly) rising participation from 
the post-war low point of the 2001 election. The 
long queues may have been more a result of the 
number of polling stations, and of votes’ desire to 
vote in daylight rather than in the dark and cold 
of a mid-winter night, than of any new-found 
engagement with politics. 
At the constituency level, too, the 2019 
turnout story was a case of same old same old! 
Turnout in Britain varied from a low of 49.3% in 
Kington up Hull East to a high of  80.3% in East 
Dunbartonshire (the closely-fought seat defended 
by Liberal Democrat leader Jo Swinson, and 
lost to the SNP by only 149 votes). The overall 
range in turnout was very similar to that seen 
two years previously (when it ranged from 53% 
in Glasgow North East to 79% in Twickenham). 
And few constituencies saw major change in 
turnout between 2017 and 2019, as illustrated in 
this histogram of the percentage point increase 
or decrease in turnout between 2017 and 2019. 
The thick vertical line shows where the two 
turnouts were identical. To the left of that line are 
constituencies where turnout fell, and to the right 
are seats where it rose: the height of the bars shows 
the number of constituencies at each step along 
the way. Turnout fell in most constituencies (there 
is more of the graph to the left of the ‘zero change’ 
line than to the right), but in most cases the change 
was modest – only a few percentage points either 
way. There are two dramatic outliers - but they are 
quickly explained. On the far left of the graph, with 
a decline in turnout of 21.1 percentage points, is 
Chorley, the constituency represented by Lindsay 
Hoyle, the newly elected Speaker of the Commons. 
To the right is Buckingham, where turnout jumped 
by 10 percentage points, and where the outgoing 
MP was John Bercow, the previous Speaker. As 
the Speaker’s constituency is, by tradition, not 
contested by the major parties, these dramatic 
shifts are easily accounted for – by the absence 
of most parties in Speaker Hoyle’s seat and the 
sudden increase in the number of candidates in the 
seat formerly held by Speaker Bercow. But those 
unusual cases aside, changes were modest.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a very (very) 
strong predictor of the turnout rate in a seat in 
2019 was the turnout there in 2017, as our second 
diagram illustrates. For those of a statistical turn of 
mind, the regression equation which describes the 
pattern in the diagram has an r2 of 0.83 (confirm-
ing that past turnout was a very major factor in 
understanding the rate in 2019), and the slope 
coefficient was 1.05 – in other words, the relative 
position of each constituency barely changed, and 
the slight drop in turnout was pretty similar across 
the two elections almost everywhere.
Expectations of either a particularly low 
turnout election or of a high-intensity, highly 
engaged contest were both confounded, therefore. 
Britain’s voters turned out in much the same pro-
portions in 2019 as in most recent elections – and 
turnout remains below the levels routinely seen 
before 2001. Whatever the other dramas produced 
by the 2019 campaign, aggregate turnout was not 
one of them.
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Cartographic perspectives of 2019 General Election
If the 2016 vote for Brexit is described as a political 
earthquake in the United Kingdom, then the 2019 
General Election is the equivalent to the tsunami 
that followed it and swept over some of the 
deepest Labour heartlands in England. Political 
commentators spoke of a demolishment of the 
Labour Party’s ‘red wall’ as the results came in 
(although the ‘wall’ that may have once stood had 
already started to crumble in previous elections). 
Approaching the outcome of the General Election 
from a visual perspective puts such metaphors into 
a visual representation.
This cartographic analysis provides an 
assessment of the impact of some key data of this 
election. The mapping techniques used in this 
analysis are deployed to create more compre-
hensive insights than conventional approaches 
usually provide. Apart from visualising the election 
statistics on a ‘normal’ geographic view that shows 
the country’s land area, two different variations of 
so-called cartograms are used. The second map 
type is a hexagonal cartogram where each hexagon 
shape represents one parliamentary constituency, 
therefore reflecting the seat distribution in the 
new parliament (for technical reasons, some 
minor changes in constituencies in recent years are 
reflected in split and merged hexagons). The third 
map type is a gridded population cartogram where 
each small area is shown proportional to its total 
population that lives there. While the electorate is 
a smaller fraction of the total population, this map 
gives a view of how the entire population in each 
area is represented through the respective political 
party that was elected there.
Although the two cartograms have a similar 
conceptual approach, their overall appearance and 
therefore their underlying message differs, not least 
because constituencies vary in size (by area and 
population) and therefore also in the number of 
people that they represent.
For the unfamiliar eye, cartograms are more 
difficult to read and interpret than the normal 
map. However, the normal map highly overrep-
resents the large rural areas and makes it difficult 
to understand the patterns in the most populated 
areas that have equal importance when it comes 
to understanding the political implications of an 
election outcome.
In this feature, all three map types are shown 
alongside each other for each variable mapped here. 
Shown is a selected range of key aspects that arise 
from the vote. This allows for a comparison of these 
through the different cartographic perspectives.
The maps showing the winning party in each 
constituency also include the changes that have 
occurred compared to the 2017 General Election. 
To account for the substantial changes in the last 
parliament with regards to members of parliament 
(MPs) changing their party affiliation (voluntarily 
or forced), the changes considered here reflect 
the most recent affiliation of an MP immediately 
before the election.
Although the political system in the UK is 
based on a first-past-the-post representation, a 
look at the second placed candidates that stood 
for election is relevant. Some of the constituencies 
were won with a very small majority. 30 constitu-
encies had a majority of under 1000 votes, another 
32 were won with less than 2000 votes difference, 
which demonstrates what differences such small 
margins can make for the overall outcome in a first 
past the post system.
When viewing the maps of winners and second 
placed parties alongside each other, it becomes 
clear from the patchwork of colours shown here 
that despite a Conservative landslide win the 
country remains very much split politically.
The Conservative vote has spread widely at this 
election, as can be seen in more detail in the vote 
share maps included here for the Conservatives and 
Labour. Nevertheless, former Labour strongholds 
are still not completely in Conservative hands and 
the cartograms relativise the ‘disappearance’ of the 
Labour vote slightly in its magnitude.
Lastly, what was portrayed as election fatigue 
amongst voters has affected parties to different 
degrees. In this third general election within 4½ 
years, overall turnout went down by 1.5 per cent 
to 63.7 per cent of registered voters. The spatial 
patterns of this are patchy and changes in turnout 
were perhaps not decisive, although it can be seen 
that in many seats won by the Liberal Democrats 
and the Scottish National Party turnout went up, 
while in many Conservative and Labour-won areas 
it was more likely to be down compared to the 
2017 election.
These maps tell manifold stories of the 2019 
election that are most likely to determine and 
shape the politics of the forthcoming years. How 
this matters geographically as indicated in this 
brief analysis is an important aspect in understand-
ing the political implications of the election and 
– to stay with analogies from nature – the political 
storms that many commentators expect to follow.
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The dispersion of the Remain vote between multiple 
competing parties created strong incentives for 
coordination in 2019. Three “Remain” parties (the 
Liberal Democrats, the Greens, and Plaid Cymru) 
were able to coordinate at the elite level, agreeing a 
joint candidate in 60 seats, but this coordination was 
limited in comparison to the Brexit Party’s decision 
to stand aside in Conservative held-seats. In order to 
fill this “coordination gap”, several websites offering 
tactical voting advice sprung up.
Who were they?
It is not possible to list all these tactical voting advice 
sites which were created, so I discuss four sites which 
were particularly important during the campaign:
• getvoting.org, a site backed by Best for Britain, 
a campaign group “committed to finding a 
democratic way to stop Brexit”, chaired by former 
Labour minister Mark Malloch Brown, and set 
up before the 2017 general election.
• remainunited.org, a group set up by Gina Miller, 
the main litigant in the UK Supreme Court case 
Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, and 
a former member of Best for Britain. Miller left 
Best for Britain shortly after the 2017 election, 
saying that the group had become more about 
stopping the Conservatives than stopping Brexit.
• peoples-vote.uk, a group with a strong degree 
of overlap with the 2016 Remain campaign, and 
which saw a significant staff mutiny during the 
course of the campaign.
• tactical.vote, “a project by the grassroots @
votetools collective”, and which distinguished itself 
by providing a meta-analysis of recommendations 
made by different tactical voting campaigns.
How did they work? 
Two sites (getvoting.org and remainunited.org) 
estimated current public opinion using multilevel 
regression and post-stratification (MRP), a technique 
for estimating opinion in small areas using large 
national samples. In most cases they recommended 
the non-Conservative candidate who was best placed 
according to this analysis. Because MRP relies on 
polling data, and because polling data can become out 
of date, these sites changed their recommendations 
over time. For example: the first Best for Britain 
recommendations were published on 3rd November, 
and were updated again on 28th November and 9th 
December.
tactical.vote made recommendations on the 
basis of 2017 election results. They recommended 
the best placed non-Conservative candidate, except 
where the Conservatives were a distant third place 
(in which case they make no recommendation), or 
where the seat is judged “unusual” (like the Speaker’s 
seat, or seats with independent candidates).
peoples-vote.uk made artisanal recommenda-
tions based on “talking to candidates… consulting 
leading pollsters, and analysing the results of local, 
European and national elections”.
How were they received?
The recommendations from Best for Britain were 
greeted with skepticism. This was motivated in 
part by the large number of recommendations 
to vote Liberal Democrat, concern over the 
freshness of the data, and some misunderstanding 
of how MRP works. As tactical voting advice 
sites multiplied over the course of the campaign, 
attention focused on constituencies where the sites 
offered differing recommendations, giving rise 
to articles with titles like “Can you trust tactical 
voting sites?”. This ignored the fact that most sites 
recommended the same party, and that most of 
the seats with differing recommendations were 
difficult to call by any measure. By the end of the 
campaign, most sites agreed on a large number 
of constituencies (see Table 1). Because Labour 
support grew over the course of the campaign 
whilst Liberal Democrat support shrunk, earlier 
differences between tactical.vote and MRP-based 
sites diminished.
getvoting.org and tactical.vote were more 
popular than remainunited.org or peoples-vote.
uk. Best for Britain claimed that their site had 3.8 
million unique visitors; the site’s Alexa page rank 
on the morning before the election (332,947) 
was beaten only by tactical.vote (231,484). These 
estimates very roughly match estimates from the 
British Election Studies team, who reported that 
6% of respondents (2.75 million people when 
expressed as a proportion of the adult population) 
listed tactical voting websites as a source of infor-
mation they use when considering how to vote.
What effects did they have?
The way in which Best for Britain based their 
recommendations on the result of an MRP model 
allows a neat test of their influence. If, for example, 
we were just to examine the swings towards the 
Liberal Democrat in seats where Best for Britain 
recommended the Liberal Democrats, we might 
over-estimate the site’s influence because the Liberal 
Democrats were always fated to do well in those 
seats, and the MRP model picked up on it. If, 
however, we compare seats in which Best for Britain 
just recommended the Liberal Democrats, because 
they were fractionally ahead their nearest Remain 
competitor in the MRP analysis, compared to seats 
where they were fractionally behind, then we can 
estimate the effect of the endorsement alone. This 
regression discontinuity design (see Fig. 1) shows 
that the effect of endorsements by Best for Britain 
was around four and a half percentage points. This 
is a huge effect – around two times the incumbency 
bonus, for example – but is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for incumbency and the presence of Plaid 
or Green candidates. Tactical voting advice seems to 
work and work well.
Tactical voting advice sites
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Figure 1: Lib Dem position relative to the best placed non-Lib Dem Remain party (horizontal axis) 
against the change in the Liberal Democrat vote. At thepoint where the Lib Dems are ahead of the 
next best-placed Remain party, there is a sudden jump in the change in the Lib Dem vote
Table 1: Rates of agreement between different tactical voting sites as percentages. Rates of 
agreement exclude "None" or "Any" recommendations.
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The 2019 General Election demonstrated once 
again that age rather than social class is the key 
cleavage dividing the electorate across contem-
porary Britain. The results also reaffirmed that 
the terms of this dominance of age over election 
outcomes are changing.  For instance, election 
turnouts since 1997 have been very generational 
affairs, albeit demonstrating significant intragen-
erational differences.  However, where previously 
these elections were characterised by the strong 
turnout of older citizens and a significant degree 
of abstention by the nation’s youth, more recent 
voting events suggest that youth could be attracted 
to the polls. In particular, 75 per cent of 16 and 17 
year olds voted at the Scottish 2014 Independence 
Referendum and 60 per cent of 18-24 year olds 
voted at the 2016 European Union Referendum. 
In our 2019 Open Access book, “Youthquake 
2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain”, 
we highlighted a huge surge in youth political 
engagement. First of all, there was a spike in youth 
turnout (amongst 18 to 24 year olds), rising to the 
highest level for a quarter of a century. Second, we 
identified a dramatic rise in support for Labour 
amongst young voters, founded on a growth in 
social liberal or ‘cosmopolitan’ values. 
However, the 2019 outcome must have 
appeared as a groundhog event for the large 
majority of young voters. As in 2017, many will 
have been left deeply disappointed that their votes, 
preferences and priorities will have counted for rel-
atively little in shaping the future course of British 
politics as the Conservative party steam-rolled 
through traditional Labour-voting constituencies. 
Against this trend, young people opted for 
Labour, increasingly so over the course of the 
campaign.  At the outset, YouGov’s October poll 
indicated that Labour was dominating the youth 
vote; but with 38%, this was significantly down 
on their 2017 final-day vote (62%).  However, this 
increased to 51% in their November 2019 poll and 
then to 55% in their December pre-election poll 
– a gap of 33% over the Conservatives. Elsewhere, 
Ipsos Mori’s final estimate indicated that Labour 
held a 26-point lead over the Conservatives 
among 18-34s.
Data from the Lord Ashcroft election day 
poll of those already voted offer a clear indication 
of this intergenerational divide with respect to 
party preferences.  As Figure 1 indicates, the final 
youth vote was overwhelmingly cast in support 
for a progressive politics. Thus, two thirds of those 
aged 18-24 voted for broadly left-ist, anti-austerity 
and cosmopolitan parties such as Labour (57%), 
Greens (5%) and the SNP (4%).  In addition, a 
further 12% voted for the pro-Remain LibDems. 
This resulted in a Labour lead over the Con-
servatives of 38 points – larger than the historic 
35-point gap recorded in 2017.  
As we explained in our book, the period effect 
of the 2017 youthquake rippled up the generations. 
In part, we can see this occurring in 2019 when we 
compare the political allegiances of 18–24s with 
those aged 25–34 and 35-44. Each of these two 
older age groups indicated considerable majority 
support for Labour, Greens and SNP. By way of 
contrast, support amongst older voters for Labour 
reached an all-time low – falling to only 18% 
amongst those aged 65-plus.
Finally, the party preferences of young 
people at #GE2019 reflect their issue priorities 
– including, but not limited to their profound 
concerns about the deepening climate crisis and 
social injustice. As Figure 2 reveals, there are 
intergenerational differences on several key issues 
– and some of these are considerable. For instance, 
after the NHS, the second most important issue 
identified by the 18-24s was climate change/
environment, with nearly three times as many 
young people prioritising this compared to the 
65-plus group (ranked at 8th place). Social justice 
concerns including poverty, inequality and 
homelessness were twice as important to 18-24s 
as for those aged 55 or over, and the cost of living 
was three times as important.  
Attitudes to Brexit and to immigration 
offered clear indicators of young people’s cosmo-
politan orientations. The 18-24s were significantly 
less concerned about the desire to “get Brexit 
done” (only 17%) than were those aged 65+ who 
prioritised it over all other issues (49%) except the 
NHS.  Furthermore, young people were far more 
relaxed about immigration (4%) than were the 
over-65s (18%).
Early evidence from the 2019 UK General 
Election offers a picture of a continued deepening 
of the intergenerational divide underpinning 
British politics. In particular, while the nation 
lurched to the right, many young people continued 
to be attracted to parties offering anti-austerity, 
environmental and cosmopolitan programmes. 
While they may feel that by voting left they have 
effectively been left-behind, their recent engage-
ment in the global climate protests suggests that 
many young people have an outlet to actualise 
their political interests.
Another election, another disappointment: Young 
people vote left and are left behind at GE2019 
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There has been relatively little discussion in the 
media about the Brexit Party. After all, they ended 
with a paltry 2.0% of the UK vote (5% in the seats 
they contested) and no MPs. UKIP performed 
even worse, with 22,817 votes (0.1%). Farage’s 
euroskeptic clothes, and thus rationale, were stolen 
by Boris Johnson. But did the Brexit Party have a 
greater impact on the results of the election than 
they gain credit for? The Conservative share of 
the UK vote under Johnson, after all, went up 
only 1.4% across the country, almost unchanged 
from May’s 2017 result; Johnson’s landslide victory 
therefore had less to do with his popularity or 
the strength of the Conservative campaign but 
a collapse in Labour’s vote. Given turnout was 
similar to 2017, where did this vote go?
Figure 1 illustrates how UKIP, and then 
the successor Brexit Party, both experienced 
roller-coaster rides in successive local, European 
and general elections. UKIP ran 378 candidates in 
the June 2017 general election - but won just half 
a million votes (1.8% of the total), with no seats. 
Despite this wipe-out, the major parties, especial-
ly the Conservatives, were rocked by the initial 
electoral success of the Brexit Party, which won 
the largest share of the UK national vote and seats 
in the May 2019 party-list European Parliamen-
tary elections, just four months after founding. 
Most strikingly, the party swept up almost half of 
the over-65s. The opinion polls registered around 
23% support for the Brexit party at their peak 
a few weeks later, in mid-June 2019, when they 
were tied or even a point or two ahead of the two 
major parties. 
As the Leave vote was squeezed and the 
standing of Brexit reduced, Nigel Farage decided 
to play the long game by competing strategically in 
the election only in opposition seats, asking Brexit 
candidates to stand down in Conservative-held 
seats. This served two goals: as a brand-new 
party, for expedient reasons, Brexit’s financial and 
organizational resources were over-stretched. 
Moreover, the stated aim of this strategy was to 
present a united front which avoided splitting the 
Leave vote.  This strategy had two consequences; 
the Brexit Party had opportunities to snatch Leave 
ballots in Labour-held seats, without simultaneous-
ly damaging the electoral prospects for incumbent 
Conservative MPs. At the same time, the Remain 
vote remained divided because Corbyn stubbornly 
ruled out any informal pact, despite discussions 
among the opposition parties, and various efforts 
to organize tactical voting. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
the Conservatives were flanked by the Brexit Party, 
but otherwise enjoyed ‘clear blue water’ to shovel 
up Leave votes on the socially-conservative and 
nationalist right. By contrast, the socially-liberal 
left parties were all clustered closely together, able 
to exchange votes with each other but thereby 
dividing the spoils and failing to gain seats.
The effects are remarkable. In seats with a 
Brexit candidate, the Labour vote fell on average by 
-8.6%, compared with -7.3% elsewhere. There was 
also a modest impact with the Brexit Party taking 
some support from the Tories: in seats with a 
Brexit Party candidate, the Conservative vote went 
up 1.7% compared with +2.5% elsewhere. But my 
estimates suggest that the share of the Brexit vote 
was large enough to allow the Conservatives to slip 
in the back door and make up to twenty seat gains 
in former Labour seats which changed hands, 
thereby doubling Johnson’s eventual parliamentary 
majority (see Figure 3).
Does the scale of their electoral support 
mean that we should write off the Brexit party as 
irrelevant to the outcome - or that Farage failed 
in his grand project? On the contrary, Farage’s 
strategic decision to compete in Labour seats, but 
not in Conservative seats, was arguably decisive 
for the eventual outcome. The failure of attempted 
negotiations to agree an informal ‘Remain Alliance’ 
among opposition parties, but the division of seats 
between the Brexit and Conservative parties on the 
Leave side, was one of the prime reasons why the 
Labour party saw a hemorrhage of votes among 
many of their Leave voters in their Northern 
industrial heartland seats. 
Divided we fall: was Nigel Farage the kingmaker 
of the Johnson victory?
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Plaid Cymru did not have a standout general 
election. The party managed to retain its four 
seats, but failed to make any gains and its vote 
share across Wales dropped below ten percent. 
Plaid Cymru did succeed in one sense though. 
It pushed independence further up the political 
agenda in Wales.
Plaid Cymru wants Wales to be an independ-
ent nation. There is nothing new about that. What 
did change in the run up to the 2019 election 
though was how the party engaged with this 
proposition. Whereas independence was merely a 
footnote in Plaid Cymru’s pitch to voters in 2015 
and 2017, largely side-lined and put on hold for 
the time being, it was much more prominent in 
2019. Plaid Cymru may not have built its campaign 
around independence to quite the same extent as 
the SNP did, but it was one of the party’s more 
salient proposals nonetheless. 
The general election of 2019 could start a 
movement towards “a new Welsh spirit of inde-
pendence” said Adam Price, leader of Plaid Cymru, 
when launching the party’s general election 
campaign. Their manifesto shortly followed suit, 
setting out proposals for significant constitutional 
change in Wales. Not only did it reiterate a desire 
for an independent Wales (in the European 
Union), but it also set a specific target of 2030 for 
achieving this objective and first concrete steps to 
facilitate the process in the shape of an Independ-
ence Commission. Chaired by former AM and 
Welsh Government minister Jocelyn Davies, it will 
“develop… policy to carve a clear pathway to… 
independence” and “draw up a written constitution 
for an independent Wales”. 
The discussion around independence has 
still a long way to go in Wales, especially when 
comparing it to the one in Scotland. There is very 
little detail about what an independent Wales 
would look like, beyond it being a member of 
the European Union, even in Plaid Cymru’s own 
proposals. We do not know what kind of political 
institutions the party recommends, what it wants 
the Welsh Constitution to say, or even how exactly 
it foresees the independence referendum to take 
place. These questions, alongside many others, 
were left unanswered by the party’s general 
election campaign. 
Plaid Cymru’s resurgent pitch for an 
independent Wales may lack practical detail, 
but we should not underestimate its importance 
in guiding the political agenda in Wales. Yes, 
independence still seems more like an ambition – 
just not quite as long term one as before – rather 
than an ‘oven-ready offer’, but there is now an 
emergence of a roadmap and a growing sense that 
this ambition might turn into a more tangible 
proposal from Plaid Cymru in the not too 
distant future. Coming at the backdrop of pro- 
independence marches and growing talk about 
indy-curiousity, the changing rhetoric of Plaid 
Cymru further raises the profile of the issue and 
pushes it up the political agenda. 
Is there widespread support for independence 
in Wales? The increased saliency of independence 
in Plaid Cymru’s manifesto certainly did not 
lead to a groundswell of support as its vote share 
dropped to 9.9%, down from 10.4% in 2017 and 
12.1% in 2015. Even if discounting seats where 
Plaid Cymru stood aside for Lib Dem and Green 
candidates, there is still no real evidence of Plaid 
Cymru surge in the popular vote. Recent opinion 
polls are more encouraging but, irrespective of 
how the questions on independence are asked, 
they still reveal only a minority support for 
independence. Even the most favourable recent 
poll – presenting a hypothetical situation where 
the rest of the UK leaves the European Union 
but Wales could remain a member if it became 
independent – saw only 33% saying yes to 
independence, with 48% saying no. Plaid Cymru’s 
resurgent pitch for an independent Wales is not, 
or at least not yet, an election winner. It does 
signal though that the party believes there to be 
a political opportunity, and necessity, to push the 
debate around independence further.
The Conservatives were the success story 
in Wales at this general election, winning back 
Brecon and Radnorshire from the Lib Dems and 
taking six seats from Labour. Whilst Plaid Cymru 
failed to make electoral gains, its campaign pitch 
for independence does reflect the growing saliency 
of the issue in Wales.
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Recent general elections in Scotland have turned 
on shifting configurations of the constitutional 
debate and national belonging. 2019 saw the 
tactical deployment of a variety of interpretations 
of constitutional dispute in Scotland, resulting in a 
battle of agendas. What emerged was a definitional 
contest that promises to reveal much on the extent 
of obligation between communicative salience with 
its implications for agenda and policy enactment. 
The context of this arises from two separate 
referenda. The first was the 2014 referendum on 
Scottish independence, which produced a majority 
to remain with the United Kingdom of 55/45 
and saw the unionist Conservatives, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats, combine resources against the 
independence-supporting Green Party, Scottish 
National Party and Scottish Socialists. The 
implications of this result have extended beyond 
the retention of the United Kingdom to influence 
subsequent party fortunes. In particular, this 
“Better Together” coalition brought some measure 
of reputational damage for Labour, whose nega-
tively framed association with the Conservatives 
lost them all but one of their parliamentary seats in 
2015; a result repeated in 2019. 
The second referendum was the 2016 Brexit 
vote, shared across the UK. The victory for the 
leave campaign had a UK-wide bearing on the 
election we see now, not least that the election 
was called amid claims of political impasse on the 
terms of departure. In regional terms, Scotland 
demurred from the UK norm on Brexit, and 
returned a 60/40 majority in favour of remaining 
with the EU. 
Since Brexit, the SNP have therefore been 
relentless in associating the vote with their claimed 
right for Scotland to determine its own political 
future. Further, they have cited prospect of departure 
from the EU as the ‘material change’ needed for 
a repeat of the independence vote. (A *third* 
significant referendum, for those keeping count.)
In 2017, this strategy yielded less for the 
SNP than they might have liked, and they 
returned fewer 21 MPs, albeit from the high-wa-
ter mark of 2015. However, in 2019 the SNP 
shifted the focus from independence as a virtue 
in its own right, to independence as a necessary 
mechanism to protect Scotland’s place within 
the EU. This representation of Brexit as contrary 
to the democratic will of the Scottish voters that 
can only be rectified by returning power from 
Westminster brought electoral success, winning 
80% of seats in Scotland. 
Contrarily, the Scottish Conservative, Labour 
and Liberal Democrat campaigns emphasised the 
prospect of yet another independence referendum, 
citing the SNP’s myopic nationalism and neglect 
of their wider governmental responsibilities in the 
devolved parliament. In the UK-wide delivery of 
a Conservative victory, 2019 will be remembered 
as a sobering example of the rewards of sustaining 
an agenda around a simple slogan – to “get Brexit 
done” – and the perils of Labour’s refusal to 
articulate an equally straightforward response. 
In the Scottish context, the Conservatives found 
less success in meeting the threat of the SNP 
by denying their focus on Brexit and framing 
Scotland as a separate battle against further moves 
towards independence. 
In separating issues around the devolved 
administration and election, the SNP were not 
assisted by the prominence of leader Nicola 
Sturgeon and her association with long-standing 
arguments for independence. Focussing on 
Sturgeon, much of the anti-independence party 
literature was expressed in highly personalised 
terms, such as the Conservative Party’s evocation 
of Trump’s campaign against Hillary Clinton in the 
repeated use of ‘Tell Her Again’. Sturgeon included, 
Scotland’s own hierarchy of political leaders 
participated in televised debates produced in 
Scotland by ITV and BBC. Driven by the Scottish 
leaders of Labour, the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats, the debates were dominated by 
the SNP’s medium-term goals of Scottish inde-
pendence in a manner that hardened the focus on 
the individual personality and agency of Sturgeon.
While set to be portrayed as a single issue 
election in the UK, Scotland was a site of struggle 
in the determination of what this issue should 
be, with discursive dominance giving the power 
to interpret the priorities of opposing parties. 
From the SNP, salience was given to the future 
of Scotland in the EU. For the unionist parties, 
emphasis rested on the future protection of the 
union, opening space for criticism of the SNP’s 
domestic record in their devolved administration. 
In winning a UK landslide, the Conservatives are 
therefore accountable to deliver on a campaign 
centred on preventing a further referendum and 
protecting the union. In partial contrast, the SNP’s 
victory in Scotland alone provides them with them 
a rhetorical mandate rather than instrumental 
strength in averting an EU exit, which can only be 
delivered by a return of focus to independence. It 
was, and promises to be, all about the constitution.
“It’s the constitution, eejit”: Scotland and the 
agenda wars
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Gender takes to the shade in Scotland
Mirroring the contest throughout the UK, the 
campaign in Scotland was a decidedly flat affair 
in terms of women’s participation, sitting in stark 
contrast to the invigorating civic and grassroots 
activism which accompanied the Scottish 
independence referendum and the 2015 and 
2017 General Elections. As commentator Kirsty 
Strickland suggested, this time there was a “focus 
on bros … an election of the men, by the men”. 
Even the record number of 220 women elected as 
MPs across the UK – up from 208 in 2017 – didn’t 
gather the celebration it may have warranted, 
representing just 34% of MPs overall. In Scotland, 
the figures were down. With only 18 female MPs 
elected, it decreased their ratio from 34% in 2017 
to 31%. Engender, Scotland’s feminist organisation, 
argued that there were hardly any proposals from 
any party focusing on a vision of the future for 
women in this year’s so-called “Brexit election”. 
This was particularly concerning, it said, “given 
that EU-membership has been instrumental in 
progressing women’s equality in the UK, driving 
the expansion of gender mainstreaming into UK 
and Scottish policy”. Indeed, the feeling was that 
gender was very much off the agenda in Scotland 
as the dividing lines were split across the intersec-
tion of Brexit and independence.
That was, of course, until the latter period of 
the campaign when it became a tale of two women, 
albeit in different governmental realms. From “the 
most dangerous woman in Britain” to “the bravest 
woman in politics” (according to Willie Rennie), 
the election experiences of Nicola Sturgeon and 
Jo Swinson couldn’t be more different. Though 
not standing as a candidate, Sturgeon was at the 
forefront of electoral coverage, while Swinson 
faced scrutiny in her short-lived role as Liberal 
Democrat leader. Ultimately losing her East 
Dunbartonshire seat to the SNP’s Amy Callaghan, 
discussions focused on her race to the bottom. 
While many argued her stance on unequivocally 
revoking article 50 was her downfall, anecdotally, 
some East Dunbartonshire constituents felt 
neglected as she focussed much of her campaign 
on England. Unavoidable though, was the role 
everyday sexism had to play in her representation. 
Though Swinson’s “girly swot” t-shirt worn during 
a photocall was a take on Boris Johnson’s slur on 
David Cameron, it acted as unfortunate echoing 
of some of the pejorative framing of her as “shrill” 
and a “head girl”, hearkening towards the stere-
otypes attached to young women who over-step 
their mark in the masculine realm of political 
leadership. This played out in the infantilising 
coverage following the election, with Bill Leckie 
of the Scottish Sun saying that “poor wee Jo” had 
“flown too close to the sun”. If that wasn’t enough, 
the author claimed, with the “feather duster [she 
brought to the] knife-fight” she could now use it to 
keep her house tidy, due to her unemployment. 
Scotland has previously attracted praise 
for the progressive ‘female face’ of leadership 
in recent years, however this has also drasti-
cally shifted in this election. Ruth Davidson, 
leader of the Scottish Conservatives, stepped 
down months prior, following Kezia Dugdale’s 
departure as Scottish Labour leader two years 
ago. Davidson’s interim replacement of Jackson 
Carlaw meant there was only one woman, Nicola 
Sturgeon, in the leadership line-up of the four 
main parties. Her resignation, Davidson said, 
came in part over her conflict about Brexit, 
but also because of the recent birth of her son, 
fuelling a revival of longstanding patriarchal 
discourses about the incompatibility of politics 
and motherhood.  Sturgeon, therefore, was the 
only female leader in the STV and BBC Scotland 
Leaders’ Debates, alongside Carlaw, Scottish 
Labour’s Richard Leonard and Willie Rennie, 
leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats. 
Scholarship suggests that women in leadership 
positions can generate relatively high media 
capital due to often embodying the news value of 
“unexpectedness”. Female leaders can therefore 
give an impression of parity in both institutional 
and mediated representation when the overall 
figures reveal otherwise. Arguably, Sturgeon’s 
high profile means there may be a sense of 
better female representation in Scotland than 
there really is: a gendered implication of the 
UK’s increasingly presidential-style politics over 
recent election cycles. 
Figures show that the gap is narrowing 
between the UK and Scottish Parliaments, with the 
current 34% in Westminster challenging the 36% 
in Holyrood. As Kenny, MacKay and Murtagh have 
pointed out, when gender parity is taken off the 
agenda, the progress to equality of representation 
often does stagnate. As has been the perennial 
argument of feminist researchers across Scotland, 
the proportion of elected female MSPs has never 
surpassed the high point of women’s representation 
in the Scottish Parliament at 39.5% in 2003. It 
remains to be seen whether Scotland will continue 
its upwards trajectory in its own 2021 election – 
with the UK nipping at its heels – or stay around 
the same figure.  Whatever the numbers show, 
though, we still have a long way to go. 
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Northern Ireland’s election contained plenty of 
drama, with four of the 18 seats changing hands 
but the impact of the Conservatives’ substantial 
majority will be to marginalise its MPs. The DUP 
had a tough defence to mount, having won ten 
seats in 2017. Amid a 6% fall in vote share, which 
dropped in all bar one constituency, the party was 
reduced to 8 MPs and came close to losing all 3 of 
the seats it held in Belfast. Sinn Fein’s return of 7 
MPs matched its 2017 tally and the party took a 
notable scalp in capturing the North Belfast seat 
of the DUP’s Westminster leader, Nigel Dodds. 
However, Sinn Fein’s vote share fell overall by 7% 
and was down everywhere except North Belfast. 
The nationalist SDLP regained the Westminster 
representation it lost in 2017, its leader Colum 
Eastwood thrashing Sinn Fein to retake Foyle, one 
of two SDLP gains.
The most striking feature of the results was the 
rise of the centrist Alliance Party, which repudiates 
unionism and nationalism. Whilst only capturing 
one Westminster seat, the party’s vote share soared 
by nearly 9%, to add to the 11% European election 
increase and 5% in council elections in 2019. 
Alliance increased its vote share in every constit-
uency bar one. With successive surveys of public 
opinion showing that those rejecting unionist or 
nationalist labels outnumber those who do identify 
as such, Alliance has a large and growing electoral 
reservoir in which to fish.
Given its potentially profound implications 
for Northern Ireland, Brexit dominated the 
election, although older Orange versus Green 
sectarian issues were never far away, even amid 
the rise of centrist voters. The key outcomes 
were the marginalisation of the region’s repre-
sentatives and the increased hopes of a revival 
of the devolved power sharing which collapsed 
almost three years earlier.
Electoral pacts: Brexit-based or sectarian?
The DUP’s confidence-and-supply deal with the 
Conservative government from 2017 to 2019 was 
successful in attracting a large amount of extra 
funding. However, the DUP was then cast aside by 
Prime Minister Johnson, who reached a Brexit deal 
which aligned Northern Ireland much more closely 
to the EU than the rest of the UK. Johnson had 
promised the DUP the exact opposite at their party 
conference one year earlier.
Much derision was aimed at the DUP for its 
failed Brexit strategy and the 2019 election was 
marked by ‘Remain pacts’, as the SDLP stood 
aside for Sinn Fein in North Belfast and Sinn Fein 
reciprocated in South Belfast. The arrangement 
allowed Sinn Fein to unseat the DUP’s Dodds, 
whilst the SDLP gained South Belfast from the 
DUP, although such was Claire Hanna’s winning 
margin that it is doubtful a pact was needed. 
The DUP complained these so-called Remain 
pacts were merely ‘pan-nationalists’ fronts, a 
charge containing some truth but the DUP was 
equally content to see pan-unionist fronts on its 
side. The UUP stood aside to try and help the DUP 
in North Belfast and the DUP did likewise for the 
UUP in a similarly unsuccessful pact in Fermanagh 
and South Tyrone. Unionism versus nationalism 
overlay the Remain versus Leave battles, not least 
because the Unionist parties were even more 
opposed to Boris Johnson’s form of Brexit than 
those parties which had always supported Remain. 
Marginalisation at Westminster – so a return to a 
devolved Assembly?
Given the size of the Conservative majority, there 
was little prospect of Northern Ireland’s MPs being 
able to achieve much at Westminster. With the 
DUP’s once-pivotal role gone, the possibility of a 
return of devolution loomed large. Whilst Sinn 
Fein’s moderate election performance also raised 
the issue of whether its policy of abstention from 
Westminster should be revisited, all Northern Irish 
MPs, participatory or abstentionist, would struggle 
for influence in London. Even if it could be proved 
beyond doubt that abstention was harming Sinn 
Fein’s electoral fortunes, the party leadership 
would be wary of touching the issue. A two-thirds 
majority of members would be needed for change 
and risks a split. 
The underwhelming performance of the 
DUP and Sinn Fein may have indicated that the 
electorate was tiring of their failure to restore 
devolved power-sharing and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly is the focus of renewed attention. If 
locally elected politicians want power, they will 
need to restore Stormont. The DUP might take 
the view that conceding Sinn Fein’s demands for 
an Irish Language Act is the bitter pill that needs 
swallowing to avoid the grim vista of power 
being confined to local councils for at least half a 
generation. If agreement cannot be found, another 
set of elections is probable. If there it still no 
agreement, direct rule may be reintroduced, but 
this now seems improbable.
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‘Remain alliance’ win the BBC Northern Ireland 
Leaders’ debate (online at least)
In June 2017, Northern Ireland Twitter’s interest 
in the BBCNI leaders’ debate peaked when 
DUP representative Jeffrey Donaldson held 
up a  photograph of Sinn Fein's Máirtín Ó 
Muilleoir meeting Ulster Defence Association 
leader Jackie McDonald. Clearly intended to 
deflect criticism that DUP candidates had been 
endorsed by loyalist paramilitaries, the incident 
garnered more attention from tweeters than the 
more pressing issues of Brexit and the collapse of 
the Stormont Executive in January 2017. There 
was much ridicule of Donaldson’s behaviour, 
in marked contrast to the praise for the SDLP’s 
Colum Eastwood and Alliance’s Naomi Long. 
Nevertheless, illustrating the limitations of using 
social media as a direct proxy for public opinion, 
the DUP went on to consolidate its position 
as the largest party in the region in the 2017 
Westminster Election.   
Fast-forward to December 2019, there appears 
little prospect of an agreement being reached to 
bring back the Assembly. Fears about the damage 
that a hard Brexit might inflict upon the region 
spurred parties such as the Greens, SDLP and 
Sinn Fein to create their own ‘Remain Alliance’, 
standing aside for each other in constituencies 
such as North Belfast and South Belfast in order 
to maximise the number of pro-Remain MPs. 
All were  critical of the DUP’s confidence and 
supply agreement with the outgoing Conservative 
government, as well as their support for Brexit. I 
set out to examine whether these issues were given 
greater prominence during the 2019 debate held 
on 10 December, which saw Eastwood, Long and 
Donaldson (again deputising for Arlene Foster) 
joined by Sinn Fein’s Michelle Foster and the 
recently appointed Ulster Unionist leader Steve 
Aiken. TAGS was used to collect 1875 tweets 
posted between 9-11 December tagged #bbcnide-
bate. As per the 2017 debate, the vast majority were 
retweets (70.13 percent) with only 42 @replies 
between tweeters (2.24 percent). However, this 
time Northern Ireland Twitter appeared to focus 
more on how each representative addressed the key 
issues of Brexit and the need to get the power-shar-
ing institutions up and running again. 
A preliminary analysis of the top 10 most 
retweeted posts (shared 410 times) revealed that 
all of them focussed on Brexit with many blaming 
the DUP for the crisis. Three of these were posted 
from O’Neill’s personal Twitter account, containing 
short video soundbites from her contributions to 
the debate reiterating her party’s desire to restore 
the Executive and for Irish unity. For example, 
the most retweeted tweet in the corpus (shared 70 
times) saw her chide Donaldson that Westminster 
had never served Ireland’s interests and encourage 
voters to “reject the toxic politics of Brexit- 
embrace the politics of hope, progress and unity”. 
However, O’Neill was not immune from criticism 
on the hashtag, as demonstrated by a tweet from 
Irish News journalist Suzanne Breen noting that 
she had become “embarrassingly unstuck” arguing 
that Sinn Fein’s abstentionism from Westminster 
had made no difference on Brexit. The party 
was also attacked by the SDLP for “claiming £5 
million pounds in expenses over 9 years” while 
maintaining this policy, with a video of MLA John 
O’Dowd shared to illustrate their opposition to 
Northern Ireland receiving special status in any 
Brexit agreement. Elsewhere, the Alliance Party 
were responsible for three of the most shared 
tweets; these included Long’s criticism of the crises 
in the NHS and schools and blaming the DUP 
for the potential border in the Irish Sea caused by 
Brexit. Overall, there was a conspicuous absence 
of support for the DUP amongst the tweets most 
heavily retweeted during the debate.
There are of course a number of health 
warnings that come with these preliminary 
findings. First and foremost, popularity on social 
media does not automatically translate into votes. 
Northern Ireland Twitter constitutes a small but 
highly engaged segment of the total population 
rather than its mirror image. Second, the use of 
party accounts to share edited clips of the leaders’ 
debate illustrates the increasing sophistication 
of their digital campaigns. There is already 
some evidence that parties such as Sinn Fein are 
mobilising supporters on sites such as Twitter to 
drown out critical voices and promote campaign 
messages. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume 
that many of those sharing those ‘dual screening’ 
the debate were already members or supporters 
of these parties, not undecided voters. While 
this might have been the most ‘digital’ election 
campaign in the region to date, issues such as 
Brexit and the NHS crisis were more likely to have 
influenced the voting behaviour of Northern Irish 
citizens during the 2019 Westminster Election.
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After nearly four years of Parliamentary deadlock 
and social polarisation where the other is not just 
wrong, but evil, the British have finally made up 
their mind. We’re going.
Like 2017 and the 2019 European elections, 
this was another Brexit election. There were other 
major issues – lack of trust, Britain’s decay, the 
climate, politicians’ incompetence – but Brexit 
was a key, if not the key, issue. This was reflected 
in leaders’ priorities. Boris Johnson’s simplistic but 
catchy mantra of “get Brexit done”, Nigel Farage 
pushing for immediate exit on WTO rules, Jo 
Swinson’s aim of scrapping Brexit entirely, Nicola 
Sturgeon awkwardly balancing Scotland’s mem-
bership of two Unions. Love them or loathe them, 
all of the leaders had clear Brexit positions. Except 
Jeremy Corbyn. After four years of vagueness, 
promising to magically negotiate a perfect new 
deal then hold another referendum whose side he 
couldn’t choose, and plagued by domestic issues, 
Corbyn’s lack of clarity on the biggest peacetime 
political crisis the British have faced since the 
possibility of revolution in 1832, led his party to its 
worst defeat since 1935.
Brexit is nearly over. At least the British civil 
war – the Brexit trade negotiations will dog the UK 
and EU for years to come. As another Brexit-dom-
inated election and a confirmatory referendum in 
all but name, what the 2019 election demonstrated 
is how “Europe” has many different meanings in 
British consciousness. Jacques Delors memorably 
defined Europe as an ‘unidentified political object’. 
Now, for the British, this malleability has multiplied. 
“Europe” is something old. The Liberal 
Democrats sought to maintain the status quo of 
1973, and cancel Brexit. This backfired as it clearly 
did not appeal, even to the millions of Remainers 
the LibDems wanted to rally. Jo Swinson losing 
her own seat reflects concerns about how liberal or 
democratic the Liberal Democrats’ proposal was. 
In the coming years this remembrance of the EU 
will grow, with “Europe” in Rejoiner imaginations 
meaning specifically – and only – the EU.
“Europe” is something new. The Brexit Party 
planned to immediately exit the EU and enter the 
unknown on WTO rules. This would have been a 
novel, and very risky, leap in the dark. But like the 
Liberal Democrats, the Brexit Party completely 
failed. Neither Remain nor Hard Leave appealed 
to the British public. For backers of a Hard Brexit, 
“Europe” has morphed into a new enemy, an 
eternal foe which must be kept at arm’s for years 
to come.
“Europe” is something borrowed. The 
Conservatives’ “Oven-Ready Brexit” is not an a 
la carte option but a dried-out, reheated version 
of Theresa May’s deal, a borrowed option but one 
which the public chose for want of anything better. 
For the winners of 2019, “Europe” is an inherited 
imagination which has barely changed since 
1973 – something to work with, but something the 
British do not wish to really be part of. 
“Europe” is something. Labour’s refusal or 
inability to take a side meant that their position 
was vague, implausible, and frustrating to both 
sides. In a country where Remainers and Leavers 
were united only by how sick of Brexit they were, 
an empty promise of magical deals, more delay, 
and somehow achieving in three months what May 
spent three years struggling with, was crushed. In 
the years to come Labour, whose current leader-
ship have long hated the EU, will have to decide 
what relationship it wants with Europe. Whatever 
“Europe” means to an unstable alliance of very 
pro-EU Blairites and very anti-EU Marxists.
With a huge Conservative majority, Britain 
will now exit the EU. But the future relationship 
with the EU is yet to be built, and imaginations 
of “Europe” will continue to evolve in British 
discourse. Some Remainers will become Rejoiners. 
The radical left will resurrect its old 2016 slogan 
of “Love Europe, Hate the EU”. British culture will 
remember membership of, or withdrawal from, 
Europe, with nostalgia and regret, celebration and 
vindication. Ethnic transnationalists will promote 
“Europe” as a civilisation under threat, including 
from the EU. And new Europes will come. IN 
the four years dominated by Brexit we have seen 
multiple imaginations of “Europe” emerge, so it is 
reasonable to predict that even more imaginations 
of “Europe” will emerge in 2020 and beyond, 
which we can’t yet conceive but which will have a 
significant role in shaping campaigns to rejoin, or 
refuse, the EU twenty or thirty years from now. Yet 
even if the EU still exists by then, it will be a very 
different EU. Perhaps the most profound conse-
quence of the 2019 UK election is that Britain’s 
withdrawal will be a defining aspect of what helps 
to strengthen, or terminally weaken, an EU which 
cannot delay change any more than the UK.
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‘Weak and wobbly’ to ‘get Brexit done’: 2019 
and Conservative campaigns
The scale of the largely unexpected 2019 Con-
servative ‘landslide’, begs the question: what did 
the Conservatives do in 2019 that they did not 
do during the 2017 General Election? This short 
analysis aims to address this by comparing aspects 
of the Conservative Party’s campaign approaches 
in the 2019 with earlier general elections. My 
analysis of the 2017 Conservative campaign is used 
as the basis for comparing key campaign factors, 
including leadership; slogans and branding; 
strategy; and digital campaigning.
Leadership: In 2019, Johnson exhibited brutally 
uncompromising leadership in standing firm on 
removing the Conservative whip from several Tory 
grandees who had rebelled against the government 
over Brexit. This demonstration of unflinching 
power established a standard for party discipline 
that ultimately fed into a display of party unity in 
the Conservatives’ 2019 campaign. 
Theresa May, who was largely untested in 
highly visible national campaigns, began the 2017 
election campaign being portrayed as a similarly 
strong presidential figure. However, mid-cam-
paign, following a number of significant campaign 
blunders and policy u-turns, the party strategy 
shifted away from a focus on May as leader to 
emphasising the strengths of the Conservative 
Party more generally.
This shift away from the presidential model 
of campaigning was less observable in 2019. Boris 
Johnson, while not being completely immune 
from occasional campaign setbacks (e.g. criticism 
over the state of the NHS and his response to the 
London Bridge attack) remained unequivocally 
front and centre in the Tories’ national campaign. 
Brand ‘Boris’ became the central presidential focus, 
akin to the party’s strategies that centred on brand 
Cameron in 2010 and 2015. 
 
Slogans and branding: The focus on Theresa May’s 
leadership early in the 2017 campaign was largely 
aimed at branding her as a second ‘Iron Lady’, a 
Thatcher-like, figure, through incessantly repeating 
the slogan ‘Strong and Stable Leadership’. However, 
public discourse soon flipped the slogan on its 
head to frame May’s seemingly shaky campaign as 
‘weak and wobbly’.
In contrast, the Conservatives’ ‘get Brexit done’ 
slogan of 2019, in the context of the largely single 
issue ‘Brexit election’, is, quite possibly, the smartest 
campaign move the Conservatives have ever taken. 
Like Donald Trump’s 2016 'Make America Great 
Again', the phrase resonated significantly with 
frustrated voters in the Brexit context and soon 
became a common lexicon frequently appearing in 
media, political and public discourses. The Con-
servatives integrated the slogan with the gimmicky 
‘memeification’ of political broadcasts, including 
a ‘Love Actually’ parody, starring Johnson as the 
Hugh Grant character; and a TV stunt using a ‘get 
Brexit done’ JCB.
Strategy: In 2017, Theresa May took a narrow 
inner-circle approach to using close advisers for the 
development and implementation of the Conserva-
tive campaign strategy. However, May’s choices came 
under significant internal criticism and the strategy 
was judged to be out of touch with the electorate.
The Conservatives’ 2019 strategy has been 
widely attributed to Vote Leave’s former campaign 
director Dominic Cummings and Isaac Levido, 
a digital strategist connected with the Australian 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s campaigns. 
The Conservatives’ digital strategy was 
reported on Channel 4 News, 4 December 2019, 
and in the Sunday Telegraph, 15 December 2019, 
to have used negative scare campaign techniques, 
in the form of Facebook and Instagram attack-ads 
targeted at specific groups of voters in target seats 
and pro-Leave areas. The ads are reported to have 
warned of the supposed impact of Labour’s policies 
on the cost of living and potential tax hikes. The 
Tories are also reported to have invested tens of 
thousands of pounds in targeted online videos, 
especially in the latter stages of the campaign.
This investment in an integrated, coordinated 
and targeted online strategy seems to have taken 
a significantly more sophisticated approach when 
compared to 2017.
Digital campaigning: Ridge-Newman (2014) 
suggests that Johnson’s 2008 Mayoral campaign 
was one of the early examples of Facebook inno-
vation; and digital campaigning grew significantly 
and organically at the grassroots of the Conserva-
tive Party during the leadership of David Cameron. 
However, under Theresa May, the party struggled 
to compete with the extent of Momentum’s 
collective digital engagement, which gave energy to 
Jeremy Corbyn’s 2017 Labour Party campaign.
Where digital innovation took a nosedive 
under May, early in the long-campaign Johnson 
reignited the Tories’ approach to digital politics in 
circumventing classic media by using Facebook to 
announce government policy. The Conservatives 
also successfully integrated their digital strategy with 
offline activities and competed more equally with 
Momentum on Twitter. The Tory Twitter strategy 
was bold and aggressive, but, at times, highly 
criticised, especially when a CCHQ Twitter handle 
was amended to appear as a fact-checking service. 
As per 2017, Labour demonstrated significant 
online mobilisation through extensive and coor-
dinated grassroots activity on Twitter. It led many 
journalists and commentators to mistakenly link 
Twitter trends to the wider public mood, which 
could be one of the key factors contributing to the 
collective surprise at the extent of the Conserva-
tives’ 2019 election win.
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Conservative victories in Labour heartlands in 
the 2019 General Election
This short article offers some initial thoughts on 
the impact of the Conservative election campaign 
in terms of the party’s performance in traditional 
Labour strongholds in the 2019 General Election. 
There are a significant number of constit-
uencies where Labour have been the dominant 
political party for many, many years.  Media 
commentary have claimed that these constitu-
encies represent a so called ‘red wall’ spreading 
from Wales, through the Midlands, and up into 
the North of England. However some of these 
constituencies were heavily Leave supporting areas 
in the EU referendum, and this presented a clear 
problem for the Labour Party who were trying 
to keep balanced between a pro-remain party 
membership,  set against many Labour loyal voters 
who chose to leave in the EU referendum. Many 
loyal Labour voters in Brexit supporting areas have 
become disillusioned by what they perceive as 
Labour not fulfilling their wishes to leave the EU, 
and see Labour in the last parliamentary session 
as preventing the Conservative Government and 
country from leaving the EU. It is sometimes 
argued that Labour which claims to represent the 
needs of the working class, are disregarding the 
views of working class Brexit supporting Labour 
voters, despite them voting for the Labour Party 
often over many generations. They are in other 
words, Labour strongholds, but have these Labour 
strongholds been taken for granted?
It seemed logical that strong Brexit voting 
areas would switch their vote in protest at the lack 
of Brexit being implemented in a timely manner. 
Yet this means a significant psychological challenge 
to many loyal Labour voters. It may have seemed 
logical, at first glance, to switch voting allegiances 
to the Conservatives who are promising an 
imminent UK exit from the EU if they could get 
a majority in the 2019 election. Put simply, give 
Boris Johnson and the Conservatives ‘the keys 
to Downing Street’ with a workable majority and 
they will deliver Brexit as promised. Yet for many 
of these so called ‘old Labour’ communities voting 
Conservative has remained a significant act, as they 
are communities which rely on public services, 
often have below median incomes, and have strong 
memories about how communities have been 
damaged by what they perceive as Conservative 
policy and inaction which led to deindustriali-
sation and resultant loss of jobs, especially in the 
manufacturing and mining industries.
So, what is the outcome of the 2019 election 
in terms of Conservative gains from Labour 
strongholds? Put simply there is a Conservative 
majority of 80 seats, of which Conservative gains 
from Labour have contributed substantially. What 
is surprising is that the Conservatives have won 
seats, where it was often unlikely to be thought 
possible based on previous electoral performance. 
For example, seats in the Black Country area of 
the West Midlands, through to the pottery areas of 
Stoke on Trent, up to former mining communities 
in Bolsover, and areas of the north east such as 
Blyth Valley, Sedgefield, and even Wrexham in 
Wales have all seen historic election results in 
2019, with so called ‘Labour heartland’ seats 
being won by the Conservatives. Gains of such 
constituencies represent a true landmark in British 
politics with Boris Johnson’s message of ‘get Brexit 
done’ resonating with proportions of voters in such 
constituencies, set against a rejection of Jeremy 
Corbyn as potential Prime Minister, and the big 
state left-wing ideology posited by Labour.
Whilst it can be seen that the Conservatives 
have made significant gains, the immediate 
challenge is now for the Conservatives to satisfy 
these voters. Key to this is delivering on Brexit, 
managing electoral expectations in potentially 
complicated negotiations on the future relationship 
with the UK and the EU, and meeting the needs 
of these constituencies by regeneration and 
job creation strategies. It remains a significant 
challenge for the Conservatives to retain tradi-
tional Labour constituencies in the next general 
election, but if they were to do so, this suggests a 
major shift in the political terrain of the UK. 
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Corbyn and Johnson’s strategic narratives on 
the campaign trail
Our analysis focuses on the ways in which Corbyn 
and Johnson’s campaigns aided the formation 
of strategic narratives about the UK’s role in 
international politics. With the 2019 election called 
to overcome a political deadlock over the process 
of de-Europeanisation, the UK’s international 
standing requires new narratives. This analysis is 
guided by two questions: What are the key news 
media campaign themes aiding the formation of 
strategic narratives by Corbyn and Johnson? What, 
if at all, do those themes reveal about the UK’s 
standing in international politics after elections? 
During the 2019 election cycle, Jeremy Corbyn 
faced a significant level of opposition from both 
historically hostile and sympathetic media alike. 
With regards to international politics, the framing 
of Corbyn in the media thus centred on questions 
about his suitability for leadership. Reporting of 
Corbyn in relation to foreign policy demonstrates 
this well – instead of praising or criticising Labour’s 
foreign policy, coverage focused on Corbyn as a 
threat to national security. One example of this is 
Corbyn’s argument for further NATO’s engagement 
with Russia depicting the Labour leader as a 
“puppet from Moscow”, whose limited reaction to 
comparisons with Stalin was telling.
Corbyn neither promoted nor had a chance 
to promote a particular strategic narrative, as the 
Labour Party’s focus on domestic policies during 
the campaign meant that he downplayed the 
articulation of a compelling vision for Britain’s ge-
opolitical future. The key media theme we identify 
concerning Corbyn was consequently his lack of 
a strategic narrative, which was only furthered by 
the media deeming him as an unsuitable leader 
to represent Britain on the world stage. Corbyn’s 
strategy of transforming the UK into a social-dem-
ocratic, European state via ‘radical’ domestic 
policies thus failed to convince electorate who 
chose to be something other than ‘European’.
Owing to Boris Johnson’s near refusal to 
divulge the UK’s post-Brexit path beyond ‘get 
Brexit done’, media coverage of his election 
campaign attempted to de-code the meaning of 
‘Global Britain’. As the NATO summit was held 
in Watford, reflection on the UK’s standing in 
the alliance became a prominent media theme 
during the campaign. Media favourable towards 
Johnson positioned the UK as a ‘particularly 
influential’ member of the Alliance due to its 
commitment to defence spending targets, which 
most European members ‘fail to meet’. As such, the 
UK was presented as ‘influential’ owing its status 
of a ‘vital hinge’ between the US and European 
allies. In the spirit of punching above its weight, 
the special relationship with the US was used to 
exemplify UK’s global reach. Yet, the Johnson’s 
campaign failed to address the question of the UK’s 
position beyond NATO. These linchpins suggest an 
Anglo-American narrative based on its ties with 
NATO and the US, whilst remaining committed to 
‘global security’, as a pillar aiding the preservation 
of the UK’s standing. 
As well as Johnson’s declarations regarding 
NATO, his commitment to the alliance was 
reinforced by his stance towards Russia. Yet, his 
delay to publish the Russian interference report 
was essentially under-reported by Johnson-favour-
ing media. Critical media reports speculated and 
challenged this narrative suppression, indicating 
the Conservatives’ willingness to accept oligar-
chical funding. On the one hand, the campaign 
coverage reveals Johnson’s ‘tough talk’ on Russia 
as a form of personalised posturing, whilst, on the 
other hand, inadvertedly showing that the UK is 
open for business with a diverse range of political 
regimes, which subscribe to diverse forms of 
political governance. 
A lack of detail on the ‘oven-ready’ Brexit deal 
is a telling aspect of the 2019 campaign coverage. 
Positive coverage framed the UK as having the 
luxury of choice when it comes to post-Brexit 
trade deals with there even being the possibility 
of ‘playing the EU off against the US’ as though 
there is a bidding contest to win a free trade deal 
with the UK. Moderate optimism for the UK 
remaining desirable and influential perseveres, 
and the election result may serve to indulge this 
notion further.
Unquestionably, party leaders have the ability 
to form strategic narratives about one’s own states 
in international politics. With the 2019 election 
result likely to accelerate the de-Europeanisation 
of the UK, both party leaders showed different 
abilities, constraints and approaches to the artic-
ulation of their vision of the UK in international 
politics during the election campaign. Whilst the 
media campaign discourses shifted the positioning 
of the UK in international politics, largely by using 
sloganeering and fragmented statements on the 
conduct of foreign policy, the political realties 
after Brexit will likely speed up the soul-searching 
for Britain’s new strategic narratives. In the first 
instance, the 2019 election result demonstrates that 
the exploration for strategic narrative will have to 
begin with the reassessment of the UK’s credibility 
as an actor in international relations. 
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More Blimp, less Gandhi: the Corbyn problem
On the doorsteps Labour activists claim their 
manifesto promises were popular, the problem 
was Jeremy Corbyn. What led many working class 
voters to vote Conservative or Brexit, abandoning 
their traditional voting pattern? The data in this 
article draws on the comments of some ordinary 
working class Britons when talking about their 
voting choices on social media.
Brexit
Brexit was an issue. Not just that Corbyn proposed 
a second referendum but that he did not articulate 
why. Labour failed to clearly set out the terms of 
the agreement they wished to negotiate with the 
EU. Instead they tried to sideline the issue and 
focus on social policy. While this played to their 
strength it left a weakness as many in the country 
want the Brexit issue resolved and off the agenda. 
The simplicity of Johnson’s ‘get Brexit done’ cut 
through, Corbyn’s vague message and promise to 
be the honest broker did not.
The two Corbyns
Corbyn’s social agenda was very complex, full 
of huge promises that inevitably would be high 
cost. At its heart was a very different plan for the 
nation, proudly socialist, reforming capitalism to 
benefit the many. For those living in areas with 
high poverty and job insecurity - many of the 
Labour heartlands - this should have been exactly 
the sort of change they wanted. But many rejected 
that platform. 
Or did they? Many working class voters went 
to social media saying they could never vote for 
‘a traitor’, a ‘threat to national security’ or ‘the 
most dangerous man in Britain’. His attempts to 
broker peace in Northern Ireland and represent 
underdogs in various parts of the Middle East 
saw him engage with a range of individuals; 
associations which the Conservative party and 
their supportive newspapers used to paint him as 
a traitor and terrorist sympathizer. Corbyn failed 
to make his own side of this story accessible and 
fudged many attempts to redress these weaknesses.
Corbyn’s consistent questioning of UK foreign 
policy allowed an image to be promulgated of him 
as opposing the national interest. This included 
his open anti-nationalism, open opposition to 
most instances of military intervention, and the 
proposing talks, however unlikely that option. 
His regret at the killing of Osama bin Laden, as 
opposed to his arrest and trial, was used to portray 
him as weak. The working class voters reference 
many of these principled stances Corbyn adopted 
as signs of his inability to lead Britain. Britain, 
to those voters, is a strong and decisive nation. It 
attacks enemies, it is the country that ‘won’ the 
Second World War, ‘Britannia rules the waves’, this 
jingoism which is embedded in British culture, jars 
with Corbyn’s pacifist political character. 
Hence the social agenda was balanced against 
the notion of a Corbyn premiership. The greater 
danger was deemed that he would welcome 
Britain’s enemies into the country, weaken the 
nation on the world stage, and so undermine the 
image of the nation many hold dear. The dangers of 
trade deals that sold off the NHS to Trump became 
a lesser fear for many of these voters.
Images of nation and the future for Britain
Perhaps Corbyn’s lack of nationalism was also 
perceived as problematic for him renegotiating 
Brexit. Would he give up too much control to 
the EU, painted in these working class areas as 
having a negative impact on the nation, given his 
propensity to support the enemies of the country? 
And we should not underestimate the perception 
among many working class voters that the EU is 
an enemy power. 
So should a new Labour leader revitalise 
Corbyn’s social policy or move back to a more 
Blairite centrist stance? In the modern era national-
ism is a powerful force in our politics. It seems these 
working class voters want on the one hand policies 
that directly benefit them, alleviating poverty and 
redressing inequality, while also happily bombing 
enemies of the nation into oblivion; however 
unrealistic the latter is. They want their leader to 
celebrate all that they think of as Britishness. They 
are also socially conservative, opposing a multicul-
tural, liberal and inclusive society. 
This represents a challenge to the values 
of Corbyn’s Labour as well as the largely young 
support base he has built. The younger voters are 
more liberal, progressive and have less interest 
in a nationalism they see as petty and outdated. 
Reconciling these different tendencies is going to 
be a major challenge for Labour as they attempt 
to return to a position where they are able to 
think once more about forming a government. A 
majority in Britain does not want a Gandhi-like 
leader, the preference is for a flag-waving Colonel 
Blimp character, their grip on detail and the truth 
is immaterial, doing whatever it takes to win and 
showing pride in their nation is the trump card.
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The media and the manifestos: why 2019 wasn’t 
2017 redux for the Labour party
Prior to the 2017 General Election, party manifestos 
were seen as relatively insignificant in influencing 
voting behaviour. However, this changed in 2017 
when the Labour and Conservative manifestos 
played an important role in the Tory party losing its 
majority. Labour’s bold manifesto, with its pledges 
to nationalise the railways and energy companies, 
raise the minimum wage and end tuition fees caught 
the public imagination, whilst the Conservative’s 
uncosted offering, with its unpopular ‘dementia tax’, 
damaged the party’s campaign.
But in the 2019 election, Labour was not 
able to repeat the trick with its even more radical 
manifesto. Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ ‘small 
target’ approach meant that their manifesto did not 
impact the significant poll lead the party brought 
into the election.  
Why was Labour’s 2019 manifesto unable to 
resurrect the party’s fortunes as it had in 2017 - 
especially since polling indicated key policies were 
individually popular? To answer that question, five 
key factors were important.
First, negative perceptions of the party 
leadership influenced how people viewed its 
policy offerings. Policies may be popular, but if 
the public don’t like or trust the party to deliver 
them, then they won’t be seen as credible. In 2017 
Jeremy Corbyn was more of an unknown quantity, 
fought a good campaign and saw his approval 
ratings rise substantially. But he came into the 
2019 election with record low approval ratings and 
although these improved during the campaign, 
they remained well below his 2017 levels. Reports 
from canvassers suggests that sustained negative 
mass media coverage and ‘dark advertising’ from 
front groups were crucial, with voters citing key 
media attack lines - such as support for terrorists, 
antisemitism and that he would bankrupt the 
country- in explaining why they disliked the 
Labour leader.
Second, the manifesto was negatively reported 
in the press and broadcast media. The right-wing 
press provided false and misleading accounts of 
how much the manifesto would cost. Broadcasting 
relied heavily on the IFS who argued that the 
manifesto costings were ‘not credible’. Despite 
many economists supporting Labour’s approach 
- these views weren’t featured in the BBC’s mass 
audience bulletins. Instead those television 
bulletins - and radio shows like ‘PM’ - only cited as 
an external source the IFS, whose negative framing 
of the manifesto predominated and was later 
weaponized in Conservative attacks ads. 
Third, the manifesto was too big and insuffi-
cient time and effort had been put into preparing 
the public for its more radical elements. Rather 
than a tight, focused offering with a few eye 
catching and popular proposals, the manifesto 
contained a cornucopia of retail offers which 
- in combination - voters found implausible. 
Furthermore, the ideological ground hadn’t been 
prepared to allow the more radical elements - like 
major public investment in a Green New Deal or 
free broadband - to resonate with voters. Such 
policies needed to be grounded in a narrative 
stressing the key role of an interventionist state and 
the importance of universalism - both approaches 
that marked a fundamental break with previous 
Conservative and New Labour governments. You 
cannot prepare the public for such a fundamental 
shift in a few short weeks. It requires a sustained 
programme of public education over many years. 
The creation of a mass membership party in 2015 
offered Labour an opportunity to mobilise its 
supporters to explain the need for such policies, 
in face to face conversations and the more open 
spaces in broadcast media. It was an opportunity 
that was not taken.
Fourth, Labour faced the problem that over 
the preceding decades much of the public had lost 
faith in the ability of politicians and the state to 
institute major social change that would improve 
their lives. Canvassers reported a deep sense of 
‘nihilism’ and ‘resentment’ - ‘Policy doesn’t matter 
here. They’ve forgotten what government can do’. 
Furthermore, as Ramsay notes, the Conservative 
campaign with its ‘key meme’ that ‘you can’t trust 
any of them’ was intended to breed cynicism about 
potential change and ‘drive down turnout among 
those who would benefit most from progressive 
policies’. This is not an environment where a 
manifesto offering radical social change could 
easily take root.
Finally, the credibility of the manifesto was 
damaged by the inability of Labour politicians 
to explain how it would be paid for. When this 
question was put to Nia Griffiths on an episode of 
Any Questions (22 November) she was unable to 
provide a clear answer. Even more damaging was 
Jeremy Corbyn’s evasiveness when Andrew Neil 
asked how the major pledge to the WASPI women 
would be funded. Labour always faces a hostile 
media much of it deeply opposed to a larger state. 
In such an environment, it has to be able to defend 
its spending commitments in a convincing manner. 
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Down a slippery rope… is Britain joining the 
global trends towards right-wing populism?   
Reflecting on the election results, I was reminded 
of a conversation I had with a delegate at a 
marketing conference after I presented my work 
on the discourse of the Vlaams Belang, an extreme 
right wing party from Belgium, titled Marketing 
‘ethically questionable’ politics: the case of a 
xenophobic political party. To my dismay, he was 
boasting about the lack of such a party in the UK, 
which he extrapolated as being evidence for a lack 
of demand for xenophobic right-wing populist 
parties. Admittedly, the BNP and NF were a 
marginal presence in the British political landscape 
and this conversation took place before the 
breakthrough of UKIP. Beyond the blind naivety 
of the statement, what astonished me was his 
self-congratulatory assurance that the country was 
somewhat immune to the appeal of prejudice and 
bigoted rhetoric. This discussion took place almost 
10 years ago. Haven’t we come a long way since?  
Extra-parliamentary organisations such as the 
EDL, Britain First, and the anti-Muslim Pegida UK 
have since emerged, and their theses been granted 
undue visibility in the media. Unfortunately, some 
tropes popular with the aforementioned far-right 
and Islamophobic groups have been steadily 
seeping through to the mainstream media and 
political discourse. The 2019 General Election 
campaign is unfortunately no exception, as it has 
seen a number of negative narratives focusing on 
immigrants and ethnic/religious minorities in 
the UK. Accusations of antisemitism within the 
Labour party have resurfaced with a vengeance, 
with a significant number of Jewish voters stating 
that it would be a deciding factor for their vote. 
Further, the lack of willingness to engage with 
endemic Islamophobia within its rank, has 
tarnished the Conservative brand and significantly 
reduced its potential appeal to British Muslim 
voters. In response, various organisations have 
mobilised against Tory candidates, such as the 
‘Operation Muslim Vote’ asking donors to “help 
[…] unseat 14 Islamophobic MPs/Ministers & 
Boris Johnson” and stating, “[w]e have unseated 8 
Islamophobic MPs in 3 general elections. Help us 
unseat 14 more in this one”. 
MEND (Muslim Engagement & Develop-
ment), a British NGO, has encouraged Muslims 
to participate in general elections. Providing a list 
of all the incidents of Islamophobia within the 
Conservative Party, MEND published a scorecard 
of various parties’ policies against of issues of 
relevance for Muslim citizens, such as Racial and 
Religious Equality, Minority rights. The Muslim 
Council of Britain, a non-partisan organisation 
also encouraged Muslims to strategically vote. They 
produced a detailed report of the main expecta-
tions of the Muslim community, highlighting how 
‘British Muslim votes matter’, and included a whole 
section on Islamophobia and hate crime. The 
report states the organisation’s “serious concerns 
of the resurgence of the far-right together with 
growing islamophobia from the governing party 
to sections of the media, which have shaped social 
attitudes about Muslims”. Relatedly, MCB have 
repeatedly demanded an investigation in Islamo-
phobia in the Conservative Party and have directly 
called out Boris Johnson for his “blind spot for this 
type of racism”. 
Whether one agrees or not with the qualifi-
cations of the Conservative Party, it is certainly 
unsettling to see the leader of the country’s current 
ruling party and some of its members seamlessly 
embrace right-wing populist rhetoric. For example, 
Boris Johnson faced backlash after his comments 
about European immigrants treating the UK as 
their own. Racist slurs, xenophobic and Islamo-
phobic tweets and ‘jokes’ from elected politicians 
are now common, alongside swift condemnation 
and promises of ‘investigations’, followed by quiet 
reinstatements. Rinse and Repeat. 
While it is worrying that the Conservative 
Party has dragged the UK in the increasingly 
growing global movement towards the extreme of 
the political spectrum, it is difficult to predict if 
these are indications of more deep-seated trends 
in the party, and in the nation by extension. Will 
the party reap any real benefit from adopting such 
problematic and divisive language? Mainstream 
right-wing political parties in France and Belgium 
for example, that have borrowed inflammatory 
far-right rhetoric (if not policies) on national 
identity, xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments 
for quick electoral gains, have typically seen their 
rewards to be short-lived. Voters who are indeed 
receptive to these themes tend to go back to the 
‘original’ far-right parties, seen as more authentic 
and uncompromised by power and political games; 
the most serious implication is arguably how their 
rhetoric is now infecting the mainstream, lending 
legitimacy to far-right thesis, and gaining traction 
amongst broader segments of the population.
The biggest loss of the General Election may 
have come to the Labour Party, but ultimately the 
ruling party may have contributed to a long-term 
shift of British politics further towards the most 
unsavoury kind of right-wing populism.
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The Brexit Party’s impact – if any
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As with UKIP in the previous three general 
elections, the intrigue generated by Nigel Farage’s 
Brexit Party was not about whether it would win 
any seats itself, but how it would impact upon the 
Conservative Party. With Boris Johnson having 
failed to fulfil his ‘do or die’ pledge to secure the 
UK’s exit from the EU on 31 October 2019, many 
Conservatives feared that the Brexit Party would 
attract support from erstwhile Conservative 
voters who felt betrayed by Johnson, and that 
the number of votes lost in the manner would, 
in some constituencies, deprive the Conservative 
candidate of victory.
Regardless of this risk, Johnson insisted that 
he was not willing do a deal with the Brexit Party, 
clearly confident that he would retain the support 
of the vast majority of pro-Brexit Conservative 
supporters. Part of Johnson’s confidence derived 
from his calculation that if the Brexit Party did 
deprive the Conservatives of a parliamentary 
majority on 12 December, this would make 
the UK’s exit from the EU more difficult or less 
likely; this scenario, he reasoned, would persuade 
sufficient numbers of putative Conservative voters 
to remain loyal, rather than be seduced by the 
blandishments of Farage.
Perhaps realising this, Farage announced, on 
11 November, that the Brexit Party would not field 
candidates in the 317 seats won by the Conserv-
atives in the 2017 election, nor would he himself 
stand as a candidate. This resulted in an immediate 
increase in Conservative support, due to erstwhile 
Brexit Party supporters now switching (back) 
to the Conservatives, with some polls recording 
a 19-point lead over Labour, although this lead 
fluctuated subsequently.  
In announcing this withdrawal, Farage 
declared that the Brexit Party would instead field 
candidates in seats held by pro-Remain Labour 
and Liberal Democrat MPs. This, however, 
prompted anxiety that this too would jeopardise 
an outright victory for the Conservative Party, due 
to the potential for Leave voters in these seats to 
switch to the Brexit Party rather than the Con-
servatives. This was a particular concern for the 
Conservatives in some of their ‘target’ seats in the 
north of England, and the Midlands, where they 
had only narrowly been defeated in 2017. Would 
the Brexit Party’s candidature in these seats attract 
support from more would-be Conservative voters 
than Labour supporters? 
On 12 December itself, the Conservatives won 
an emphatic victory overall, and in so doing, won 
many Labour seats in the North of England and 
the Midlands. However, it is difficult to discern 
the extent to which the Brexit Party impacted on 
the result in these constituencies. In several of 
these seats, as illustrated in Table 1, the tally of 
votes attracted by the Brexit Party candidate was 
more than the margin between the victorious 
Conservative candidate and the defeated Labour 
candidate. If the Brexit Party had not contested 
these seats, would their support have gone instead 
to the Conservative candidate, thus making their 
victory in these seats more emphatic, or would 
such support have remained with Labour, and 
thereby enabled the latter to retain at least a few 
more seats? In support of the latter interpretation 
is the sometimes-heard suggestion that some 
disillusioned life-long Labour Leavers in the North 
of England still could not bring themselves to vote 
Conservative, but were willing to vote for the Brexit 
Party. If this was the case, in at last some of these 
seats, the Brexit party did indeed damage Labour 
electorally, and facilitate the Conservatives’ victory.   
However, the main reason for Labour’s defeat 
in these seats was a general surge in Conservative 
support since 2017, while Labour’s support was 
often only marginally down. In a few seats, the 
Brexit Party might have attracted just enough 
support from erstwhile Labour voters to deprive 
of the Party’s candidate of victory in 2019, but 
overall, Labour’s electoral woes in 2019 went 
far wider and deeper than the intervention of 
the Brexit Party: Boris Johnson’s charisma, the 
trust he inspired that he would “get Brexit done” 
(regardless of other concerns about his honesty), 
and the profound unpopularity of Jeremy Corbyn 
among working-class Labour supporters. In other 
words, even if the Brexit Party had not fielded any 
candidates in Labour marginals, the Labour Party 
would still have suffered a heavy and humiliating 
defeat overall. 
 
              
Table 1: A sample of marginal seats won by the Conservatives from Labour, in which the Brexit Party also 
stood (number of votes won, and margin of Conservative victory over Labour)
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Farage: losing the battle to win the war
Apart from reaction to Nigel Farage’s brief BBC 
interview with Andrew Neil on election night, 
the Brexit party have seemingly been consigned 
to become a footnote of modern history and the 
occasional doctoral thesis. After all, they ended 
with a paltry 2.0% of the UK vote (5% in the seats 
they contested) and no MPs. UKIP performed even 
worse, with 22,817 votes (0.1%). Robert Ford, for 
example, was typical when he remarked that the 
Brexit party proved an ‘electoral flop’, with the main 
effect of their efforts likely to have saved several 
Labour incumbents by ‘splitting the Leave vote’.
But is this a correct assessment of Nigel 
Farage’s legacy? Arguably, despite being wiped 
out electorally in this contest, Farage’s role has 
been one of kingmaker in terms of both the 
predominance of the Brexit policy agenda and the 
Conservative parliamentary victory in the 2019 
General Election. As Giovanni’s Sartori observed 
decades ago, minor parties can still serve a critical 
function through their ‘blackmail’ potential, 
even if they fail to win seats or ministerial office. 
The impact of Nigel Farage was both direct 
(as discussed in my other contribution to this 
collection), and indirect, on the policy agenda.
The entrance of UKIP and then the Brexit 
party shaped British politics in a profound way 
indirectly, by mobilizing authoritarian-populist 
forces and thereby polarizing the country and 
the policy agenda around the issue of Brexit. 
Farage tapped into long-term shifts in partisan 
dealignment and generational shifts in cultural 
values, which had loosened the salience of the 
traditional Left-Right economic cleavage and the 
politics of class, as argued in Cultural Backlash – 
but also their interaction with supply-side factors, 
including strategic decisions by leaders over 
Downsian party competition, within a broader 
context of the opportunities for exerting power 
and influence within the Westminster electoral 
system. Mainstream parties on the center-right and 
center-left can respond to new rivals by strategic 
attempts at either exclusion (treating their new 
rivals as pariahs) or else inclusion (by parroting 
their competitor’s rhetoric and issues positions). 
Ever since Anthony Downs, the consequences of 
these strategies have been widely debated in terms 
of both their electoral effects and their impact on 
the policy agenda. Farage has obviously failed at 
gaining office at Westminster - but he has had a 
profound effect on the policy agenda by forcing 
other UK parties adapt their policy position 
towards Europe.
Cases vary, but in many countries, new au-
thoritarian-populist parties have become accepted 
as legitimate and democratic partners with a seat 
at the table, thereby directly influencing the issue 
agenda in parliament and the composition of 
coalition governments. In Norway, for instance, 
Siv Jensen’s anti-immigrant Progress Party entered 
ministerial limos as part of successive center-right 
coalition governments. In this context, mainstream 
parties have often sought to parrot or adopt the 
key issues of minor parties, notably by adopting 
the populist language and more restrictive 
immigration policies championed by authori-
tarian-populist, and governing coalitions have 
stolen key planks from their platforms in election 
campaigns.
Elsewhere, however, exclusion from entry 
to governing coalitions is often common. In 
Germany, for example, the Christian Democratic 
Union party refused to collude with the far-right 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), despite their 
becoming the third largest party in the Bundestag 
in 2017, in an attempt to erect a cordon sanitaire. 
In the Netherlands, as well, Mark Rutte’s 2017 
governing coalition excluded Gert Wilder’s Party 
for Freedom (PVV), in the attempt to deny them 
credibility and respectability. In extreme cases, 
some authoritarian-populist parties have been 
banned by law, for example the racist Flemish 
Vlaams Blok, or otherwise legally restricted from 
funding or ballot access. 
Even where treated as ‘pariahs’, however, minor 
rivals can still impact the policy agenda indirectly, 
by forcing the mainstream parties to adjust their 
stances in response to new concerns, in this case by 
parroting issues of nationalism and immigration. 
Johnson’s unprincipled ambitions, and the machi-
nations of the ERG group, made the Conservative 
party ripe for a hostile tack-over by populist forces. 
In this regard, both major parties have absorbed the 
cancer of Euroscepticism, mobilized by Farage and 
the ERG Conservatives, and injected this into the 
mainstream of the body politic. 
Therefore, the Brexit Party should go down 
in the history books as a project which proved an 
electoral failure at Westminster, losing the general 
election battle. But in the long-term, Farage played 
a decisive indirect role by boosting the size of the 
Conservative’s electoral victory, fueling the politics 
of Brexit and thus influencing the UK’s withdrawal 
from EU membership, strengthening the polari-
zation of UK party competition around cultural 
cleavages dividing nationalists and cosmopolitans, 
and even potentially heightening existential 
threats to the future of the United Kingdom as an 
independent nation-state.
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In the 1951 General Election the first ever televised 
Party Election Broadcasts were the only television 
content about the campaign (other than the 
results). By comparison, PEBs achieved less than a 
tenth of a percent of the television audience share 
in 2019. Over time, their function has shifted from 
centre-pieces of party campaigns, to packaged 
efforts to promote leaders, to agenda-setting 
vehicles through sometimes controversial content. 
Much like 2017, though, the majority of the 2019 
PEBs came and went with little to no impact or 
attention at all, bar a couple of notable exceptions. 
Whilst some researchers have claimed to show 
potential influence on voters in the past, partially 
explaining continued close party attention to them, 
any influence depends on things like exposure 
and attention which this year’s crop seemed to 
largely fail to achieve. For all the assertions about 
differential impacts of different styles of ads, this 
was possibly because several parties seem to have 
decided to use essentially the same style of PEB. 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party 
featured PEBs focused on their respective leaders 
in one PEB and then other PEBs drawing substan-
tively, or exclusively, on the images and voices of 
candidates, members, and supporters from the 
general public. They all used incredibly similar film 
styles, with lots of location shots, talking heads 
and campaigning imagery, set against orchestral 
scores. Labour’s PEBs had a somewhat melancholy 
tone, focused on the deprivations of austerity, and 
this was mirrored by a surprisingly similar tone to 
the Brexit Party PEBs, though the focus there was 
on the blocking of Brexit, and by the Lib Dems in 
turn, who focused on the frustrations of the major 
parties. The Lib Dems including former Tory 
and Labour MPs alongside Jo Swinson may, with 
hindsight, be seen as a mistake given how they all 
lost their seats. The Greens, always trying to use 
PEBs to agenda-set, centred both of their PEBs on 
Caroline Lucas, the second of them, “If not now, 
when?”, featuring Lucas in a grainy, black and 
white, extreme close-up single shot, offering an 
almost poetic monologue, with little response (just 
10,000 views on Youtube to date [with all figures 
that follow correct at the time of writing]).
The only PEBs that seemed to generate 
wider attention were the Conservative ones at the 
beginning and end of the campaign, both using 
notable gimmick approaches. The first, “Twelve 
Questions to Boris”, provoked debate, partly about 
the superficial questions he was being asked in 
what was a mock interview on the hoof (fish and 
chips or Sunday roast; marmite yes or no) but 
predominantly over his preparation of a cup of tea 
by putting milk in with the tea bag still in it, and 
then not taking the tea bag out. What The Sun (and 
others) dubbed a ‘Storm in a Teacup’, even made 
international news as far afield as New Zealand, 
and drew comparisons to the cringeworthy 
comedy of The Office. In an era where almost every 
action or statement is now taken to be a “dead 
cat strategy” to divert attention from substance, 
whether by accident or strategic intent, it did at 
least draw attention to the PEB (viewed 261,000 
times on YouTube), even if the Prime Minister’s 
inability to make a proper cup of tea wasn’t the 
level of faux pas the debates suggested it might/
should have been.
Towards the end of the campaign, “Vote 
Conservative, Actually”, also generated substantial 
public attention (606,000 views on YouTube). 
Parodying a scene in what is now a classic British 
Christmas movie, Love, Actually, the PEB features 
Boris again. A key scene in the movie features 
Andrew Lincoln silently declaring his love for 
(married woman) Keira Knightly through a series 
of cards which he shows her whilst standing at 
her door and carol singer music plays. The PEB 
has Boris in Lincoln’s role, with cards spelling 
out plans to get Brexit done. Hugh Grant, one of 
the stars of Love Actually and an active Remainer 
who canvassed for several pro-Remain candidates, 
was asked for his view on the PEB on Radio 4. He 
noted that unlike the original film “one of the cards 
... Boris Johnson didn’t hold up was the one saying 
‘Because at Christmas you tell the truth’”. Others 
noted the irony of recreating a scene where a man 
declares his love for a married woman, with Boris’ 
notorious personal history.
Deliberately copying Love, Actually, and 
making something that others likened to The 
Office, arguably illustrates as clearly as anything 
else Johnson’s populist approach, one others may 
follow in future, as well as indicating that whilst 
PEBs may be receding ever further into electoral 
insignificance, they still, on occasion, can play a 
distinctive role.
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Party election broadcasts… actually?
Figure 1: ‘Vote Conservative, Actually’, Conservatives, 2019
Figure 2: ‘12 Questions for Boris’, Conservatives, 2019
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GE 2019: lessons for political branding
The 2019 UK General Election is a good 
example of political ‘brands’ contesting their 
position on differing levels. Not only was 
it a contest between political parties, each 
promoting their political brand position, it was 
also a contest between the party leaders and 
their personal brands. When reflecting upon the 
2019 General Election, three key lessons about 
political branding become apparent: 
The importance of a brand positioning that is 
clear and in sympathy with electoral sentiment
This was probably the most apparent lesson 
learned about political brands in the 2019 General 
Election. The two parties that succeeded most, 
the Conservative Party and the Scottish National 
Party (SNP), had leaders that advocated a clear 
brand position (Brexit and Scottish independence 
respectively) and it was one that their target market 
sympathised with. In contrast, whilst the Liberal 
Democrat leader Jo Swinson also advocated a clear 
position, the resolute ‘revoke’ stance sat uncom-
fortably with many of her usual supporters who felt 
it undemocratic to simply cancel the result of the 
Brexit Referendum.
The clear stance adopted by the Conservatives, 
SNP and Liberal Democrats stood in sharp 
contrast to the apparently conflicted position 
adopted by The Labour Party. Jeremy Corbyn’s 
purposefully neutral stance to Brexit contrasted 
sharply with the position held by senior figures 
within the Labour Party who supported a ‘remain’ 
stance toward the EU. Moreover, their communi-
cation strategy appeared fragmented as a number 
of initiatives and policies were proposed but a 
coherent vision to draw them together wasn’t 
communicated well. As a result, the positioning 
of both the party and the leader appeared to lack 
definition, consistency and direction.
It’s important to have a profile but all publicity is 
not necessarily good publicity
During the election it became clear that whilst 
media exposure was valuable, it was equally 
important that exposure should be positive. The 
refusal of ITV to allow Liberal Democrat Party 
leader Jo Swinson to take part in their Leaders’ 
Debate undermined the credibility of her claim as a 
potential Prime Minister in waiting. Compounded 
by a poor performance on the BBC Question Time 
Leaders’ Debate and limited coverage of her day-
to-day campaigning, Swinson’s message struggled 
to gain traction and both her approval rates and 
voting intentions for the party plummeted.
Conservative leader Boris Johnson and Labour 
Leader Jeremy Corbyn also suffered embarrassing 
media incidents. Jeremy Corbyn received savage 
treatment at the hands of the BBC’s Andrew Neil 
whilst Boris Johnson was openly laughed at by the 
audience during the BBC Question Time Special. 
Both leaders suffered confrontations by members 
the public and there was some nervousness on the 
part of party managers as to how the leaders, and 
particularly Johnson (who had a reputation as a 
loose cannon) might respond. As a result, there 
were a number of instances where the two leaders 
either refused to attend events/interviews or sent 
proxies in their place. Clearly it was felt that the 
ridicule suffered as a result of a non-appearance 
would be preferable to potential damage that might 
come out of difficult questioning or an unsupport-
ive audience response.
The importance of ‘likeability’
‘Likeability’, or lack of it, appeared to be a deter-
mining factor over the course of the election. It has 
already been noted that Jo Swinson struggled to 
gain approval following poor media performances 
but Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn also appeared to suffer 
from a lack of likability. Media reports suggested 
that voters simply didn’t warm to him and this 
was not helped by some rather ill-tempered 
responses when questioned about his leadership 
or ability to deal with anti-Semitism within the 
party. In contrast, the Conservative Party appeared 
much more successful in cultivating their leader’s 
likability. Repeated questioning suggested there 
were clearly issues around trust but these were 
minimised by legitimising his unconventional and 
slightly comic persona with the use of novel and 
engaging media opportunities. Examples of note 
include the creation of a parody of the film ‘Love 
Actually’ entitled ‘Brexit Actually’ and a visit to the 
JCB factory where numerous photo opportunities 
were created when Johnson crashed a bulldozer 
through a wall of bricks.
In summary, it was clear that the winners 
in the 2019 UK General Election were those 
that adopted a clear brand positioning strategy. 
Ambiguity and/or neutrality on the part of 
a party or its leader was not well received. 
However, as we can see from the winners in 
this election, it wasn’t enough to have a clear 
position, the position also had to be one that was 
defensible and communicated by a leader that 
the electorate liked, if not trusted. 
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The postmodern election
Social theory tells us that postmodernity is the 
condition of culture in which the social structures 
which have shaped the modern world have largely 
dissolved. De-industrialisation fragments the class 
structure, psycho-cultural changes rework gender 
roles and family life, all traditional values including 
the primacy of reason itself come under challenge, 
and little or nothing can be taken as settled. Our 
2019 General Election looks like the one in which 
democratic politics became fully postmodern. 
To being with, the issue which for many 
people has defined the election - Brexit - is in large 
part an artefact. Being in or out of Europe was not 
a major preoccupation of the British public until 
the referendum. Led by Leave but with Remain 
in pursuit, propaganda around and since the 
referendum has resulted in us believing we were 
at war with each other on an issue of fundamental 
identity. In a major example of a ‘media effect’, 
this most bitter election has been fought over a 
contrivance, in which a grossly simplified binary 
has been heaped with cultural and emotional 
meanings which mostly belong elsewhere. It is a 
massive case of postmodern irony then that ‘Brexit’ 
was the reason for the election and the sole theme 
of the Conservative campaign, and was one of two 
or three major factors in determining its outcome. 
Admittedly, traditional class-based ideology 
could also be seen in the campaign, in the 
emphasis Labour’s manifesto placed on redistri-
bution and on state intervention in public utilities. 
While these policies expressed the enthusiasm 
of the recent cohorts of Labour support, some 
other voters were alienated from Labour by this. 
However the extent of this effect is not known, and 
without further analysis the claim that this was 
evidence of wide public distaste for more radical 
economic policies cannot be sustained, especially 
given that the core economic proposals could have 
been presented more persuasively and without 
the less plausible add-ons. It may be that other 
non-class based ideological issues, linked to Jeremy 
Corbyn and Labour’s general political leadership, 
were the most important – for example, the ideas 
that he was ‘soft’ on terrorism and on anti-Sem-
itism within the party, and the party conference 
resolution on expanding immigration. 
Whether ideology of any sort was a major 
factor or not, Corbyn’s unpopularity as a leader 
certainly was, combining as it did with the ‘Brexit’ 
factor to drive hundreds of thousands of long-term 
Labour voters away from the party and thereby 
delivering Johnson’s majority. This takes us to the 
most fundamentally postmodern feature of the 
election: the stage it marks in the decay of the 
party system, at least as all living memories have 
known it. While the Conservative majority may 
bring a deceptive stability to Parliament it does 
not represent stability in public opinion. Johnson 
won, as he says, on borrowed votes, and once 
the Brexit glue dries out his one-off constituency 
will fall apart. The Labour Party has a chance to 
begin a radical reconstruction of its place in the 
eyes and feelings of the public in the upcoming 
leadership contest, but Corbynism has exposed the 
depth of its divisions, and cast it as the place where 
egalitarian idealism goes to die (electorally).
And even if either or both of the major 
parties can hang together, more fundamentally 
the electorate is no longer segmented in the 
orderly way which brought some legitimacy to 
a two- or three-party system. In postmodern 
times we are more individualised, which is by no 
means all a bad thing. It brings psychological and 
cultural richness, for those materially secure. But 
politically it means chaos, at least during a long 
transition, and amongst some parts of the public 
it brings a hunger for the comforting togetherness 
of regressive populism. Also, the sceptical stance 
of postmodern thinking towards all traditional 
authorities has been a liberating cultural force, 
yet at the same time in politics it has ushered 
in the nightmare of a ‘post truth’ public sphere. 
And a very substantial minority of voters in this 
election, for both the major parties, have cast their 
votes for a leader they wouldn’t trust. This may 
be an extreme example of old-fashioned cynical 
pragmatism, or a sign that in the turbulence of 
postmodernity, the trust on which democracy 
depends is now in jeopardy (or perhaps it is both). 
Moreover, even within ourselves, we are 
not coherent citizenly units, but endlessly varied 
bundles of values, impressions and impulses. The 
postmodern self is a complex and changeable 
entity: not the de-centred flux as some cultural 
theorists would have it, but still more open-ended 
than the highly structured modal self of classical 
modernity. Whether any of our existing political 
parties can be re-tooled in order to be able to 
address the postmodern public remains to be seen.
Policy and 
strategy
5
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The uses and abuses of the left-right distinction 
in the campaign
The left/right distinction is a familiar interpretive 
frame through which to make sense of political 
divisions and disagreements, but its status, 
character, and relevance are highly contested. 
British politics has, in recent years, seen a range of 
starkly opposed narratives not only between left 
and right political positions, but also about the 
continued relevance and viability of the left/right 
distinction itself. 
Simplifying somewhat, the 2019 General 
Election saw two main narratives about the 
changing shape of the left/right distinction. One 
suggested that 2019 was significant in part because 
it coincided with a reinvigoration of the left/
right distinction within British political life. This 
narrative asserts that the Conservatives under 
Johnson, and Labour under Corbyn, embraced 
a politics more unambiguously right and left 
(respectively) than their predecessors. Johnson’s 
Conservatives were seen by many as tapping into 
a groundswell of right-wing nationalism and 
nativism. Conversely, Corbyn’s Labour found itself 
frequently characterised as ‘hard left’. Thus, much 
commentary during the election campaign high-
lighted, and frequently bemoaned, the supposed 
abandonment by both parties of their centrist, 
moderate wings. Consequently, and in contrast to 
the ideological convergence that marked British 
politics for much of the 90s and 2000s, 2017 and, 
especially, 2019 saw the major parties standing 
on clearly demarcated policy platforms, in which 
voters had a clear and unambiguous choice 
between left and right. 
A second narrative suggests that far from 
becoming more relevant, the left/right distinction 
has become an arcane device ill suited to the 
various divisions and antagonisms that shape 
contemporary British society. Evidence offered 
in support of this view includes: the relatively 
small percentage of voters who have a clear 
self-perception as either left or right; the displacing 
of left vs right by a whole series of other axes of 
division (e.g. ‘open’ versus ‘closed’, ‘somewheres’ 
versus ‘anywheres’, young versus old); and the 
increasing salience of cultural values at the expense 
of economic factors. The pivoting of many voters 
in the so-called ‘Labour heartlands’ towards the 
Conservatives is further grist to the mill of those 
who say that, in the age of Brexit, the left/right 
distinction no longer holds. Indeed, it seems 
likely that, following the electoral failure of a left 
platform, the pressure on the Labour Party to a 
return to a centrist politics ‘beyond left and right’ 
will intensify over the coming months. 
But we should be wary of such claims. Irrespec-
tive of where one situates oneself on the left/right 
spectrum, we abandon it at our peril. As Belgian 
political theorist Chantal Mouffe has powerfully 
argued, a clearly delineated left/right distinction is 
essential for a vibrant, flourishing public sphere. 
Perhaps controversially, I would argue that the 
partial polarisation of British politics along the left/
right axis in recent years has been positive in terms 
of citizen interest, engagement and participation in 
democratic politics, in stark contrast to the depolit-
icised technocracy and managerialism of the New 
Labour era. In many cases, therefore, the desire to 
bury or ‘move beyond’ the left/right distinction can 
function as a thinly concealed attempt to delegitimise 
all but a fairly narrow range of political opinion. 
Furthermore, the 2019 General Election was a victory 
for a revitalised right-wing of the Conservative Party. 
Consequently, we need the left/right distinction as an 
analytic frame if we are to come to terms with how 
and why the Conservatives won on a more unasham-
edly right-wing platform than in previous elections.
But if we agree that we need to retain the 
left/right distinction, this begs the question of 
precisely how the left/right distinction is under-
stood. Often, left and right are cast as indices 
of political attitudes, particularly in relation to 
specific economic indicators such as taxation, 
public spending, and wealth distribution. But this 
‘economistic’ understanding of left and right is too 
limited, especially at a time when contemporary 
political movements and identities do not cleanly 
correspond with class positions, or economic 
factors. Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio 
famously argued that left and right should be 
understood in relation to the relative priority 
afforded to equality and inequality within different 
political movements and projects. Consequently, 
to be ‘left-wing’ is to be motivated by what Bobbio 
calls ‘the emotive value of equality’, rather than 
whether not you support particular levels of 
taxation or redistribution. 
Going forward, a more fluid and dynamic 
understanding of the left/right distinction – along 
the lines of what Bobbio describes – could 
become a major asset in our on-going attempts 
to make sense of a highly fractious and confusing 
political moment, while also seeking to cultivate 
citizen interest and engagement in democratic 
politics. As the dust settles from the upheavals 
of the 2019 General Election, we must doggedly 
resist on-going attempts by politicians and 
pundits at to consign the left/right distinction to 
the dustbin of history. 
64
In experimental economics, ultimatum games 
measure individuals’ distributive behaviour. Two 
players participate. The first has $10 and is tasked 
with making an offer to distribute an amount to 
the second player.  If the second accepts the offer, 
both keep their respective shares. If they decline, 
they both lose. 
Homo economicus assumes individuals 
are rational, self-interested and concerned with 
absolute gains. Even an offer of $0.01 should be 
sufficient for the second player to accept, since 
they are materially better off. However, time and 
again, in a range of cultural contexts, players 
reject offers even approaching $5. This finding 
indicates individuals are concerned with relative, 
not absolute, gains and that there is a species-wide 
sense of fairness that leads to acts of spite when 
presented with insulting offers. We saw that in 
action on Thursday night. 
For the last three years, Centrists have cam-
paigned relentlessly against the leadership of the 
Labour Party and, to a lesser degree, the Conserv-
ative Party, on the basis of Brexit. Woke Labour 
Centrists, apparent Lib Dem and Green allies and 
the ‘liberal’ media made a case for Remain that 
had already been rejected in 2016 and 2017 and 
was increasingly being rejected, viscerally, on the 
ground in constituencies that Labour needed to 
hold or win. 
Beyond the centrist echo chamber, anger was 
palpable about the contempt in which voters were 
being held. Put simply, over the past three years, 
Leave voters and their family members who voted 
Remain but respected democratic decision making, 
were told that they were ‘thick’, ‘brainwashed’, 
‘racist’ and ‘self-defeating’. The only justification 
given for revising their decision was that their lives 
would get worse by leaving the EU. 
While some are racist and many lives will 
certainly get worse as a result of this election, for 
many the notion of their lives getting even worse is 
a bit of a stretch. After 40 years of decline in the EU, 
in which no substantive measures have been taken 
to invest in declining communities and reasonable 
concerns about the effect of migration on those 
areas and working conditions were rejected as racist, 
many people just could not see their lives could 
get worse. Hence, the biggest motivating factor for 
those who voted Conservative for the first time can 
be seen in the behaviour of players who reject pitiful 
ultimatum game offers. These voters were being 
given the proverbial $0.01 offer by actors who were 
ubiquitous and utterly self-obsessed. 
Now, everyone bar the 1% will lose, those 
losing the most would have benefited most from 
the first systematic attempt at reconfiguring our 
country since 1945. Labour’s Manifesto was the 
only project capable of restoring Labour heart-
lands. But time and again, voters, including those 
who had voted Labour in 2017, said that they 
would not back a party frustrating the will of the 
people led by someone who was weak or actively 
hostile to their interests. 
Centrist analyses of the catastrophe are already 
focusing exclusively on the weakness of Corbyn, 
but that fails to take into account the effect of four 
years of effective, but disastrously self-defeating, 
lobbying and bullying by a conspiratorial liberal 
wing of the establishment. The most effective 
vehicle for tarnishing a 70 year old vegetarian, 
anti-racist peace campaigner as a racist, terrorist 
Remainer, has been a vapid, self-absorbed Centrist 
cult who used wedge issues to advance a policy to 
which the leadership was intuitively opposed and 
to frame party discipline issues as being wholly 
disproportionate to reality. Studies show a third of 
voters thought Labour was anti-Semitic, despite 
only 0.08% of members being found to have 
committed anything remotely anti-Semitic. That is 
due to the work of Watson et al, attacking Corbyn 
to recapture the party for the Centrist cult. Those 
of us who live in the heartlands knew exactly how 
this would pan out and feared watching our family 
members suffer. 
The evidence of this election offers a remark-
able insight into Centrist thinking and strategy: 
campaign for Remain in the wake of defeat and get 
the hardest of hard Brexits; campaign against the 
leadership on the assumption that everyone shares 
the same fetishistic dinner party concerns about 
the impact on European identity.
Niemöller famously stated ‘First they came for 
the socialists, and I did not speak out – because I 
was not a socialist’. In the case of Labour Centrists 
and the liberal establishment, ‘First they came 
for the socialists and I helped because I was not 
a socialist and felt entitled to leadership’. Spite is 
powerful and we are headed for a generation of it. 
Centrists need to own it, but they will likely just 
pay a trivial visa fee and head to their châteaux in 
the Dordogne. As the Lib Dems would put it, that’s 
just ‘bollocks’. 
Entitlement and incoherence: centrist ‘bollocks’ 
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Brexit doesn't mean Brexit, but the pursuit of power
The 2019 General Election was widely touted as 
‘the Brexit election’ by both the Conservatives 
and some broadcasters. No doubt Brexit was an 
important issue looming large in light of significant 
parliamentary and courtroom battles for much 
of the year. It will be suggested that - to borrow 
Theresa May’s phrase - the saying ‘Brexit means 
Brexit’ is deceptive because its primary purpose is 
to serve as a means, not an end, for the pursuit of 
political power.
The original decision to support an EU 
referendum was taken by David Cameron before 
the 2015 General Election. Five years earlier, the 
Tories had failed to win a majority and had to settle 
for forming an uneasy coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. The cause was Nigel Farage’s UKIP 
taking a slice of voters from the Tories. 
Cameron’s offer of a referendum worked 
in the general election by ending UKIP’s threat 
and gaining a small parliamentary majority. But 
Brexit was never planned for or wanted. A year 
later Cameron rushed a referendum only to lose 
and exit office. His successor, May, spent the first 
months of her term fighting lost causes in the 
courts possibly to make them scapegoats for the 
inability to realise Brexit. Ultimately, she never 
succeeded and Boris Johnson became Prime 
Minister over the summer.
Johnson made much of the repeated mantra 
‘get Brexit done’. This undoubtedly appealed to 
pro-Leave voters and Farage’s new Brexit Party 
posed no real threat after the latter agreed only to 
stand in a one-third of seats instead of all - and 
winning none. 
But that phrase ‘get Brexit done’ was also suc-
cessful for two further reasons. The first is it gave a 
simple, clear message about what the Tories would 
do if they won. In contrast, Labour published 
multiple manifestos that probably diffused their 
message, rendered less clear their priorities and 
timetable for delivering on them. 
The second success of ‘get Brexit done’ was 
it resonated with voters who wanted get news 
coverage about Brexit done. Over three years, there 
has been much fatigue among the public in making 
heads or tails of how progress has or has not been 
made. With over 18,000 EU laws to sift through and 
a 40+ year institutional relationship, some likened 
Brexit to separating ingredients from a cake after 
baking it. It’s certainly a sticky and complex matter 
for even a trained expert in EU law. 
This latter reason suggests that ‘get Brexit 
done’ had traction not because the public wants 
Brexit, but because the public wants to move on 
from it. While the government made clear Brexit 
means a new Australian-styled points-based 
immigration system, the truth is such a system 
was launched by Labour in 2008. If this is the big 
signature policy change, Brexit isn’t needed. 
Within 24 hours of reopening Parliament, 
Johnson outlined plans to change the withdrawal 
agreement he asked voters to back to cut workers’ 
rights and environmental protections. He also 
suggested a review of the BBC’s licence fee. 
A US study in the 1990s found that Americans 
would most often say they were for or against 
capital punishment based on whether they thought 
it was a deterrent, but the real reasons for sup-
porting one side or another was based on values 
separate from deterrence. It is suggested here that 
Brexit’s origins and future lies mostly in using it as 
a means for the pursuit of other domestic ends like 
reshaping rights, the BBC and more. Whether this 
prediction is correct can be tested in five years, but 
signs are strong already.
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One of the defining features of British politics in 
recent decades has been the critical discussion 
of European integration. And this election 
was called because of a major issue about the 
European Union (EU). So surely this is the 
apotheosis of euroscepticism?
Well, not really.
If we understand euroscepticism to be about 
challenging some aspect of European integration, 
then we’ve seen hardly any expression of that 
during the 2019 campaign.
What there has been is much discussion about 
fulfilling the result of the 2016 referendum on 
EU membership, but couched entirely in terms of 
democracy and legitimacy in the British political 
system. “get Brexit done” says nothing about the 
EU and everything about the UK.
This might seem to be a narrow academic 
question, one of definitions, but it reflects the troubled 
place of ‘Europe’ in the British political debate.
Consider that the only extensive critique of 
the EU and its operation came from the Green 
Party, who devoted several pages of their manifesto 
to outlining reforms at the constitutional, insti-
tutional and policy levels, even as they strongly 
advocated continued membership.
By contrast, neither the Conservatives nor the 
Brexit Party discussed the nature of the EU per se, 
but only the necessity of securing withdrawal (and 
a new trade agreement in the Tories’ case).
This is not to say that the EU hasn’t been a 
major part of the political discussion, but rather to 
argue that euroscepticism is much more about the 
national context than the European one.
Consider the party manifestoes.
Given the centrality of Brexit, one might antic-
ipate that much of their wider programmes would 
depend upon the particular form of relationship 
with the EU that they sought to secure. That might 
be because being out of the EU might open up 
some political paths not currently available, or 
because being in the EU allows the UK to secure 
changes within the organisation.
With the usual caveats about the difficulties of 
weighting the significance of different manifesto 
commitments, we can still see from the graph that 
this is not actually the case.
By breaking down manifestoes into their 
sections and gauging the extent which there is 
a dependency, it is quickly evident that for all 
parties, most of what they propose has nothing to 
do with the EU at all, and in most of the remaining 
cases, it hasn’t got much to do with it either.
Even in the case of the Tories, with the 
highest dependency at roughly a quarter of their 
manifesto, much hangs on the specifics of the 
future relationship that they would negotiate with 
the EU. That relationship is presented as a list of 
objectives, rather than as an engagement with 
the functioning of the European Union itself, as 
underlined by the rather confused language on 
Northern Ireland.
In short, the EU is largely externalised from 
the British political debate.
It is there, but as a largely abstract entity to be 
either got away from or to be embraced closely. For 
those that would leave, the Union is presented as 
a body that will simply give the UK what it wants 
– monies owed, deals delivered, access granted – 
without any sense of how the eurosceptic critiques 
of the past – self-interest, inefficiency, not listening 
to the UK – might anyhow make this problematic, 
especially as the UK moves from being a member 
state to a third country.
But the pro-European side also raises issues. 
While the years since the referendum have seen a 
blossoming of overt European rhetoric and action, 
that has not been accompanied by the development 
of more grounded and engaged view of how the 
EU works.
In essence, this general election has been a 
continuation of very polarised views on the EU: 
those in support of membership seem very largely 
bound to treat it uncritically, while those against 
mostly wish it away.
Whether either approach is one that will 
withstand the realities of the coming year, as the 
country moves into the next stage of Brexit, is 
highly questionable. What is clear already at this 
point is that euroscepticism has been better at 
providing questions than answers.
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Immigration in the 2019 General Election campaign
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Of all of the contentious issues sublimated by the 
term ‘Brexit’ during this General Election, arguably 
the most significant of all has been immigration. 
Significantly and prominently featured during 
the referendum debate of 2016, with ‘leave’ voting 
widely attributed to negative social attitudes, 
immigration remained very concerning to voters, 
including in the UK ahead of the 2018 Parliamen-
tary Elections. However, whilst public concerns 
continue to be negative, polling and other research 
evidence strongly suggest they have ‘softened’. 
IPSOS MORI data indicate a significant decline 
in immigration’s salience as ‘the most important 
issue’ facing Britain since the 2016 referendum, 
overtaken by the NHS and the European Union. 
These, ostensibly less anxious, attitudes towards 
immigration have attracted commentary in the 
mainstream media, including, for example, the 
BBC’s ‘Crossing Divides’ season earlier this year. 
So, if no longer a pre-eminent issue for public 
concern, how did immigration play a role in the 
public discourse during the election campaign? 
Mainstream Party Policies
Across the manifestos we saw a general 
consensus on establishing distance from Theresa 
May’s ‘hostile environment’, albeit to varying 
degrees and with different substance. Recog-
nition that many of the consequences of May’s 
approach were profoundly damaging (not least 
the Windrush scandal) and a more pro-migra-
tion tone could be traced in the Labour, Liberal 
Democrats and Green manifestos. Advocating 
recognition of the social and economic benefits 
of migration, an automatic right to residency 
for EU nationals already in Britain, equality for 
all workers with a right to be in the country, 
and the closure of immigration detention 
centres were key promises of both Labour and 
the Greens. Another anti-hostile-environment 
measure from the Liberal Democrats proposed 
the re-distribution of specific visa granting 
powers away from the Home Office to other de-
partments, such as Business, Education and the 
Department for International Development. A 
more positive focus on the benefits of migration 
also typified the nationalist parties’ manifestos, 
with Plaid Cymru and the SNP each proposing 
‘needs based systems’ and visas specifically 
designed for the Scottish and Welsh economies. 
Conservative proposals, moved away from 
arbitrary net migration targets associated with 
the ‘hostile environment’, instead promising to 
end freedom of movement for EU citizens, fast 
tracking ‘highly skilled’ migrants, e.g., through 
a cheaper ‘NHS Visa’, and reducing numbers 
through an ‘Australian-style’ points based system 
(a similar policy on the latter was included in 
DUP proposals). 
Whilst some of these policies appeared to 
enjoy greater traction than others in the press, 
coverage largely seemed to follow established 
partisan editorial lines, including extensive 
repetition of Conservative attacks on Labour 
in right-wing publications (including misrep-
resentations of policy, for example on freedom 
of movement), and support for Labour plans in 
the Daily Mirror. The policies of other parties 
on immigration appeared to receive very little 
coverage in the national titles.
Press Coverage
When we look at the prominence of immigration 
as an issue across the major national newspapers 
during the six weeks leading up to polling day1, we 
see that it was certainly not ignored or marginal-
ised by the standards of recent election campaigns. 
Coverage intensified in week 3 with the 
trailing of Labour and Tory manifestos, and the 
first leaders’ debate on 19th November, and then 
again in the final week, as key campaign messages 
were reiterated, including in Boris Johnson’s letter 
to the nation, warning against the ‘nightmare’ of 
a potential Labour win. Somewhat more unex-
pectedly, football pundit Gary Neville’s comments 
on the racist abuse of Manchester United players 
were also widely reported, where he blamed Boris 
Johnson for fuelling racism in language about 
immigration during the Leaders’ debate.
In polling week, the Daily Mirror suggested 
that ‘Immigration is the dog that hasn’t barked 
in this election’ (8th December), attributing this, 
in part, to wider recognition of the benefits of 
immigration to the country. Although Labour’s 
social media video advertising sought to 
challenge misdirected hostility towards migrants 
and transform the debate, realistically it is 
doubtful that this message would have landed 
with readers of a right-wing press strongly 
supporting the “Tory crackdown on post-Brexit 
migrants”, and the equation of Labour’s immi-
gration policy with an ‘open borders’ security 
threat, over-burdening the NHS, and a betrayal 
of democracy. A familiar collection of hostile 
tropes on immigration, it was articulated all the 
more powerfully as an ominous and obvious 
flipside to “delivering Brexit”. Johnson’s late 
controversial claim that “membership of the EU 
meant its population of 580 million had been 
able to treat the UK as though its basically part 
of their own country”, should arguably be seen, 
then, as merely the loud, concluding ‘bark’ of a 
concerted dog whistling campaign. 
1 Data for both figures based on basic search of Nexis: 6 weeks leading to polling day; 
keywords: immigra! or migra! or “asylum seeker!” or refugee!; No manual filtering applied.
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At the beginning of this General Election 
campaign immigration was the 7th important 
issue for British adults. This confirmed the gradual 
decline of the issue during the past years from the 
most important issue facing Britain (June 2016), 
to the 3rd (June 2017), and the 10th (September 
2019). It was clearly not on the main radar this 
year. Nevertheless, it was frequently invoked 
by all parties and candidates in relation to the 
main issues: Brexit and NHS. My analysis draws 
on critical discourse studies to explore how the 
manifestos referred to immigration.
Conservatives: “get Brexit done. Unleash Britain’s 
potential” with “the best and the brightest”
Immigration is a problem to be solved and 
controlled through a commitment re-enforced by 
the candidate’s personal guarantee and signature. 
The imaginary of a catastrophic, fictious scenario 
is re-enacted: immigration is a threat that requires 
fixing and taking back control of borders. Our 
borders. The main narrative of the 2016 EU 
referendum is heavily instrumentalized to remind 
of the danger and set the grounds for the populist 
leader, the saviour, who has the solution: the 
Australian-style points-based immigration system, 
an inclusion – exclusion vision legitimized through 
appeal to competency and skills. Finally, the main 
promise: attracting the best and the brightest, while 
there will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall 
numbers will come down; less of ‘them’ for the pro-
tection of ‘us’, ‘our’ NHS and ‘our’ benefits system. 
This is the Conservative vision of making the 
immigration system more fair and compassionate. 
Labour: “It’s Time for Real Change” with “a 
humane immigration system”
The Labour vision on immigration is presented 
as centred on human rights and aimed at meeting 
the skills and labour shortages as opposed to the 
hostile environment system attributed to Tories. 
Furthermore, the Windrush scandal is invoked and 
powerful imagery is used to illustrate the extent of 
damage that led to British citizens being deported. 
Immigrants are considered a positive resource 
enriching society. The core idea of change is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Migration section of 
the manifesto, being replaced by decisive action. 
The actions are legitimized through a perpetuation 
strategy of pointing out the failures of current 
system, attributing the blame to Conservative and 
Liberal Democrats policies and augmenting the 
consequences: undermined our economy and public 
services, encouraged the demonisation of migrants 
and the use of residents as bargaining chips. The 
party’s position on Brexit is reflected through a 
strategy of balancing the outcome of both leave 
and remain scenarios with the pledge of respecting 
our values and domestic laws while respecting EU 
and UK citizens’ rights. 
SNP: “Stronger for Scotland”. “Scotland relies on 
migration for growing our population” 
Immigration is explicitly framed as a resource for 
the growth and development of an independent 
Scotland, in a firm stand for freedom of movement 
and against the demonisation of migrants. It 
is legitimized in opposition to Westminster’s 
broken policies (including the hostile immigration 
environment) and more broadly to the current 
‘dependency’ that limits the overall development 
potential of Scotland. Furthermore, the promises 
have been broken, thus there can only be a 
radical, transformation solution, justified by the 
appeal to our right as a country to decide our own 
future: the break with the status-quo in a mission 
personally assumed and signed by the candidate 
Nicola Sturgeon - it’s time to put Scotland’s future in 
Scotland’s hands.
Liberal Democrats: “Stop Brexit. Build a 
Brighter Future” with “a compassionate and 
effective immigration system”
The Lib Dems’ vision on immigration revolves 
around a diagnostic: Britain’s immigration system is 
in desperate need of reform. This is supported with 
statements and evaluations of a current disastrous 
situation, linked either to key issues (NHS’ 
impossibility to recruit) or appeals to emotions 
(separation of families due to visa requirements; 
people detained indefinitely). The blame is directly 
attributed to the Conservatives’ hostile environment 
(illustrated symbolically by the Windrush gener-
ation), as well as to the Labour and Conservatives 
previous Home Secretaries. The party positions 
itself as having the solution to this crisis, empha-
sizing their unique offer: the only party with a plan 
for a fair migration system that works for everyone. 
Welcoming migrants and restoring confidence 
in the system are the key pillars of their plan. 
Migrants are considered a resource for the skills 
and contribution they bring, therefore the first 
actions in the plan are Stop Brexit and save EU 
freedom of movement.
Overall, immigration is a resource for Labour, 
SNP and Lib Dems that label unanimously the 
Conservatory system hostile environment and 
symbolically instrumentalize the Windrush 
scandal. The SNP campaigned for independence; 
the Lib Dems claimed a radical reform; Labour’s 
change was weakened into decisive action. The 
Conservatives were consistent in re-enforcing their 
2016 main narrative and capitalized on the need 
for direction: uncontrolled immigration is a threat; 
take back control and get Brexit done. And now, it 
looks like they will.
Immigration in party manifestos: threat or resource?
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Foreign policy in the 2019 election
Foreign policy does not tend to be a hot topic in 
general elections, with some notable exceptions. 
Manifestos tend to include platitudes and largely 
meaningless phrases, outlining some broad 
brushstrokes of policy, but with very little tangible 
detail, reflecting the changing nature of foreign 
policy, and the dynamics involved in international 
relations. A quick glance as the positioning of 
foreign policy in the Labour and Conservative 
Party manifestos will give you some idea of its 
lack of prominence during election time, starting 
on page 51 in the Conservative party manifesto 
and page 95 in the Labour party manifesto. There 
are, however, key differences between the two 
parties on foreign policy, not just in policy terms 
but also in style, which is more unusual to see 
and a result of the leadership of Corbyn and the 
move of the Labour party away from the centre of 
British politics.
The Conservative manifesto includes a fairly 
traditional, some might even say staid, outline of 
their foreign policy aims. There is certainly nothing 
dynamic in the manifesto coming from the party 
being led by a former Foreign Secretary. Instead, 
the section on foreign policy includes discussion 
of the armed forces, some mention of Brexit and 
even a short section on international sporting 
events. The manifesto is heavy on values but light 
on detail, implying that the Conservatives are the 
party of the armed forces and the protector of 
British values. There is a commitment to maintain-
ing the headline figure of 0.7% GDP funding for 
overseas development aid, and support for several 
of the UN Millennium Development Goals, but no 
detail on how these lofty aims will be achieved. 
This is grist to the mill for manifestos but 
particularly noticeable in an age where the 
consequences of Brexit will mean foreign affairs 
takes on a new significance and any government 
will have to be very clear on which international 
friendships they need to maintain. For the 
Conservatives, foreign policy is presented in a very 
traditional way, with a focus on military strength 
and an underlying assumption that Britain is a key 
global player and will remain so. Of course, that 
narrative will not only be warmly received by Con-
servative party supporters, but is also necessary 
for a party staking its political reputation on its 
pro-Brexit credentials and ability to “get Brexit 
done”. To admit any potential damage to Britain’s 
global standing or reputation at the hands of the 
Conservative party would be unthinkable, and the 
manifesto reflects this, projecting only strength.
The Labour party manifesto is noticeably 
different to that of the Conservatives, although 
different does not automatically mean better. The 
Labour manifesto has a ‘lead in’ section entitled “A 
New Internationalism” which outlines the general 
aims of the party. The focus here is on multilater-
alism, more co-operation with other nations and 
a ‘ask question first, act later’ approach. The party 
tries to put its Iraqi ghosts to bed by indicating it 
will enact all the recommendations of the Chilcot 
Inquiry and promises to enshrine in law the mod-
ern-day convention of Prime Ministers seeking 
Parliamentary ascent for overseas military action. 
The manifesto also references specific issues 
within foreign policy, such as the ongoing issues 
over the Chagos Islands, and the imprisonment of 
Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe. 
The most striking feature of the manifesto 
though is not the detail, but the tone. For the 
Labour party, foreign policy needs to move in a 
more measured, more ethically driven direction, 
perhaps accidentally reminding readers of the 
early years of the Blair government. Hot heads will 
be replaced by measured negotiation and a desire 
to resolve long-standing conflicts, such as the 
Israel-Palestine conflict or an investigation into the 
impact of British colonialism. These are certainly 
lofty aims, and few would disagree that negotiation 
and a cool-head are important in international 
affairs, but what is the cost of this? Banning arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia because of concerns over 
their actions in Yemen may be morally justifiable, 
but what is the economic impact for the UK? Arms 
sales, while unpalatable, are a profitable industry 
and many individuals within the UK make their 
living working in this industry. How do you sell 
a globally moral stance if it has economic conse-
quences for those who you are representing? 
While foreign policy may not be a particular 
vote winner for either the Labour or Conservative 
party, the next occupant of number ten will affect 
the foreign policy aims and processes of the UK. 
A Conservative victory means that foreign policy 
continues on in a familiar way, with the unknown 
impacts of Brexit looming on the horizon. Were 
the Labour party to win, or be in a coalition of 
some kind, foreign policy making as we know it 
would have changed extensively. However, as has 
been seen before, good deeds and kind words 
do not necessarily lead to a change in the harsh 
realities of the world. For both parties, their 
aims will almost certainly be over-written by 
their immediate international needs, making the 
manifesto pledges impractical.
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Post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ as the theatre of the 
New Cold War
One of the central tenets of the Leave campaign in 
2016 and of Boris Johnson’s campaign in 2019 was 
the idea of ‘Global Britain’: a prosperous, extrovert, 
sovereign country that has taken back control of 
its laws and borders, quickly doing beneficial trade 
deals with the world, away from the regulatory 
shackles of the EU. The reality, as we are about 
to discover, is slightly more complicated and this 
election campaign serves as a warning. 
The reality is that Britain is already facing 
major challenges to its security and sovereignty 
– not from the European Union, but from Russia 
and China. Both countries, each for their own 
reasons and in their own ways, are engaging in 
separate massive campaigns of strategic expansion, 
influence and penetration in the domestic systems 
of western liberal democracies, the Middle East 
and – in the case of China – Africa, the Pacific and 
the Americas, too. The evidence that this is already 
happening in the UK, too is vast, sustained and 
public: from daily cyber attacks (against infrastruc-
ture, academia, industry and government targets) 
and assassinations in UK soil (such as the Salisbury 
chemical attack) to complex hybrid war operations 
(including disinformation campaigns) and the 
cultivation of networks of agents and informants 
within UK communities – including universities. 
We know that Russian activists tried to 
assist the break-up of the UK during the 2015 
referendum on Scottish independence – and when 
they failed, they orchestrated a disinformation 
campaign to discredit the referendum itself. We 
know that the Leave campaign was supported by 
Russian bots and by a conglomerate of shadowy 
economic and political interest groups associated 
with the Kremlin, Cambridge Analytica and the 
2016 Trump campaign.
The Russian government would have probably 
been happy regardless of the outcome of the 
UK election. As revealed in the report on illicit 
Russian activities in Britain by the cross-party 
intelligence and security select committee (ISC), 
which the government tried to suppress, several 
Russian oligarchs – some associated with Vladimir 
Putin himself – have donated large amounts to 
the Conservative Party and are socially associated 
with the prime minister. Such reports are not new; 
evidence of Russian cash flows into the party’s 
coffers has been public for years. Labour’s lacklus-
tre support of the government’s counter-measures 
after Salisbury aided the Russian government’s 
misinformation campaign, which fabricated and 
promoted more than 30 different theories about 
who was responsible so as to sow confusion and 
cynicism towards the UK authorities. 
As for China, the new government will now 
have to make a decision on whether to allow 
Huawei into the UK’s 5G network – a move that 
would have massive security implications. Other 
countries have already banned or are considering 
banning Huawei from using their networking 
equipment, while evidence has emerged of the 
Chinese government putting pressure on foreign 
governments to approve 5G network agreements 
with the company.
In 2016, the Chief of the MI6, Sir Alex 
Younger, warned that attempts to subvert 
democracy by countries such as Russia “pose a 
fundamental threat to British sovereignty”. The UK 
may be taking its laws and borders back from the 
European Union, but it is also stepping outside of 
the only reliably liberal and democratic suprana-
tional structure in the world. Britain will now have 
to fulfil its ‘global mission’ alone; working with a 
notoriously unreliable US administration (itself 
going into an impeachment trial and an election 
year); with two nuclear superpowers carefully 
placing their chips around the globe; and with its 
domestic political and technological infrastruc-
tures under the influence of those same foreign 
actors and, in the case of social media, murky 
private interests. 
Rather than emerging as a sovereign beacon 
– a politically correct neo-colonial power for the 
woke 21st century – Britain may find its own 
domestic sovereignty colonised as a theatre of 
the New Cold War. This New Cold War may 
be different to the old one; its aims, risks, costs, 
weapons, victims and endgame are still unclear, 
invisible and fragmented. However, the core 
concept of deterrence – of setting credible red 
lines – is still applicable. All this may be happening 
simply because we are allowing it to happen. 
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The Rorschach election: how the US narrates 
UK politics
As Brits went to the polls, Americans watched 
anxiously from overseas, divining harbingers of 
their own pivotal elections nearly eleven months 
out. Ballots were barely tallied when the ideolog-
ical work of projecting preferred narratives onto 
election results launched into full gear.
Unsurprisingly, one of the most prominent 
analyses to emerge—especially among mainstream 
media pundits and right-leaning democrats—was 
that the Corbyn-led Labour Party had received its 
due comeuppance for moving too far left. Spelling 
bad news for Sanders, Warren, and their support-
ers, such analyses suggest that Americans should 
heed the obvious lessons of this cautionary tale and 
move quickly to the center—or otherwise assure 
four more years of Trump’s disastrous presidency.
Seen as a boon for Biden and like-minded 
centrists, this story warms the hearts of status 
quo-defenders. According to their construction, 
wildly utopian aims like universal healthcare and 
free college is the height of folly. But alas, this 
analysis crumbles under scrutiny, with precious 
little evidence backing it up. 
First of all, the Labour Manifesto’s socialist 
proposals—from nationalizing broadband to 
renationalizing the railways—were clearly popular 
and not the main reason for Corbyn’s defeat. 
Polling data has consistently shown a strong British 
majority supporting plans such as nationalizing 
gas, water, and transportation services. Indeed, 
support for public ownership of major utilities, 
postal services, and buses actually increased since 
2017. Likewise, protecting nationalized healthcare, 
taxing the wealthy, and advancing a Green New 
Deal remained decidedly popular goals—precisely 
the kind of political program advocated by Sanders 
and fellow leftists.
Furthermore, it must be said, Sanders is no 
Corbyn. Although specious charges of anti-Semi-
tism have begun in earnest, it is difficult to imagine 
that any candidate, no matter how much character 
smearing they receive, will plummet to such low 
approval in a contest with Trump. Indeed, Sanders 
has consistently polled as one of the most popular 
politicians in America.
But perhaps the biggest reason why this 
parallel does not hold up is simply because 
America lacks the comet-like spectacle of Brexit, 
which dominated the UK political landscape and 
transfixed public attention for months, forcing 
Labour into a hopelessly compromised position. 
Nothing like Brexit exists in the US, and this 
idiosyncrasy alone confounds most parallels.
Where there are parallels between the two 
countries is a vibrant youth activism among a new 
generation that is no longer in thrall to market 
fundamentalism, a failed neoliberal project in 
desperate need of economic policy interventions, 
and a media establishment that is generally hostile 
toward significant structural change. For these 
reasons and more, the new American Left should 
not be deterred by the UK election, but there are 
still lessons to be learned. 
In particular, Sanders and Warren supporters 
should prepare for an onslaught of negative 
coverage as major media (and threatened corporate 
interests) align against them. As documented 
by scholars and analysts, systemic media bias 
was a mainstay leading up to the UK election. In 
reflecting on his defeat, Corbyn warned: “Anyone 
who stands up for real change will be met by the 
full force of media opposition.” In combating 
such bias—as well as the mis/disinformation 
originating elsewhere but amplified by mainstream 
media institutions—he recommended a “more 
robust strategy to meet this billionaire-owned and 
influenced hostility head-on.” 
While communication scholars have long 
quibbled over the nature of media effects, it is 
generally accepted that major news institutions 
play an important role in setting discursive 
agendas and framing political debates, especially 
during election seasons. Therefore media discourse 
is a crucial terrain of struggle, and one for which 
American leftists must be ready despite the 
extreme commercialism and ideological paradigms 
working against them. Strong media opposition to 
Sanders is already evident in the US (as it was in 
the 2016 election), but will likely get much worse.
Ultimately, while Americans are right to 
closely examine the contours of the recent UK 
elections and recognize significant similarities 
and lessons, Corbyn’s loss by no means dampens 
the prospects of a rising progressivism within the 
American polity. Successful progressive campaigns 
in the US someday might even help boost those in 
the UK. 
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If everyone has a mandate… surely nobody has 
a mandate? 
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In his victory statement to the media, Boris 
Johnson asserted that, “…we will get Brexit done…
delivering on the democratic mandate of the 
people” (Source: BBC news online). Surrounding 
Boris during his victory statement, the Conserv-
atives proclaimed in logos that they were ‘The 
People’s Government’. Later the same day, Boris’s 
media message from Number 10 had strengthened 
to “an overwhelming mandate from this election 
to get Brexit done” (Source: BBC news online). 
With 365 seats out of 650 the Conservatives 
had captured 56% of the seats. Presumably ‘The 
People’, who had voted 52% in favour of Brexit, 
were now 56% in favour of the ‘get Brexit done’ 
Conservative Party. However, the mandate for 
Brexit derived from 37.4% of the total electorate 
voting for leave in 2016, and the mandate for the 
Conservatives in 2019 was even worse at 29.3% of 
the total electorate. Moreover, the EURef2 poll of 
polls (source: whattheukthinks.org) suggests that 
average support for Brexit (2016 to 2019) is 53% 
remain versus 47% leave. So where is the mandate 
from ‘The People’?
It is not only the Conservatives who are 
claiming a mandate from their seat total, the 
SNP won 48 out of 59 seats (81%) in Scotland 
and so claim that they have a very clear mandate 
for a second independence referendum. In her 
victory statement, Nicola Sturgeon asserted that, 
“the stunning election win last night for the SNP 
renews, reinforces and strengthens the mandate 
we have from previous elections to offer the 
people of Scotland a choice over their future. That 
mandate says that it is for the Scottish Parliament, 
not a Westminster government, to decide whether 
and when there should be a new referendum on 
independence” (Source: BBC news online). In 
turn, this re-energised SNP supporters on Twitter 
and calls for an indyref2 are trending once again. 
However, only 30.6% of the total Scottish elector-
ate voted for the SNP. 
Of course, it might all seem a little disingen-
uous to be focusing upon measures pertaining to 
the total electorate and not total voters. But, even 
if we focus on votes, the Conservatives still got a 
minority of the votes in the UK (43.6%) and the 
SNP still got a minority of the votes in Scotland 
(45%). The SNP also picked up some tactical votes 
as most of the tactical voting sites recommended 
voting SNP to block the Conservatives and Brexit, 
so support for the SNP and/or independence may 
even be over-stated a little - albeit 46% of the vote 
(SNP 45% + Greens 1%) looks about right given 
the indyref poll averages).
Conversely, the unionist parties in Scotland 
could also be claiming a mandate as although they 
lost the lion’s share of seats to the SNP, combining 
their vote totals (Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, and Brexit Party), they got 54% of the 
vote compared to 46% of the vote for the SNP and 
the Greens. Meanwhile, in Wales, Labour took 
the most seats (22 out of 40) and the 2016 Welsh 
mandate for Brexit looks to have slipped as both 
the Conservatives and Brexit Party could only 
muster 41.6% of the vote. That said, support for 
the Conservatives in Wales increased in both vote 
share and seat share (up six seats to 14). 
The Liberal Democrats can even claim two 
mandates. Not only are the majority of people now 
not in favour of Brexit (EURef2 poll of polls noted 
above), but in Scotland, the majority of people 
were not in favour of Brexit (62% voted to remain 
in 2016) and were not (and are not on average) in 
favour of Scottish Independence (55% voted to 
remain in the UK in 2014). 
Meanwhile, online many of the public seem to 
use the party colours of the constituency winners 
on the electoral map to illustrate what a mandate 
is. The UK looks nearly all blue and Scotland looks 
nearly all yellow. What the press statements and 
social media comments tell us is that there is going 
to be an almighty battle in the coming months 
and years over who has a ‘mandate’ and who are 
‘The People’.  This argument is also likely to rage 
between the British government and the SNP, each 
with their own justification of their mandate. The 
government will argue the SNP lack a mandate 
while claiming one themselves, this will be 
countered by the SNP claiming the Conservative 
have no mandate in Scotland. Thus the battle over 
mandates could become one of the most conten-
tious issues for 2020.                                                                                                                               
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The climate election that wasn’t
For the Green Party and the wider green 
movement, this was billed as the climate election. 
The climate chaos that scientists and environmen-
talists had been warning us about for over thirty 
years was relentlessly dramatised in the news 
in November and December 2019. The election 
campaign began against a montage of burning 
forest in Brazil, ferocious wildfires in California 
and Australia and the flooding of Venice and its 
many iconic landmarks at an estimated cost of 
1 billion euros. The flooding of Venice Council 
occurred just minutes after its right-wing majority 
rejected measures to fight climate change. The 
image of the regional council debating chamber, 
located on the Gran Canal, submerged in water 
on the 12th November, served as a striking 
metaphor of the inaction of politicians around 
the world on this issue, a failure that would be 
repeated on a global scale at Cop 25 in Madrid in 
December. For Boris Johnson, perhaps the most 
dangerous moment in the election campaign 
came on November 13th when he was taken to 
task by locals in Yorkshire, angered by his slow 
response to their plight. Had Britain suffered 
more severe flooding in the weeks that followed 
Johnson’s heckling in Doncaster, the climate crisis 
might have made a more significant impact on the 
debates, but Brexit and the NHS almost completely 
dominated the headlines until election day. 
In fact, the best hope for putting global 
warming back on the national agenda came on 
the 28th November when Channel 4’s Krishnan 
Guru-Murthy hosted a lively one-hour debate on 
the climate crisis which all the major party leaders 
attended, except Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage. 
The studio replaced the no-show politicians with 
melting ice sculptures of the earth mounted on the 
Brexit and Conservative Party emblems, which 
dripped quietly beneath the studio lights. The 
Conservative Party’s response to what it called a 
“provocative partisan stunt” was to threaten to 
review Channel 4’s public service broadcasting 
licence over a “pattern of bias” and to make an 
official complaint to Ofcom, which the broadcast-
ing regulator rejected a few days later. Aside from 
accusations of Trump-like bullying by Channel 
4 and others, Boris Johnson was criticised for 
dodging the climate debate by Sir David Atten-
borough, who told Channel 4: “I don’t know what 
else he had to do, but it would have to be very, very 
important to dodge this one.” 
Boris Johnson’s failure to attend the debate was 
symptomatic of a campaign where the party leader 
appeared to be evading scrutiny – hiding in a fridge 
from a Good Morning Britain interview and called 
out by Andrew Neil for refusing to be interviewed. 
But aside from the Channel 4 debate, climate 
change played a relatively minor role in the election 
– featuring in a Question Time election special with 
an audience of under-30s – but otherwise making 
little or no impact on the leaders’ debates and 
with no questions at all on the subject in the final 
leaders’ debate. This, despite YouGov polls showing 
the environment tied with the economy as one 
of the top four issues facing the country, behind 
crime, health and leaving the EU. 
The Labour Party had stolen some of the 
Green Party’s thunder on its radical plans for a 
Green New Deal and was, controversially, judged 
to offer the greenest plans according to Friends 
of the Earth. The Green Party certainly saw some 
of its support drain away to Labour and disputes 
break out in the Party on the wisdom of their 
electoral pact with the Liberal Democrats and 
Plaid Cymru not to stand against each other in 
some seats, while challenging Labour candidates 
in marginal constituencies such as Stroud. There, 
sitting MEP Molly Scott Cato took enough votes 
to deprive Labour candidate David Drew of a 
majority and was heckled at her concession speech 
on election night for allowing the Conservative 
candidate Siobhan Baillie to take the seat. Scott 
Cato argued that the Labour Party needed to 
“respect democracy and the voters’ choice” and 
there was criticism of Labour for not joining 
in a ‘defeat Boris’ pact. After the election night 
landslide results were announced for the Conserv-
ative Party, the Greens released an infographic 
showing that, under proportional representation, 
Labour would be leading a coalition government 
with the support of 18 Green MPs. There was also 
frustration with the first-past-the-post system 
that despite the Green vote increasing by over 
60% (at 850,000 votes) the party still only had one 
Green MP, Caroline Lucas. The realities of Britain’s 
electoral system are likely to mean that Greens are 
massively under-represented in British Parliament 
compared to their European counterparts and that 
real action on the climate emergency, including a 
Green New Deal, may simply come too late.
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The short answer might seem to be, “No,” as we 
parse the psephology. However, there is a signifi-
cant generational divide. 
The Conservative Party devoted just two and 
a half pages of its manifesto to environmental 
concerns; “Stewards of Our Environment” (p43) 
“Animal Welfare” (p54) and “Fight Climate Change 
and Protect the Environment” (p55). On the 
other hand, the first section in the Labour Party 
manifesto was titled, “A Green Industrial Revolu-
tion” (pp9-25) promising to radically transform the 
economy in a “greener” direction. 
The Conservatives did announce they 
were “banning” (perhaps “pausing”) the deeply 
unpopular natural gas extraction process of 
fracking, ahead of the election. They also promised 
not to make changes to the Hunting Act (2004), 
following the unpopularity of Theresa May’s 
2017 pre-election promise to allow a free vote to 
overturn the ban on foxhunting.
According to the environmental campaigning 
group Friends of the Earth, in their assessment 
of the 2019 manifestos, which they scored in ten 
policy areas (Climate Change, Surface Transport, 
Aviation,  Energy, Homes, Food, Farming and 
Land-Use, Nature, Local Authorities, Brexit, Rights 
and Democracy) Labour scored best (33), the 
Greens second (31), the Liberal Democrats third 
(30) and the Conservatives significantly lower (5.5):
The Conservatives may have won, despite 
lower environmental commitments than other 
parties (with the exception of the Brexit Party) 
however, the election campaign did signal, in a 
number of ways, that environmental concerns 
now have a higher public profile than in previous 
elections. Pre-election data from YouGov (2019) 
suggested that for 18-29 year old voters, the second 
most important issue facing the country, after 
Brexit, was the environment. According to Lord 
Ashcroft’s post-election polling, Labour won more 
than half the votes of 18-24 year olds (57%) and 
25-34 year olds (55%). Thousands in Britain have 
taken part in the, growing, global School Strike for 
Climate movement inspired by Greta Thunberg, 
and thousands more in Extinction Rebellion, in 
the two years since the 2017 election. By 2024 (the 
next election date under the Fixed Term Parlia-
ments’ Act) many of those younger participants 
will also be of voting age.  
There were new developments in media 
coverage of the environment as an election issue. 
Channel 4 hosted the, “World’s first party leaders’ 
debate on the climate” (28 Nov 2019). Nicola 
Sturgeon (SNP), Jeremy Corbyn (Labour), Jo 
Swinson (Liberal Democrats), Sian Berry (Green 
Party co-leader) and Adam Price (Plaid Cymru) 
all took part. Boris Johnson for the Conservatives 
and Nigel Farage for the Brexit Party chose not 
to attend, their parties symbolically replaced by 
melting ice-sculptures of the planet. This led to a 
Conservative complaint to Ofcom, which was not 
upheld. The BBC’s “Under 30s” Question Time 
special included a segment of questions on the en-
vironment, including climate mitigation and meat 
consumption. And the BBC Sounds election show, 
“This Matters”, aimed at younger listeners, included 
an episode titled “Is this the climate election?” 
The Green Party of England and Wales 
increased their vote share (from approx. 500,000, 
or 2.1% in 2017, to approx. 870,000, or 2.7% in 
2019), but, thanks to first past the post, remained 
static with one MP, Caroline Lucas. Both Lucas and 
Sian Berry were impressive media performers for 
the Greens. However, Jonathan Bartley (co-leader) 
was forced to apologise after a BBC North West 
television interview, in which he appeared to single 
out halal meat for a putative ban, prompting a 
dismayed reaction from Muslim communities, and 
solidarity from Jewish ones. That incident exem-
plifies future challenges for those campaigning 
on environmental issues, inside and outside party 
politics; to be vigilant about eco-fascist tendencies 
(witting and unwitting). Xenophobic and/ or racist 
environmental nationalism is already experiencing 
a resurgence, exemplified by the (alleged – as he 
is awaiting trial) Christchurch mosque terrorist’s 
self-identified “eco-fascist” manifesto (2019). This 
ideology has the potential to become attractive 
to certain populations, as global climate impacts 
become more evidently catastrophic.   
While the 2019 general election was taking 
place, so was the yearly United Nations Climate 
Change Conference (COP25) in Madrid. With 
Greta Thunberg and other youth protesters outside, 
it had to go to extra time. The final concordat, 
reported by The Economist, “…agreed on only 
weak and watered-down commitments to the 
drastic cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases that 
had been promised. And a decision on regulations 
for new international carbon markets was deferred 
until next year.” 
The latest climate models, generated for use 
in the United Nations’ next major report (due to 
be published in 2021) suggest that the planet is 
presently on course for 5 degrees of warming by 
the end of the century. This would be catastrophic 
for billions of people, in terms of food, land and 
health security.   
2019 may not have been a climate election 
for a majority of voters, yet. But as the century 
progresses, there’s little doubt that future elections 
will be.
 Is this a climate election (yet)?
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Movement-led electoral communication: Extinction 
Rebellion and party policy in the media
In recent years, UK social movements have 
become more actively engaged in electoral 
political communication. In the 2015 and 2017 
general election campaigns, The People’s Assembly 
Against Austerity adopted novel strategies to try to 
enter into the political debate and reach the wider 
electorate. During the short campaigning periods, 
the movement published podcasts, crowdfunded 
anti-Conservative billboards and brought back 
the protest song with the number one hit Liar 
Liar GE2017, as well as maintaining an active 
presence online and launching successful hashtag 
campaigns such as #ManifestoOfMisery on 
Twitter. The purview of each of these tactics was 
the electorate and the content sought to negatively 
evaluate the incumbent government and austerity 
policy in general.  
In 2019, Extinction Rebellion (XR) employed 
similar communicative tactics (producing a 
billboard, releasing hashtags, a protest song, and an 
election special podcast) but with voters citing the 
environment as one of the top four issues facing 
the country, XR’s communicative tactics focused 
on prospective parliamentary candidates (PPC). 
One such example was the Climate hustings held 
by local XR groups in their constituencies, each 
aimed at securing support from PPCs for the 
movement’s Three Demands Bill that called for 
the next Government to “declare an emergency, 
commit to zero emissions by 2025 and create a 
Citizens’ Assembly to set out how we achieve this.”
Alongside these hustings, XR performed 
a series of non-violent direct actions (NVDA) 
directed at the political parties, the majority of 
which featured during their ‘12 Days of Crisis’ 
campaign. From 30th November until 11th 
December activists sounded air raid sirens across 
the rocks of Hay Tor at dawn, paraded a four metre 
ostrich with its head in the sand between political 
party headquarters in London, and were joined by 
the actor Emma Thompson outside BBC’s broad-
casting house to deliver a mock weather forecast. 
Unusually for social movement action during 
elections, a number of these tactics were reported 
in the mainstream print media and linked, therein, 
with policy proposals from the main parties. The 
reporting of XR’s protest repertoires throughout 
the year could account for this increased attention. 
In this short analysis, I will focus on the most 
broadly reported action (across the red tops, 
mid-market and broadsheets) dubbed ‘Bee-yond 
Politics’, to demonstrate links made between 
movement action and policy reporting. On the 
5th Day of Crisis, several activists dressed in 
yellow-and-black bee outfits glued themselves to 
the Liberal Democrat battle bus. Later that week 
‘the bees’ found the Labour bus and on the 10th 
Day the Conservative one, all with the intention of 
focusing the parties attention on the Bill. Across 
the newspapers, there was no media reporting at 
all of activists gluing themselves to Labour’s bus, 
rather the focus was on the Liberal Democrat 
and Conservative buses and concomitant policy. 
The two red tops analysed here reported on the 
events in markedly different ways, with The Sun 
codifying the activists negatively, branding them 
as “leftie clowns”, while The Mirror stuck with 
puns about bees to describe them (“a swarm” of 
activists “buzzed around”). Both papers report 
on XR’s Three Demands Bill, but only The Mirror 
reported the voices of the activists and alluded 
to specific environmental proposals (the Liberal 
Democrat’s 2045 emissions reduction target and 
the Conservative’s elusive plans). The mid-market 
MailOnline also described activists as “bumbling” 
and gives the rationale behind XR’s action, but, 
perhaps surprisingly, foregrounded activist voices 
most prominently in its reporting of the Conserva-
tive battle bus. XR’s warning of Conservative party 
2050 decarbonisation policy as a “death sentence” 
is given in the first sentence and around two thirds 
of the article expands on this view. This distinction 
in reporting is also found in two broadsheets. Both 
The Independent and The Guardian report exten-
sively on the reasons for activists gluing themselves 
to the Liberal Democrat battle bus and link the 
action with the party’s policy to reduce carbon 
emissions, but when reporting on the Conservative 
battle bus mention only its delayed departure and 
limited police action, and make no reference to the 
party’s environmental commitments.
The inconsistent linking of XR action and 
policy in the small sample here was reflected in 
overall media reporting of the environment in this 
election. As Loughborough University analysis 
reveals, coverage of the environment remained 
low and the issue did not appear in the top five 
themes across the media sector, which is somewhat 
surprising given that data showed voters were 
concerned with the environment and, therefore, 
the potential electoral salience of this issue. But 
with Brexit dominating and XR’s strategy of 
circumventing voter-communication in favour 
of targeting parliamentary candidates and battle 
buses, the shift in this election from voter-focused 
anti-policy (austerity) communication to that of 
party political pro-policy (environment) messaging 
may have proven ineffectual at ensuring 2019 
became the climate election.
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Digital campaign regulation: more urgent than ever?
This General Election has shown digital cam-
paigning to be the ‘wild west’ of politics, revealing 
the extent to which electoral law has not adapted. 
Looking at transparency and veracity, we discuss 
the need for urgent change.
 
Transparency: Who is Campaigning Online?
 Transparency is a key principle of electoral law, 
the Electoral Commission argue that voters should 
be able to understand ‘who is behind the campaign 
and who created it’. However, at the moment, there 
are no rules compelling political actors to disclose 
who they are online. Whilst offline campaigners 
need to include ‘imprints’ on campaigning 
material, online you are not required to declare 
who you are.
Although campaigners’ identity can remain 
unclear in the offline world, the high costs of 
campaigning mean that few actors get involved and 
they are often relatively easily identified. However, 
online a diverse range of individuals can get 
involved with relatively little effort (and money), 
resulting in a more crowded and unfamiliar cam-
paigning landscape. The only official information 
provided about these actors comes from a require-
ment for parties and ‘non-party’ campaigners to 
register with the Electoral Commission if they plan 
to spend over £20,000 in England and £10,000 in 
the rest of the UK. 
Looking at the most recent records, we can see 
that these thresholds mean only a small number of 
actors register. Indeed, just 69 groups or individu-
als are on the Commission’s register of ‘non-party’ 
campaigners. Whilst providing data about some 
actors such as ‘We Own It’ and ‘3rd Party Ltd’, this 
fails to capture the range of groups revealed as 
active through Facebook’s advertising archive. This 
(somewhat unreliable) resource, has shown the 
rise of third party campaigners, but we have little 
information about who these actors are, whether 
campaigns are co-ordinated, or where funding 
comes from. 
If voters ought to be able to know ‘who is 
behind the campaign and who created it’ then 
there is an urgent need to visit the information 
collected and disclosed about those active in 
campaigns. This should involve introducing 
digital imprints, reducing spending thresholds for 
Electoral Commission registration, and encourag-
ing reliable industry-led transparency initiatives. 
Veracity  
In addition to highlighting the need to update 
existing electoral regulations, the General Election 
has also shown the need to consider the case for 
new regulation, particularly around ensuring 
veracity. A desire for truth - and a perception that 
politicians might not hold that same desire - at 
elections is clearly not new. The rise in digital 
campaigning has shone a further light on  
misinformation and the need to consider what 
regulation in this area might look like.   
Parties across the spectrum have been accused 
of spreading false information online and offline, 
from the Conservative Party’s doctoring of 
interview footage, to Liberal Democrat barcharts 
and Labour photoshopping, parties (and others) 
have been accused of issuing false information. 
Whilst being creative with the truth is not a new 
political development, at this election online 
technology has been used to further promote 
these ends... 
From a regulatory perspective, these examples 
fall outside the purview of existing oversight. 
At present, the content of online material is not 
subject to regulatory scrutiny, although there is 
some precedent for factual claims to be checked in 
advertising. Companies, have also shied away from 
regulating political content, with Mark Zuckerberg 
deciding to promote ‘free expression’. There is also 
evidence that platform algorithms can promote 
provocative or untrue content due to the engage-
ment it promotes. 
 The debate over whether and how to promote 
political veracity brings a new dimension to calls 
for increased digital regulation. Whilst it is by no 
means simple for regulators to become arbiters of 
political truth, at present power is being given to 
companies to determine what it is that voters do 
or do not see. This raises questions about whether 
we want to contract out fundamental democratic 
principles to third parties and companies who 
have unclear (or contradictory) conceptions of a 
‘good’ society. 
Whilst it may therefore be challenging, this 
election illustrates the case for pursuing regulation 
of content or, at the least, providing frameworks 
and guidance for how campaigners, platforms and 
actors are able to promote this material to voters. 
This could involve compelling platforms to provide 
balanced coverage, pursuing algorithmic trans-
parency and implementing protocols to prevent 
extreme and reactionary material being promoted 
on platforms. 
Conclusion 
The General Election has shown that electoral 
oversight principles are not being upheld online, 
and that there may be a case for new regulations. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether poli-
ticians will act on these most recent concerns 
and implement new legislation of the form we 
urgently need. 
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Did the Conservatives embrace social media in 2019?
It has now become almost trite to point out that 
the political conversation on social media is not 
representative of the public at large. For many 
people this was brought into sharp focus on the 
day after the election, as the scale of the Conserv-
ative victory seemed to be at odds with the mood 
online. Social media, then, isn’t a great way to take 
the temperature of the nation—but we should not 
lose sight of the fact that it is nonetheless seen as a 
useful way for parties to communicate with certain 
sections of the public.
That’s why social media was a key part 
of Labour’s election campaign in 2017. They 
posted more content, uploaded more videos, and 
generated more interactions than any of the other 
main parties. This didn’t necessarily translate into 
a meaningful increase in support for Labour, but 
when the Conservatives hired Sean Topham and 
Ben Guerin—two twenty-something consultants 
from New Zealand that worked on the successful 
Morrison campaign in Australia—it was taken 
as a sign that they would be taking social media 
seriously this time around.
So, did the Conservatives use social media 
differently in the 2019 General Election campaign? 
To explore this, I’ve used CrowdTangle—an online 
tool that allows users to monitor the output of 
Facebook pages—to access data about the output 
of the official pages of seven parties (Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, Green, UKIP, 
and the Brexit Party) in the last three election 
campaigns. I’ve focussed on Facebook because it 
is regularly used by over two-thirds (67%) of the 
online population—making it the most wide-
ly-used social network in the UK.
The data show that the Conservatives 
massively increased their Facebook output in 2019 
(see Figure 1). In the 2017 campaign they made 
an average of around 3 Facebook posts per day, 
but this rose to nearly 21 in 2019. Labour also 
increased their output slightly, from an al-
ready-high figure of around 12 Facebook posts per 
day in 2017, to nearly 18 per day two years later. 
The number of posts from both parties increased 
steadily over the course of the campaign, and 
surged in the final week, when the Conservatives 
averaged around 29 posts per day and Labour 
around 33.
The data in Figure 1 also suggest that the 
Liberal Democrats may also have changed their 
strategy in 2019, more than doubling their number 
of posts per day from around 4 to 10. The Brexit 
Party were close behind with around 9 posts per 
day (shown as a dashed line in Figure 1 because 
they did not exist in 2017), ahead of the SNP, 
Greens and UKIP, who all appear to have stuck 
with the same basic approach as last time.
However, even though the Conservatives 
pushed out more Facebook content than Labour 
during the campaign, this did not translate into 
more interactions (engagement with the content 
measured through the number of likes, comments, 
shares, etc). The Conservatives averaged around 
74,000 interactions per day compared to Labour’s 
80,000. This could be to do with the fact that both 
Labour voters and Facebook users tend to be 
younger—though it may simply be that the content 
from Labour was more engaging.
Video, which Labour utilised considerably 
more than the other parties in 2017, seems to 
have been less of a priority for them in 2019. In 
2017, Labour made around 9 video posts per day, 
but this fell to around 5.5 in 2019. The amount of 
video from the Conservatives increased, but fell as 
a proportion of all posts. This may reflect the fact 
that video is no longer seen as a way to game the 
Facebook algorithm and springboard posts to the 
top of people’s news feeds.
Facebook is just one network, and, of course, 
posts are just one way for parties to communicate 
with social media users. Much attention will be 
focussed on the use of paid political advertising on 
social media in the coming months. And regardless 
of the format, it’s the message that is important. 
But it is clear that the two largest parties increas-
ingly see social media as a way of getting their 
message across.
Figure 1. Average number of Facebook posts per day by the main parties during the last three UK General Election campaigns    
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#GE2019 – Labour owns the Tories on 
Instagram, the latest digital battlefield
Jeremy Corbyn may have been unable to lead the 
Labour party to victory on polling day but during 
the campaign there was one place he was undis-
puted victor – Instagram. The Labour leader saw 
a significant increase in followers (Table 1), as did 
Labour’s official party account. All the parties’ and 
leaders’ accounts increased their followers across 
the course of the campaign. But it is striking that 
while Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn started at 
a similar level, as the election progressed, far more 
Instagram users decided to follow Jeremy Corbyn’s 
account than that of his main rival. 
As demonstrated in figure 1, by mid-Novem-
ber Jeremy Corbyn’s account began to pull strongly 
ahead. Interestingly, both Corbyn and the Labour 
party accounts also saw a strong uptick in users in 
the last few days of the campaign, perhaps reflect-
ing the received wisdom that voters don’t take a 
strong interest until close to the election date.
The dramatic increase in followers 
is important for several reasons.  
Instagram appeals to a younger demographic 
than Facebook or Twitter. There are around 
23,900,000 UK users of Instagram, 74% of them are 
aged between 18 and 44. That’s a key demographic 
Labour hoped to energise and encourage to 
vote. This is because in the 2017 General Election, 
voters younger than 47 were more likely to vote 
Labour than Conservative.  
The increase was also important because it 
echoed a similar rise in social media followers for 
Corbyn in the 2017 campaign. Then, he was able to 
increase the number of followers of his Facebook 
account by more than a third, the Labour party 
increased its followers by more than 75%.  
Part of Labour’s digital strategy was to 
encourage people to back it who have not tra-
ditionally voted for the party. On Instagram, it 
repeatedly ran posts encouraging young people to 
register to vote, including this one featuring the 
TV presenter, Billie JD Porter.  
The desire to motivate Millennial and older 
Gen Z voters explains the party’s concerted 
campaign to target them. An analysis of 
activity on both parties and leaders’ Instagram 
accounts, demonstrates that Labour posted 
more than its rivals.  This pattern of activity was 
accentuated on the party leader accounts. Corbyn’s 
account was by far the most prolific, far outstrip-
ping his rivals. Indeed, on polling day alone it 
posted 53 times.
Corbyn’s account posted a range of content. 
Among the blizzard of posts were real-life 
case studies of people affected by austerity, 
exhortations to register to vote or get out and 
vote, celebrity endorsements, and screenshots 
of Twitter statements aimed at firing up his 
supporters. And true to the cliché of Instagram 
users’ interests there were also animal pictures, 
including this one of his cat, El Gato. 
The Labour party not only produced the most 
content, it generated the most engagement too. An 
analysis of the most watched videos demonstrates 
content produced by Corbyn and Labour vastly 
outperformed those of other parties. Almost all 
this engagement came from Corbyn’s account. It 
delivered the vast bulk of Labour’s video views, 
8,161,500 compared to just 1,537,000 from the 
party’s official account. Videos that cut through 
with social media users were those that empha-
sised Corbyn’s down-to-earth personality, or used 
emotional messaging to drive engagement, such 
as this video message about her experience of the 
NHS made by a young woman with cancer.
Other posts that performed well were videos 
that accused Johnson of being a liar, a coward 
or a racist. By far the most watched video was 
posted on the final day of the campaign. Titled 
“If you’re not sure who to vote for, watch this”, it 
was a collection of news clips showing the impact 
of inequality, poverty and austerity, interspersed 
with interviews with Conservative politicians and 
a speech by Boris Johnson, all edited to promote 
the impression that the Tory politicians were cold 
and uncaring. 
Videos posted by Corbyn dominated the 
most-watched list. While the leader accounts were 
more successful than anonymous party accounts 
at generating engagement, Johnson’s struggled to 
get anywhere near the level of views that Corbyn’s 
achieved (Table 2). Johnson’s most watched video 
was of him laying bricks at a new housing develop-
ment in Bedfordshire, viewed 98,700 times, putting 
it well outside the top-10 most viewed videos.
Given Instagram’s demographic, it was clear 
Johnson’s digital team were not prioritising it to 
the same extent as Corbyn’s. Clearly, Labour and 
Corbyn used Instagram to reach younger voters, 
easily out-performing other parties. What is less 
clear is whether they only reached those already 
intending to vote Labour or users who might be 
persuaded to back the party. But given Labour’s 
performance on polling day, it is clear future 
social media campaigns will need to demonstrate 
persuasive impact in delivering voters as well as 
online engagement. 
Table 2 - Top 10 most viewed Instagram videos during the campaign
Table 1 - Increase in Instagram followers during campaign
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Spot the difference: how Nicola Sturgeon and 
Jo Swinson self-represented on Twitter
There is no doubt that the results of the general 
elections came as a shock to many across the 
UK, not least to Jo Swinson. As leader of the 
Liberal Democrats, she not only lost her seat 
but consequently had to step down as the party’s 
leader. For someone who had said she will be the 
next Prime Minister when she was first elected, it 
was telling that she could not even convince her 
own constituency to vote for her. Compare that 
to Nicola Sturgeon, another female party leader 
whose party did remarkably well, gaining 13 new 
seats including Jo Swinson’s. What made these two 
women leaders so different?
From my critical perspective as a gender 
scholar, I was interested to know why Nicola 
Sturgeon sparked so much confidence as a 
politician while Jo Swinson often left me feeling 
unconvinced. If the results are anything to go by, it 
seems that I was not the only one who felt this way. 
Thus, I turned to social media, specifically Twitter, 
to determine the sort of online political self these 
two women projected to the public, given that 
social media offer more control over content than 
traditional media. The understanding was that 
their self-representation will project the preferred 
political persona, and therefore be a better marker 
of how each woman wanted to be seen by the 
public. Focusing on their Twitter activity a week 
before and a day after the election on December 
12 (5th-13th December 2019), I looked at each 
leader’s level of visibility, the personality they 
projected and the level of public engagement with 
their tweets.
While these are preliminary reflections, the 
first thing to note is that Nicola Sturgeon was far 
more visible on Twitter than Jo Swinson. During 
the 9 days, she tweeted 215 times compared with Jo 
Swinson’s 80. These comprised 25 original tweets, 
22 retweets with comments and 168 retweets 
without comments, while Jo Swinson’s were 39, 
15 and 26 respectively. Thus, beyond visibility on 
traditional media and face-to-face campaign inter-
actions, Nicola Sturgeon made better use of Twitter 
to remain visible to the public. As people often vote 
for candidates they are familiar with, this seemed 
like a good campaign strategy. However, it must 
also be noted that much as social media can be an 
alternative space for women politicians to counter-
act their marginalisation in traditional media, they 
can also serve as an arena for the (re)production of 
sexist and stereotypical abuse from the public. Jo 
Swinson, for example, have reported of relentless 
online sexist abuse as have other women MPs like 
Diane Abbott. At the start of the campaign, 18 
women MPs also stood down citing abuse as one 
of the key reasons. Thus, social media can be a 
double-edged sword to women politicians.
Considering tweet content, Nicola Sturgeon 
adopted a more populist approach that included a 
large number of endorsements from other people, 
images with smiling crowds to signify her popularity 
and likeability, endorsements of other SNP candidates 
to portray herself as a supportive leader, a variety 
of ‘ordinary’ activities like ice skating and tossing 
vegetables to foreground her affinity with the masses, 
and a clear and simple campaign message: lock Boris 
Johnson out by voting for her party. Many of these 
strategies were missing in Jo Swinson’s feed as she 
adopted a more individualised political persona that 
focused on her campaign message (most of which 
were criticisms of Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn), 
and rarely showed her with crowds, thereby missing 
an opportunity to counter her (perceived) unpopular-
ity especially in traditional media. Thus, while Nicola 
Sturgeon adopted a mix of aspects of her femininity, 
masculinised politics and ordinariness to lay claim to 
an authentic political self, Jo Swinson’s constructed 
self focused too narrowly on conventional ideas 
about politicking, thereby leaving information gaps 
about who she really is and whether what she showed 
online was authentic. 
Jo Swinson’s individualised approach to her 
self-representation, which did not differ much 
from her portrayal in traditional media, may have 
considerably contributed to her unpopularity, 
which was reflected in responses to her tweets. 
For example, retweets above 1000 were 5 (9.3%) 
while likes above 2000 were 13(24.1%), compared 
with Nicola Sturgeon’s 12 (25.5%) and 38 (76.6%) 
respectively. In fact, poll results show that the more 
people saw Jo Swinson, the more they disliked 
her. The extent of Jo Swinson’s unpopularity is 
even evident among her fellow women politicians 
as both Nicola Sturgeon and Diana Abbot were 
jubilant when they heard that she lost her seat. 
Achieving an authentic political self that 
inspires confidence in voters is a difficult task for 
women politicians because politics is so mascu-
linised. This initial analysis has shown that while 
social media gives women more content control, it 
is still very easy to get it wrong.
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“Go back to your student politics”? Momentum, 
the digital campaign, and what comes next
The dust has barely settled on the 2019 General 
Election, and the post mortem on the Labour 
Party’s lowest number of seats since 1935 has well 
and truly begun. Jeremy Corbyn has focused on 
the polarising impact of Brexit, and how the offer 
of a second referendum failed to resonate with 
Leave supporters. Research from Datapraxis and 
Opinium suggests that the leadership was partially 
to blame. Described as “unelectable”, “too old”, 
and “too far to the left” by voters interviewed by 
the Financial Times, Corbyn was a dealbreaker for 
some. Further, this unpopularity was consistently 
fuelled by the negative media coverage that the 
Labour Party received in the press.
But what about Momentum, the political 
activist group founded in the wake of Jeremy 
Corbyn’s rise to leader of the Labour Party? With 
40,000 members, 200,000 supporters, and over 
170 local groups, the organisation was described 
as a significant factor in the surprise result in the 
2017 General Election. Momentum built upon 
this blueprint in 2019, focusing their efforts on 
three aims: (1) mobilising supporters to canvass in 
marginal constituencies using My Campaign Map, 
with access to WhatsApp groups to quickly create 
networks amongst local campaigners; (2) crowd-
funding over £200,000 for micro-targeted adverts 
on social media, aimed at driving voter registration 
and youth turnout; (3) sharing memes and video 
content with an increased focus on personalisation 
through “Videos By The Many”, where supporters 
filmed and shared their own personal experiences 
on key policy issues.
While successful in mobilising supporters 
on the ground, the canvassing failed to make a 
difference in key marginals. Now, Momentum is at 
a crossroads, facing a time of re-definition. Firstly, 
who will they endorse in the upcoming leadership 
election for the Labour Party? In interviews Dennis 
(2019) conducted with members, there was notable 
frustration for not being consulted on the selection 
of the candidates backed by Momentum in the 
National Executive Committee elections in 2018. 
Supporters, however, were willing to overlook 
this in the name of a Corbyn-led government. 
With Corbyn due to step down imminently, the 
organisation faces a leadership election without 
him on the ballot paper. This is significant for 
a group whose very existence is entwined with 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership.
Momentum’s leadership and the National 
Co-ordinating Group now face a choice on 
whether to consult supporters, risking division, or 
make a recommendation and instruct members 
to lend their support to the preferred candidate, 
contradicting their commitment to member-driv-
en decision making. 
A potential dividing line here is Brexit. In a 
consultation in November 2018, 82% of members 
who responded felt that “Brexit will make things 
worse” and the majority supported a public vote. 
With the UK due to leave the EU by January 31, 
this may seem insignificant. The trade negotia-
tions that follow, however, will see the question of 
Europe firmly in the minds of the public. As the 
Labour Party considers how to win back seats lost 
in Leave-supporting constituencies, Momentum 
must consider how much of a sticking point this 
could be when evaluating the likely frontrunners. 
During the campaign, both Angela Rayner 
and Rebecca Long-Bailey suggested they could 
support Leave in a hypothetical second referen-
dum, with a Labour-negotiated deal. This could 
be problematic for a membership that adopts a 
pro-Remain position.
Secondly, Momentum needs to consider how 
it is perceived outside of the Labour Party. During 
the election night coverage on ITV, former home 
secretary Alan Johnson described Momentum as 
a “cult”, stating that its’ members should “go back 
to your student politics”. Further described as a 
“cancer” in modern politics by Iain Duncan Smith 
MP and a “disaster” by Nina Myskow on Jeremy 
Vine on 5, the organisation has been presented as 
a radical fringe with nefarious intentions in the 
immediate aftermath of the election. This is not 
new - in the past Momentum has chosen to lean 
into this criticism to foster the group’s identity and 
deepen the connections between supporters. 
While this is an effective form of mobilisation, 
this obfuscates their activism between elections. 
In Portsmouth, Dennis (2019) found examples 
of community-focused projects, such as an event 
commemorating the first anniversary of the 72 
people killed in the Grenfell Tower fire. “The 
Organiser”, a monthly email digest to Momentum 
supporters, shares similar updates from local 
groups across the country: debates about the future 
of social housing in Manchester, training events on 
local democracy in Liverpool, campaigning against 
transphobia in Southampton. This is a far cry from 
the representation in post-election coverage.
Momentum’s latest email to supporters calls 
for a period of reflection. Looking inwards, the 
organisation must contemplate if the narrative 
of “people power” can be realised. Looking 
outwards, it must consider how it engages with 
the public, and whether the mobilising benefits 
of its provocative communication outweigh 
potential reputational damage.
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Taking the tube
Two days into the 2019 campaign, the Labour 
Party’s Facebook event “Vote Labour for real 
change Thursday 12 December” had 2,600 sup-
porters registered. Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ 
“Back Boris on Dec 12th to get Brexit done” had 
3,500 people registered. By election day, the Tories 
had 4,600 registered, Labour 11,000.
The major parties focused heavily upon 
Facebook for their online advertising strategies, 
placing more than 25,000 ads during the course 
of the campaign. But if the younger demographic 
is key to electoral success, strategies based on 
the overarching influence of Facebook (which 
appeals to broader age ranges) may eventually 
become questionable.
Ofcom reports that the entertainment 
platform most popular with British youth is 
YouTube (at an average of 73 minutes a day). 
As the campaign began, Labour had 30,000 
YouTube subscribers, the Tories 38,000. The day 
of the poll, the Conservatives had increased their 
lead, with 47,600 subscribers against Labour’s 
32,300. Labour’s YouTube video of its campaign 
launch attracted 1,200 views in two days. The 
Conservatives’ campaign launch video drew 5,500 
views in 24 hours. The only content the Labour 
YouTube channel posted in the last fortnight of 
the campaign comprised six BSL (British sign 
language) versions of parts of their manifesto. The 
Tories were still posting on election day.
The Conservatives also (successfully) offered 
rather more entertaining material: from slick 
adverts to ostensibly voter-generated content. 
Posted on 12 November, ‘Boris Johnson’s hilarious 
election advert’ reached 193,000 views in its 
first week. Though far from hilarious, Johnson’s 
celebrity appeal and the clickbait headline worked 
wonders.  The Conservatives’ chillax music video 
of 25 November (‘lo fi boriswave beats to relax/
get brexit done to’) attracted more than 340,000 
views in five days. A fortnight later, Boris Johnson’s 
“funny Love Actually parody” gained 80,000 views 
in its first 12 hours. (This was not however uncon-
troversial: Labour candidate Rosena Allin-Khan 
claimed the Tories had stolen the idea from her 
own spoof video; and within hours an alternative 
version – in which Johnson was wooed by Donald 
Trump – appeared online.)
Meanwhile, it proved difficult for Labour to 
maintain the social media initiative it had seized 
in its previous campaign. Where there had been 
harmony, there was now discord. The demise of 
2017’s Grime4Corbyn movement (which had only 
2,000 followers on Twitter, 1,000 on Facebook 
and 600 on Instagram) might not have merited 
the attention the BBC gave it in 2019, but, when 
on 12 November the Scarcity Studios YouTube 
channel posted a video critiquing that movement’s 
exploitation of grime artists, it attracted more than 
5,000 views in a day.
The youthful enthusiasm of 2017 seemed 
very far away. Playing to attention spans rather 
shorter than the typical electoral cycle, YouTube 
tends (perhaps like much of Momentum itself) 
to favour the disruptive characteristics of a 
protest movement over nuanced, complex and 
constructive political dialogue. Thus July 2019’s 
harshly satirical ‘Boris Bop’ video, created by 
YouTube mash-up maestro ‘Joe’, gained more than 
a million views in four months. The same channel 
followed this on 25 October with Boris Johnson’s 
‘Any Deal Will Do’, attracting 300,000 views in a 
month. Published five days later, a John Bercow 
version of Electric Six’s ‘Danger! High Voltage’ 
(‘Order! High Voltage’) drew 200,000 views in six 
weeks. The following day’s ‘Brexit Halloween with 
Jacob Rees-Mogg’ gained 150,000 views in the 
same period. Posted on 12 November, a video of 
Nigel Farage lamenting (to the tune of Depeche 
Mode’s 1981 anthem) that despite his attempts 
to promote “bigotry and hate” he “just can’t get 
enough” electoral support attracted over 50,000 
views in a week. Other YouTube channels followed 
suit. Cassetteboy’s similarly simplistic response to 
the politics of the post-truth era – an edit of Boris 
Johnson speeches to the beat of MC Hammer’s 
‘U Can’t Touch This’ (‘Can’t Trust Me’) posted on 
YouTube on 5 December – gained a quarter of a 
million views in five days.
YouTube has rarely engaged its audiences in 
more serious political debates, despite attempts by 
establishment ‘Boomers’ to impose their earnest-
ness upon the site. As 2019’s campaign began, the 
government’s YouTube video encouraging online 
voter registration (originally posted in 2014) 
was fronted by a middle-aged website manager. 
On 7 November, the BBC posted a spectacularly 
patronising video called “the voting system 
explained”. Meanwhile, E4’s celebrity-strewn video 
of 5 November encouraging youth to “pop [their] 
voting cherry” gained fewer than 3,000 views in a 
month – but was at least preferable to the YouTube 
vacillations of Russell Brand who, following his 
2015 claims that revolution trumped democracy, 
had gone on to encourage voter registration for 
the 2017 poll.
The politicization of that platform won’t start 
with established broadcasters, governments or 
political parties but at the grassroots. It remains to 
be seen whether that’s a direction which YouTube’s 
influencers and influenceds will seek to take.
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The politics of deletion in social media campaigns
Influence operations and propaganda on social 
media emerged in the run-up to electoral events 
in 2016 and continue to challenge policymakers. 
These operations rely on coordinated and targeted 
attacks where the accounts and profiles sourcing 
the content disappear in the months following the 
campaign. User accounts may be suspended from 
social platforms for violating standards and Terms 
of Service, such as posting inappropriate content 
or displaying bot-like activity patterns; others 
are deleted by the malicious account holders to 
cover their tracks. The modus operandi of these 
operations often consists of amplifying original 
hyperpartisan content by large botnets that 
disappear after the campaign. The emerging thread 
is then picked up by high-profile partisan accounts 
that seed divisive rhetoric to larger networks of 
partisan users and automated accounts.
It is against this landscape of information warfare 
that political campaigns seek to influence the public 
opinion. Social media platforms ramped up efforts 
to flag false amplification, remove “fake accounts,” 
and prevent the use of highly optimized and targeted 
political messages on users. These efforts sought to 
clear social platforms from “low-quality content,” 
including user accounts, posts, and weblinks selected 
for removal. The removal of social media posts and 
accounts thus constitutes the central line of action 
against influence operations, misinformation, false 
or fabricated news items, spam, and user-generated 
hyperpartisan news. While social platforms rarely 
disclose content that was flagged for removal, some 
companies have released publicly the community 
standards used to remove content from their services.
Studying the politics of deletion on social 
platforms is thus an exercise in reverse engineer-
ing, as content that has been blocked from social 
platforms is likely to be problematic content no 
longer available. As such, the volume of deleted 
accounts and posts linked to campaigns can be 
used to gauge the extent to which a given election 
on social media was plagued by problematic 
content. The process of verifying if content remains 
available is however cumbersome. Moreover, 
election campaigns need to be monitored in 
real time, as once a post is deleted by a user or 
blocked by the platform it disappears from the 
platform altogether; similarly, deleting a tweet 
automatically triggers a cascade of deletions for 
all retweets of that tweet. This specific affordance 
of social platforms has of course facilitated the 
disappearance of posts, images, and weblinks from 
the public view.
The 2019 UK General Election appears to 
have been relatively trouble-free. On the eve of 
the vote, only 6.7% of election-related tweets had 
been removed and less than 2% of the accounts 
were no longer operational. This figure is in line 
with previous studies reporting that on average 
4% of tweets disappear, but contrasts with the 
referendum campaign, where 33% of the tweets 
leading up to the referendum vote have been 
removed. Only about half of the most active 
accounts that tweeted the referendum continue 
to operate publicly and 20% of all accounts are no 
longer active. These accounts were particularly 
prolific: while Twitter suspended fewer than 5% 
of all accounts, they posted nearly 10% of the 
entire conversation about the referendum. Partisan 
affiliation was also a good predictor of tweet decay 
in the referendum campaign, as we found more 
messages from the Leave campaign that disap-
peared than the entire universe of tweets affiliated 
with the Remain campaign. 
Ephemerality is perhaps an expected affor-
dance of social media communication, but it is not 
an expected design of political communication 
and deliberation across social platforms. Influence 
operation can exploit this affordance by offload-
ing problematic content that is removed from 
platforms before the relentless - though time 
consuming - news cycle has successfully corrected 
the narratives championed in highly volatile social 
media campaigns. This amounts to the involuntary 
but spontaneous gaslighting of social platforms: 
the low persistence and high ephemerality of social 
media posts are leveraged to transition from one 
contentious and unverified political frame to the 
next before mechanism for checking and correct-
ing false information are in place. 
Ultimately, the politics of deletion allow for 
daisy-chaining multiple disinformation campaigns 
that disappear as soon as rectifying information or 
alternative stories starts to emerge.
Campaigners adopting the “Firehose of 
Falsehood” model can offload social media 
messages rapidly, repetitively, and continuously 
over multiple channels without commitment to 
consistency or accuracy. The high volume posting 
of social media messages can be effective because 
individuals are more likely to be persuaded if a 
story, however confusing, appears to have been 
reported repetitively and by multiple sources. In 
this context, counterpropaganda methods and the 
fact-checking of social media posts are particularly 
ineffective. On social media platforms, as it turns 
out, nobody will know you are a troll.
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“Behind the curtain of the targeting machine”: 
political parties A/B testing in action
One of the core processes that we know has been 
occurring over the last decade, but have had little 
evidence of its action, is A/B testing. However, 
thanks to (albeit limited) data sources such as the 
Facebook Ad Library, we finally saw behind the 
curtain of the targeting machine and how parties 
are using Facebook users as a data source to exper-
iment with different political content. A/B testing 
is a method of comparing two or more versions of 
an advert against each other to determine which 
one performs better. Depending on what content 
is used, people will interact differently. Then 
statistical analysis can be used to examine which 
variation performs better for a given goal.
All the parties are engaging in this process, 
however a clear example showed up during the 
election campaign via the Liberal Democrats. 15 
different versions of Jo Swinson were sent to a 
combined 128,000 people early in the campaign 
(Image 1). This interest in testing out different 
Jo’s shows us both the origins of their misplaced 
highly personalised campaign, and how A/B 
testing via Facebook can lead to content decisions 
on and offline.  
All the posts featured the same message 
(Figure 1), and a link to the Liberal Democrat 
website to measure clickthroughs. The Liberal 
Democrats were clearly trying to find the right 
Jo for their campaign communications, the 
audience data (Graph 1) shows how the party was 
reaching different demographics via the different 
Jo’s. This is because of the Facebook ad delivery 
algorithm, user choices and targeting parameters 
chosen. Of the 15 adverts sent by the Liberal 
Democrats, they decided to retire types 1-10 and 
continue with types 11-15. This will be due to the 
clickthrough rate of these adverts, as well as the 
demographics reached.
The adverts that were continued reached a 
more equal group of people, especially more men 
than other versions of the adverts. The party had 
found the Jo’s to use, with this testing leading to 
many instances of Jo 12 and 15 seen on and offline 
(Figure 2). Even leaflets used image 15, showing 
the wider impact of the digital campaign. Although 
tis was prior to the Liberal Democrats being 
presented with evidence that Jo Swinson was a vote 
loser which led to her removal from leaflets and 
adverts late in the campaign.
Overall, this election showed us that A/B 
testing is now ubiquitous for the political parties, 
with it occurring on all types of messages right up 
to election day. Political parties using Facebook 
ads have today a powerful capacity to hone their 
messages. Unlike the past where expensive and 
hard to organise focus groups were the only avenue 
available for parties to test their messages; today all 
the political parties engage in multivariate testing 
of images, messages and content forms. Thousands 
of instances were seen, with the majority testing 
policy, colours, styles and messaging. Political 
parties have never had it so good.
Facebook, through targeted advertising, has 
allowed parties to engage in complex psychological 
experiments, hyper-charging their content to 
maximise their intended goals. This has both 
positive and negatives. On the one hand it gives 
parties greater opportunities to activate support, 
inform the public of policy positions, issues and 
candidates, test policy messaging and increase the 
campaign learning potential of content. However, 
A/B testing can also be used to hone negative 
messages, promoting a more polarised and 
negative campaign discourse. Today parties can 
fight as much on demobilisation as mobilisation, 
threatening the operation of democracy. This 
ability for parties to hypercharge their messaging 
is a new campaign norm, and one we should 
question. We the voters are being compartmental-
ised, fractured apart and sold different ideas, with 
this having stark impacts on the foundations of 
common ground of politics. It is our activity online 
that makes this process possible and as such we 
have a right to understand whether we are being 
A/B tested online and what for. 
Graph 1. The audiences of the different Jo ads
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Against opacity, outrage and deception in digital 
political campaigning
In the 2015 UK General Election, £3m was spent 
on advertising on platforms, companies, consult-
ants and strategists. In the 2017 General Election, 
over £6m was spent. This includes increased use 
of data analytics (automated insights into datasets 
using data-mining techniques), and data man-
agement approaches to “profile” audiences (via 
mathematical techniques to discover patterns in 
“big data”). It includes increased use of iterative, 
large-scale, rapid testing of ads online (“A/B” tests) 
to identify and deploy the most persuasive ad; and 
to gather data on, and target, the most important 
voters with tailored messages.  
While using such techniques to mobilise 
activists and engage voters is good for democracy, 
these processes are opaque. Potential harms arising 
include fragmented national conversations (A/B 
testing allows secret negative messaging to niche 
audiences without alienating the broader elector-
ate); and undue political influence over voters by 
exploiting their vulnerabilities (such as inability to 
recognise deception). 
In 2019, the UK Parliament’s House of 
Lords Select Committee on Democracy and Digital 
Technologies asked whether greater transparency 
in digital political campaigning would improve 
the UK’s electoral process. To answer this, we 
analysed the Leave groups’ campaigns from the 
2016 Brexit Referendum. We concluded that we 
need an ethical code of conduct for transparent, 
explainable, civil and informative digital political 
campaigns (see Table 1). The 2019 General 
Election confirms this need. 
Unethical campaigning: the 2019 General Election 
Contravening transparency. Since 2018, Google 
and Facebook provide publicly searchable 
libraries of election ads and spending on their 
platforms: each Facebook ad also says who 
paid for it. However, abuse continues. Cam-
bridge-based Green Party activists complained 
that campaigning group 3rd Party Ltd managed 
by Vote Leave’s former chief technology officer 
(Thomas Borwick) was pretending to be the 
Green Party by buying Facebook and Instagram 
ads encouraging people in swing constituencies to 
“Vote Green”. 3rd Party Ltd also ran social media 
ads to “Save Brexit”. Borwick boasted that he 
could use proxy groups on Facebook to “split the 
vote” of Conservative opponents.
Contravening explainability. Facebook’s 
political ad library includes information on broad 
geographic targeting (England, Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland), broad demographic targeting 
(age, gender), reach and amount spent on ads. 
Since February 2019, users can click on a Facebook 
button ‘Why am I seeing this ad?’ which tells them 
the brand that paid for the ad, some biographical 
details targeted, if and when the brand or one of 
their agency/developer partners uploaded the 
user’s contact information, and when access was 
shared between partners. However, there is no 
information on finer-grained targeting such as use 
of psychographics and probabilistic data inferences 
from metadata; or to what campaign end they were 
targeted (e.g. voter mobilisation, suppression). 
Contravening civility. Early in the campaign, 
the Liberal Democrats tested 13 identical Facebook 
ads attacking Corbyn, with differently provocative 
headlines on Corbyn’s personal lack of trustwor-
thiness, weakness and failure to stamp out hate, 
discrimination and anti-Semitism in his party. 
Accusations of anti-Semitism grew increasingly 
shrill, with Chief Rabbi Mirvis urging people to 
“vote with their conscience” as “A new poison – 
sanctioned from the very top – has taken root in 
the Labour Party” (selectively evidencing Corbyn’s 
past comments and associations).
Contravening informativeness. Numerous 
examples of deception include the Conservative 
Party press office assuming a false identity online, 
creating a parody Labour manifesto site, circulat-
ing doctored, misleading videos of the opposition, 
and contravening Google’s ad rules. Labour ran 
misleading Facebook ads on how much Labour’s 
policies would save the “average family”.
Transparency is Not Enough
Unethical campaigning proliferates despite 
large tech companies’ efforts to reduce opacity 
via greater transparency and explainability. 
Since campaigning started in October, Twitter 
committed to stop accepting most political ads 
(from 22 November onwards). On 20 November, 
Google said that targeting of election ads would 
be limited to general categories (age, gender, post 
code location); and advertisers would no longer 
be able to target political messages based on 
users’ interests inferred from browsing or search 
histories. While tech companies should continue to 
reduce opacity, the onus lies on political campaign-
ers to meet the ethical demands for civility and 
informativeness.
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Table 1: Ethical Code of Conduct for Digital Political Campaigns
Transparency Make clear if political messages online come from a party, how much campaigners spend on 
digital campaigning, and on what. 
Explainability In campaigns that extensively use AI to profile voters, give all voters an explanation of the 
profiling. 
Civility Campaign material should be civil (e.g. not nasty, aggressive, disrespectful, or pitched to 
provoke anger and outrage) and must not incite others to commit crimes (e.g. making 
false statements of fact about candidates’ personal character or conduct). If campaigners 
deliberately breach civililty codes to become righteously uncivil (for moral reasons), then 
rationally justify why.
Informativeness Campaigns should give voters enough information to freely make informed judgments. The 
information provided should be true, complete, undistorted and relevant.
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The explosion of the public sphere
It is Thursday, 21st November 2019. The Labour 
manifesto has just been published and you want to 
know what to think about it. You could, of course, 
read all 107 pages of the manifesto in full online, 
or snack on Labour Party digests of it (including 
Jeremy Corbyn’s 60 second synopsis from the back 
of a moving car). Alternatively, you could go to the 
Conservatives’ critique of it at labourmanifesto.
co.uk (briefly the top ad when you search Google 
for ‘Labour’).
Rather than read the necessarily one-sided 
pitches by the parties themselves, you probably 
want some non-party analysis. For this you will not 
find yourself wanting. For lightning reactions you 
can scroll through the thousands of tweets under 
#labourmanifesto. For more thoughtful responses 
you can read breakdowns from every thinktank 
from the IFS to the IEA, from the Institute for 
Government to the UK in a Changing Europe. 
If you are aligned to a particular cause you can 
look at the many posts from NGOs and campaign 
groups, from Greenpeace to Taxpayers Alliance.
The national media didn’t hold back in their 
reporting and analysis. Of the more than 4,500 
news articles published online on 21st November 
by the UK’s national newspapers and broadcasters, 
you could read just under 300 reporting on 
Labour’s manifesto. 
Then there are the online native news sites. 
Buzzfeed, Vice or Huffington Post will give you 
a general view. For an inside take you could 
turn to Politico, or PoliticsHome, Politics Means 
Politics or Politics.co.uk. For insight you might 
choose Tortoise, or CapX, The Conversation or 
Unherd. Or perhaps you want to confirm your 
partisan prejudice at ConservativeHome, the New 
European, or Labour List. Further from the centre 
still you can find coverage on Breitbart, Novara 
Media, the Canary, Skwawkbox, Evolve Politics, 
Westmonster, or Politicalite. Or you might find 
yourself following a link to a lesser known online 
news site, like LondonEconomic, Joe.co.uk, the 
Descrier, the Overtake, or ScramNews. Or one 
of a growing collection of sites whose origins, 
ownership, and objectives are obscure or entirely 
opaque – such as ukupdates.co.uk.
Exhausted by the idea of trawling through 
each of these sites individually? How about 
using a news aggregator: AOL News, Yahoo 
News, MSN News, Bing News, NewsNow.co.uk, 
or even Newsdump.co.uk. If you would rather 
get a personal take on the manifesto you could 
watch one of many YouTube vloggers (such as 
TLDR, A Different Bias or Akkad Daily), read 
innumerable blogs (like briefingsforbrexit.com), 
sign up for one of dozens of newsletters, or 
listen to one of a bevy of podcasts (Reasons to 
be Cheerful, Remainiacs, The Political Party, or 
Talking Politics). Alternatively, you could gauge 
what effect the manifesto is having on Labour’s 
odds at politicalbetting.com, or track the polls at 
one of the many polling sites (including YouGov, 
Ipsos MORI or Lord Ashcroft polls). 
We are inundated with political news and 
views, and this is simply the production of political 
news and opinion rather than its redistribution, 
adaptation, and consumption. Your interpre-
tation of the manifesto will almost certainly be 
conditioned by the context in which you find it. 
If, for example, you are one of the 109,393 people 
who follow the Fight4Brexit group on Facebook, 
then the manifesto will be framed as a proposal 
for a second EU referendum. Or you might be 
one of the 226,000 members of the r/ukpolitics 
community on Reddit critiquing mainstream 
media and making their own assessments of the 
party’s promises.
Much of the current debate about ‘fake 
news’, false claims, and polarized debate, does 
not adequately acknowledge the most significant 
change in political communication in the last two 
decades – the explosion of the public sphere. There 
is a cacophony of voices competing to be heard – 
individuals, groups, communities, for-profit and 
non-profit organisations, campaigners, govern-
ments (foreign and domestic).
This means that many of the established 
theories we reach for when thinking about 
political communication, such as agenda-setting, 
framing and priming, need to be fundamentally 
reconceptualized. Who is setting the agenda 
of an active member of Fight4Brexit or r/
ukpolitics? It means that quantitative content 
analysis – the bread and butter of lots of media 
research – has become vastly more complex and 
more difficult. What does counting the number 
of articles published in a handful of mainstream 
publications now tell us about the impact of 
media on public attitudes and opinions?
The 2019 UK election campaign has parallels 
with that of 1983. An unelectable Labour leader, 
a hard-left Labour Party, a collapse of Labour 
support in traditional strongholds, all ending with 
a hefty Conservative majority. Yet, despite these 
similarities, there is one aspect that is unrecognis-
ably different – the media and communications 
landscape. And, as yet, we have yet to understand – 
or even know how to understand – what this really 
means for our politics.
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Big chickens, dumbfakes, squirrel killers: was 2019 
the election where ‘shitposing’ went mainstream?
On the second official day of the 2019 election 
campaign, the BBC Political Editor Laura Kuenss-
berg appeared on the BBC’s Brexitcast podcast and 
was asked what ‘shitposting’ was. She said “Political 
parties or campaign groups make an advert that 
looks really rubbish and then people share it online 
saying, ‘Oh I can’t believe how shit this is’ and then 
it gets shared and shared and shared and shared 
and they go, ‘Ha ha ha, job done’” (Brexitcast, 
2019). Although Kuenssberg was correct that some 
of the Conservative adverts had been shitposts, 
she did not understand the phenomenon more 
broadly and this attracted much opprobrium 
from online commenters due to her inaccurate 
description. As Alex Hern, the Guardian’s tech 
editor explained, shitposting is ‘the act of throwing 
out huge amounts of content, most of it ironic, 
low-quality trolling, for the purpose of provoking 
an emotional reaction in less Internet-savvy 
viewers’ (New Statesman, 2019). Sarah Manavis, 
digital expert for the New Statesman, wrote that 
shitposting would likely play a part in the election 
and it was important for the BBC Political Editor 
to understand it (ibid).  
Manavis proved correct, and shitposting did 
indeed play a part in this campaign, even being 
incorporated into formal party communications 
and causing a party leader to have to deny 
information contained in one. In the run up to 
the election, the official Conservative Twitter 
account tweeted a picture of Jeremy Corbyn’s head 
Photoshopped onto a man in a chicken costume 
with the caption ‘Hey @KFC_UKI we found an 
even bigger chicken than you’. The assertion was 
that Corbyn was running scared from an election 
that the Conservatives were attempting to call at 
that time. However, the post was very much out of 
the shitposter playbook, with a low quality stock 
image, poor Photoshop, absurd tagging of KFC 
and a caption that did not make sense. 
In a follow up to this, around a week into 
the campaign, the official Conservative account 
uploaded a video of Kier Starmer on Good 
Morning Britain. However, instead of the original 
footage, they had edited the video to add pauses 
after questions to make it seem as though Starmer 
did not have a ready answer, and added wacky 
music (The Guardian, 2019). Again, this is a 
common shitposter technique or ‘dumbfake’. It 
is generally not meant to be taken seriously and 
when viewed by people who understand the 
language of shitposting would not be mistaken for 
the real thing. However, stripped of the context 
of coming from a known shitposter account, the 
video merely looked misleading, and this was how 
it was taken by many people (and possibly how 
it was intended). Instead of a joke, it was labelled 
‘fake news’, perhaps highlighting the perils of 
attempting to incorporate this type of communica-
tion into more mainstream campaigns. 
The Liberal Democrats also felt the effects of 
shitposting going mainstream, but as a victim of it 
rather than a deployer. A well-known shitposting 
account @groovyguyzone (now permanently 
banned from Twitter) posted a clearly-faked 
newspaper article which purported to have 
uncovered old Facebook posts from Liberal 
Democrat leader Jo Swinson declaring how much 
she loved killing squirrels, and referring to them 
as ‘pleb bunnies’. Again, for the intended audience 
this was an obvious joke and a riff on her blasé 
attitude to pressing the Trident nuclear button 
in an interview earlier that week. However, a few 
days later the post made its way onto Facebook, 
where there tends to be less social media-savvy 
and more credulous audiences. It spread to such a 
degree that Swinson was forced to deny on a radio 
interview that she enjoys killing squirrels and 
she furthermore decried the spread of ‘fake news’ 
(Buzzfeed, 2019). 
All of this tells us that despite social media 
having been a common political tool for over 
10 years now, for many users of these platforms, 
there is still a lack of understanding about some 
of the more niche communication cultures online. 
Shitposts are not fake news in the same way that 
satire sites such as The Onion are not fake news. 
However, if less critical audiences believe them, 
as happened with the squirrel-killer post, the line 
between jokes and disinformation does become 
blurred in this digital context, and could have an 
impact during events such as election campaigns. 
A quick Google of the headline of these shitposts 
would tell people that the stories are not real. As 
there is a real push presently to ensure a higher 
level of digital and social media literacy, it would 
likely be valuable to incorporate an increased 
awareness of shitposting and shitposting tech-
niques into this education too.
 News and
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Even in an election campaign were few individuals 
or institutions emerged with credit, the organisa-
tion of televised debates was particularly shambolic. 
To recap, the centrepieces of the debate 
schedule were two head-to-head leaders’ debates 
featuring Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn. 
Additionally, there were a smorgasbord of other 
programmes including seven-way leaders’ 
debates (which Johnson and Corbyn did not 
attend, instead sending party representatives); 
party leader-focused editions of Question Time; 
policy-focused debates on issues such as climate 
change; and programmes for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.
The 2019 debate schedule proved that quantity 
does not guarantee quality. Nor does novelty. 
While the two head-to-head leaders’ debates 
were a first for a UK election, the content of the 
programmes was largely limited to pre-prepared 
talking points. Furthermore, the two-way debates 
ran the risk of distorting the electoral playing 
field, neglecting the decisions that faced voters in 
constituencies which were not a straight contest 
between the Conservatives and Labour. 
How did we end up in this situation? Debates 
in the UK are not regulated but rather negotiated 
by self-interested political parties and broadcasters 
on ad hoc basis each time the country goes to the 
polls. Hence the changing formats over the years 
– the three-party debates of 2010, the seven-party 
debate of 2015, the absence of meaningful debates 
in 2017, and now the two-party debates of 2019. 
This creates a huge problem, as it means the 
rules for debate inclusion are non-transparent. 
To ask a counterfactual question, in a parallel 
universe where Liberal Democrat support had 
surged during the election campaign, what poll 
numbers would Jo Swinson have required to 
be invited to attend the ITV and BBC debates? 
We have no idea because the broadcasters never 
developed criteria for inclusion (or if they did, 
they never revealed them).
Additionally, over the course of recent 
elections, the way broadcasters are negotiating 
debates has changed. In 2010, the programmes 
were the product of broadcasters acting as a 
consortium. This is why each organisation (the 
BBC, ITV and Sky) got to lead on one of the three 
programmes. Now there appears to be far greater 
competition between broadcasters. Indeed, Sky 
admitted as much when it pitched for a three-way 
debate. Their original plan had been for a debate 
between Johnson and Corbyn, but since ITV had 
got agreement for this format first, Sky modified 
their proposal. Needless to say, because it did 
not suit the agenda of the two major parties, the 
Sky debate never happened. Competition among 
broadcasters of this kind is a real problem, as it 
means politicians (particularly those from the 
larger parties) can play them off against each other 
to get their preferred formats. 
The Channel 4 climate change debate high-
lighted other problems. This was attended by five 
party leaders. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage did 
not accept the invitation from the broadcasters. 
Instead, they were replaced by blocks of ice on the 
debate stage. On the night of the debate, Conserv-
ative Minister Michael Gove arrived at the studio 
and demanded to be included in the debate. This 
request was refused by Channel 4, on the grounds 
that the debate was for party leaders. 
While Gove’s actions were clearly grandstand-
ing, designed to create a story for social media, 
this event raises a question about why Channel 
4 felt a leaders’ debate was an appropriate format 
to discuss climate change. After all parties have 
environment ministers and spokespeople charged 
with the environment brief. If we are generous, we 
can say Channel 4’s decision is the product of the 
UK’s dysfunctional system of cabinet government 
which has become overly presidentialised. Less 
charitably, we might say that the network felt party 
leaders would get higher ratings.  
We urgently need to look overseas at other 
parliamentary democracies for better ways to 
organise election debates. Canada is a West-
minster-style Parliamentary democracy with a 
multi-party system including strong regional 
parties, which has held election debates since 1968. 
Perhaps the most important lesson the UK could 
learn from Canada comes from the creation of the 
Independent Leaders’ Debate Commission in 2018 
(prior to this, debates had been organised by a 
consortium of broadcasters, although even then 
the rules for organisation were considerably more 
advanced and transparent than anything in the 
UK). The Commission organised the two debates 
in the 2019 election campaign, applying very clear 
rules for inclusion, which are laid out in the Order 
of Council that created it.
For the avoidance of doubt: TV debates are 
a good innovation, with the potential to enhance 
the election campaign for voters and help them 
make informed choices. But this makes it even 
more important they are not created through 
shoddy backroom deals between politicians and 
broadcasters. It is time for the UK to get serious 
about TV debates. 
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There has been a striking amount of controversy 
about the mainstream media’s role during this 
election, almost all of which has focused on the 
evaluative dimensions of coverage. But what about 
the interpretative aspects of the campaign? To 
paraphrase Bernard Cohen: what were we being 
told to think about in 2019? 
As it has for every General Election since 
1992, Loughborough University conducted a 
‘real time’ content analysis of all weekday election 
coverage in the main evening TV news bulletins 
and front pages and prioritised editorial spaces of 
all national, paid for newspapers.
In Table 1 we compare the main issues that 
were reported across the five weeks of the formal 
campaign (7 November to 11 December inclusive). 
It is no surprise to see electoral process coverage 
dominating the show. Journalists have always been 
interested in the drama of the electoral horse race, 
deconstructing the parties’ strategies, consulting 
citizens’ perspectives and revelling in schaden-
freude at politicians’ missteps. Levels of process 
coverage in 2019 broadly matched those observed 
in 2017.
Also unsurprising is the dominance of Brexit. 
Some news organisations were so confident of its 
salience that they burned it into their electoral 
straplines from the outset (e.g. The Sun, The Daily 
Mail and, controversially, Sky TV). In 2019 Brexit 
gained more prominence than it did in 2017, but 
not by as much as one might have anticipated (13 
percent compared to 11 percent). TV news gave 
greatest emphasis to this policy. 
Aside from Brexit, the clearest difference 
between news sectors was coverage of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland’s future role in the 
United Kingdom. This received some degree of 
presence in TV news coverage but barely registered 
in press terms.
Elsewhere, there was striking consistency 
between the two news sectors as to the other 
main issues. The economy, the health service 
and taxation were predictably prominent. A 
major reason for the relatively high rankings for 
‘Standards/ / scandals’ and ‘Minorities/ religion’ 
was the allegations made against the Labour party 
and its supposed failure to deal with anti-semitism 
in its ranks.  
The environment received more coverage 
than it did in 2017, but only marginally so (up 
to 3 percent from 1 percent in 2017). Though 
coverage of the environment may be increasing, it 
has yet to be emphasised in party political terms 
in election coverage. 
In the last week of the campaign, Boris 
Johnson was condemned for criticising EU 
migrants who ‘treat the UK as if it’s part of their 
own country’. It was a clear echo of the Vote Leave 
strategy in the 2016 EU Referendum, but this 
time around it didn’t resonate in media terms. 
Coverage of ‘Immigration/ border controls’ was 
2 percent down from levels observed in the 2017 
General Election.
But what of the temporal dynamics of the 
campaign? Figure 1 shows the relative prominence 
of the main policy themes and reveal considerable 
volatility week-by-week. Brexit was by far the most 
dominant theme at critical points of the campaign 
– its start and end –but in the intervening periods 
its prominence lessened, to the point in week 4 that 
it fell behind all other three major themes.   
This dramatic decline needs some interpre-
tation. Brexit was still there, but as our analysis 
focused on manifest content, the results showed 
how it had become increasingly part of the 
background context of the campaign rather than 
its focal point. That said, we know that many voters 
only start paying attention in the last days of an 
election, so the final rush of Brexit coverage could 
have been consequential.
Even when Brexit was reported, there was a 
lack of policy focused analysis as to what imple-
mentation might mean. This stood in contrast 
to the detailed appraisals often applied to other 
manifesto commitments. For example, the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies gained considerable campaign 
coverage through their analysis of parties’ spending 
pledges and projections. Fifty three percent of their 
appearances linked to taxation related coverage 
and 46 percent to business and economy coverage. 
Only 8 percent connected to Brexit1.
At the start of the campaign the Prime 
Minister claimed his withdrawal deal was ‘oven 
ready’. In the following critical weeks, to extend the 
metaphor, the media did precious little to assess its 
fat content or salt levels.
  
   
1 These percentages are separate and do not add up to 100.
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What should pluralistic punditry look like in a 
multi-party parliamentary democracy? How should 
a state-owned broadcaster’s flagship political show 
populate its panels before elections to guarantee 
balance between Left, Right and Centre, eliminate 
perceptions of bias, and maintain that most 
disputed measure of fairness: impartiality?
When BBC2’s Politics Live was unveiled as 
a snappier, social media-friendly successor to 
long-running Westminster digest The Daily Politics 
in July 2018, the announcement was couched in 
studiedly public service-tinged terms: as part of a 
package of improved “political and parliamentary 
output” designed to deliver “trusted impartial” 
coverage and combat “concerns about misinforma-
tion and ‘echo chambers’”. These bold claims have 
since been tested through producer Rob Burley’s 
tortuous explanations of his efforts to calibrate 
the show’s party-political balance on Twitter. “The 
fact that Party X is on a programme on one day 
and Party Y is not does not mean the programme 
is being unfair on Party Y”, he pre-emptively 
tweeted days before the launch of the 2019 election 
campaign, because “on future programmes Party 
Y will appear”. This meant that, “over the course 
of a series or an election period”, the show would 
achieve “the correct balance between the parties”.  
But how realistic is it to expect viewers to stay 
tuned to a programme for weeks or months in 
order to be exposed to a fair spread of coverage? 
And how does Politics Live’s peculiar mode of 
impartiality measure up – even judged on its own, 
debatable, terms?
 A provisional breakdown of on-air con-
tributors to the show between 2 September 2019 
(the start of its second series) and 11 December 
(the final day of the election campaign) suggests 
the balance between pundits one might broadly 
categorise as Left and Right was roughly equal. 
Each ‘wing’ enjoyed around 33% of the limelight, 
with the Left actually enjoying a marginal 
advantage (at 160 to the Right’s 158) if the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru and Greens 
were bracketed alongside Labour. But throwing 
a further 10 ‘libertarian’ contributors into the 
mix, including stalwart Left antagonists Brendan 
O’Neill, editor of Spiked, and fellow ex-communist 
contrarian Claire Fox (now a Brexit Party MEP), 
it seems safe to characterise the overall Left/Right 
balance as broadly fair.
Viewed through a strictly party-political 
lens, however, the breakdown begins to vindicate 
Labour’s pre-election complaint about the BBC’s 
‘anti-Labour framing’. Over the entire three-month 
period, the number of Conservative politicians 
interviewed on Politics Live was 65 (36% of the 
total), compared to Labour’s 62 (34%). Signif-
icantly, this imbalance proved especially stark 
during the ‘phony election’ phase: the period 
before stricter Ofcom impartiality rules formally 
kicked in. During this time, Tory MPs, MEPs 
and candidates outnumbered Labour ones by 
41 to 35 (37% to 31%). Although the SNP, Plaid 
and Greens bolstered the Left’s representation by 
collectively notching up 23 contributors across 
the three months, their relative prominence (18, 
3 and 2 slots respectively) might be justified by 
their real-world electoral standings at the time, 
particularly if these include vote-shares in the 
2017 election (measures to which we return). 
More contentious, arguably, was the appearance 
across the period of 12 pundits from the Brexit 
Party – all but two of whom featured before the 
election was called. Though Nigel Farage’s party 
would be side-lined during the official campaign, 
it provided 9% of all panellists beforehand. This 
gave it an agenda-setting prominence that could 
only conceivably be justified in the context of its 
then recent European election success and defining 
contribution to the Brexit debate.
What, then, of the official campaign period? In 
the five weeks before polling-day Labour pundits 
actually outnumbered Tories by 27 to 24, though 
this Left/Right imbalance was easily offset by 
the inclusion of a disproportionate number of jour-
nalists from right-wing outlets and several ‘neutral’ 
contributors with normatively neoliberal agendas, 
notably the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). A 
more telling pattern was declining visibility of the 
Centre – whose share of screen-time halved from 
10% to 5% between phony election and campaign, 
as its Liberal Democrat standard-bearers were 
squeezed from 11% to 9%. 
Arguably, this ‘Centrist squeeze’ merely 
reflected the wider polarisation of today’s political 
debate. But is this good enough? Discounting 
the most literal definition of pluralism – that all 
UK-wide parties should be given equal exposure, 
proportional representation-style, during an 
election campaign – shouldn’t Politics Live allot 
airtime based on individual parties’ real-world 
standing? Well, in some respects, it did: the 
Lib Dems’ 8.7% of screen-time compared to a 
7.4% vote-share in the 2017 election. Yet if their 
exposure had been based on their most recent 
electoral successes we might have seen twice as 
much of them: the party’s 2019 European election 
vote-share was second only to the Brexit Party’s 
(20.3% to 31.6%). As this approach would have 
cut Labour’s airtime to just 14% and the Tories’ 
to 9%, however, it’s easy to see why achieving 
measurable impartiality remains such an editorial 
headache. Maybe Politics Live didn’t do such a bad 
job after all. 
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The role played by news media in the identity 
management of politicians as a means to control 
the public’s perceptions of those key individuals 
was a significant feature in the run up to the 2019 
election. The UK’s press is heavily influenced by 
right-wing, neo-liberal ideologues and as such 
their representation of society, through their 
construction of an individual’s identity, reflects 
their interests and objectives which in turn impacts 
on the attitudes of large swathes of the population. 
During the election campaign, members of the 
in-group, those supportive of the status quo, were 
made to appear normal and likeable, reducing the 
figurative distance between them and the elector-
ate, whereas the out-group, the left and the liberals, 
irrational and untrustworthy.  
In an age of mistrust and the public’s thirst for 
greater democratic representation, our political 
system has been infiltrated by politicians claiming 
to be more representative of the public and an 
alternative to the establishment. Take for example 
the Brexit Party leader, Nigel Farage, who has 
been positioned as an everyday pint drinking, fag 
smoking British bloke willing to take on the elite. 
Alongside his anti-elite message, via the battle 
cry of the Brexit party, privately educated Farage 
positioned himself as representative of the British 
public. Much like his multi-billionaire friend 
Donald or The Donald, stirring things up on the 
other side of the pond, this image, propagated by 
the media, has resonated with a public desperate 
for change.  
Unsurprisingly, this unscrupulous tactic of 
appearing normal and empathetic to the public’s 
concerns, extends to more mainstream politicians 
who recognise the significant role personae plays 
in gaining power and influence. So, with their 
well-paid brand managers in tow they cultivate 
a public image which sells. The darling of the 
right-wing press, Boris Johnson (BJ), was rarely 
out of the spotlight throughout the election with 
significant attention placed on his buffoonery and 
off the cuff remarks. In ordinary circumstances, his 
quips about ethnic minority groups, his deceptive 
mis-information – the construction claim for 40 
new hospitals that turned out to be only six, as 
an example - may have been perceived as detri-
mental to a Prime Ministerial candidate, yet, the 
media were able to manipulate this persona into 
something positive. In contrast to the immacu-
lately constructed identities of past leaders such 
as Tony Blair, Nick Clegg and David Cameron, 
seen as representative of the establishment, BJ was 
presented as a person willing and honest enough to 
express his true self, differentiating him from those 
within the perceived elite.  
The portrayal of ordinariness is even more 
surprising given the fact that, Eton educated, 
Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson is as establish-
ment as they come, and yet this normal identity, in 
its various guises, was pervasive across the media. 
In particular, the use of Boris or the affectionate 
Bojo were ubiquitous within both left- and 
right-wing publications.  For instance, a Google 
search for the term Boris generates 384 million 
results directly relevant to BJ demonstrating the 
almost brand like association his first name carries. 
Conversely, other politicians were rarely attributed 
the same level of informality, maintaining the 
distance between them and the electorate, while at 
the same time positioning BJ as somebody familiar 
and trustworthy.  
Amazingly, in spite of a decade of callous 
austerity at the hands of the Tories, where public 
spending cuts have been rife, impacting on the 
living standards of the poorest, and resulting in 
over a million food banks users, the only person 
regularly cast as the villain was BJ’s opponent, 
Jeremy Corbyn (JC), hailed as a threat to the 
UK’s economy and security.  Despite a history of 
peaceful protest, anti-war sentiment and much 
needed public spending proposals, JC was vilified 
in the media as an anti-Semite, communist, IRA 
supporter and a terrorist sympathiser. In other 
words, in contrast to the haphazard, mischief 
maker BJ, JC was attributed the worst possible 
traits of any potential leader: a racist, anti-patri-
otic, anti-democratic, dangerous loon. Indeed, 
rather than celebrating his desire for multi-lateral 
nuclear disarmament, his entirely hypothetical 
reluctance to launch nuclear weapons on another 
nation and progressive policies that attempted to 
wrestle control from the elite, JC was cast as the 
enemy of the state, unable to defend the nation 
and keep it secure.
Evidently, the public persona of politicians 
can mean the difference between success and 
failure, irrespective of policies or previous actions. 
In the case of the 2019 election, the media went 
into overdrive with the continuous identity 
manipulation of the two main protagonists, 
transforming BJ’s negatives into positives and 
redefining JC’s character from a resilient, forth 
right politician, determined to impact positive 
change, into a feeble-minded, communist unable 
to govern the country. That said, a multitude of 
factors contributed to a Tory victory, not least 
Brexit, though, to use a music analogy, their lyrics 
were predictable, but with a tireless marketing 
team and a charismatic front man at the helm 
their success was never in doubt, even for the most 
optimistic of Labour supporters.
Hero and villain: the media’s role in identity 
management
Jagon Chichon
Department of 
International Relations, 
Asia University. 
Email:  jagonchichon@yahoo.co.uk
100
When the BBC’s Huw Edwards announced the 
exit poll shortly after 10pm on the 12th December, 
two figures flashed up on our television screens: 
the projected number of Commons seats for the 
Labour Party and the Conservative Party, accom-
panied by pictures of their respective leaders. The 
poll predicted a Conservative government, with 
368 seats, with the Labour opposition standing 
at an estimated 191. Such a picture is typical of 
the UK’s electoral landscape, underpinned by 
what Dutch scientist Arendt Lijphart termed a 
‘majoritarian’ political system; one characterised 
by (among other things) two main political parties 
and a first-past-the-post electoral system. For 
most elections in the post-war period, voters have 
gone to the polls in the certainty that the either the 
Conservative or the Labour party would see their 
leader standing on the steps of Downing Street. 
For a long time media coverage at election time 
focused overwhelmingly on the two main parties, 
with print media nailing their colours to the mast 
of one of them.  
The 2015 General Election (which saw the 
rise of the SNP at Westminster and the impressive 
vote share achieved by UKIP) marked the first 
real step change in this two-party dominance 
and this was further evidenced in 2019. While 
the majority of the print media overwhelmingly 
backed one of the big two parties, The Economist 
sided with the Liberal Democrats, and some, such 
as The New Statesman and i News, refusing to 
endorse any party. The election results themselves 
also bore this out. While the two main parties 
received 83% of the vote in 2017, this fell to 73% in 
2019. In practice this means that over five million 
people voted for parties other than Labour and the 
Conservatives and they returned MPs from eight 
small parties, bringing the total number of parties 
represented in the House of Commons to ten. 
The weakening grip of the Conservative and 
Labour parties within an increasingly fragmented 
party system poses a challenge for broadcasters in 
their election coverage and reporting. The result 
in 2019 was something of a cacophony of debates; 
from a seven way ITV debate, to a four way 
Question Time special and the BBC’s head-to-head 
with Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn. Even these 
did not include all of the political parties standing 
candidates at the election. Nor did they include all 
of the political parties who held Commons seats at 
the time of the election – three sitting Independent 
Group for Change MPs for example were also 
standing in their respective constituencies but 
played no part in any of the debates. 
The smaller parties were enthusiastic about 
their inclusion in these debates, something which 
Liberal Democrat leader Jo Swinson had pressed 
for prior to the election, but the two main parties 
did their upmost to exclude them. When Swinson 
took legal action against ITV alongside the SNP’s 
Nicola Sturgeon, Jeremy Corbyn stuck firmly to 
majoritarian principles, backing the head to head 
debates between himself and Boris Johnson on 
the basis that “there are only two possible people 
who can be prime minister at the end of this 
campaign”. When smaller parties do gain visibility 
in election debates they tend to attract support 
from the public. Nick Clegg outshone everyone 
for the Liberal Democrats in the 2010 debate and 
UKIP and the SNP performed particularly strongly 
in 2015. This time around it was the Brexit Party’s 
Richard Tice who seemed to impress viewers with 
his performance. 
The haggling over big media appearances 
is not helped by the ambiguity in Ofcom’s 
broadcasting code which states that ‘due weight’ 
and ‘appropriate coverage’ should be given to 
different organisations and perspectives but does 
not clarify who these actually are or how such a 
balance is ensured. Neither is it likely to go away. 
With analysis showing that a more proportional 
electoral system would have brought over 70 
more seats for the smaller parties, it will be 
increasingly important to find a balance between 
majoritarian traditions and multi-party realities 
of media reporting and programming during 
election campaigns.
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The day after the 2016 EU referendum, I took 
part in a conference at St James’s Park, in central 
London. When I entered the building, I was 
met by looks of disbelief and shock of how it 
had come to this, and how seemingly none of 
us had predicted the outcome. And although 
polls suggested a majority win for Boris Johnson 
under the Conservatives this time around, I had 
a distinct sense of déjà-vu when I was asked by 
a stunned colleague: “But how did this happen? 
Almost everything I saw online suggested it was 
going terribly for the Tories”. He may be forgiven 
– my own Twitter feed looked no different: from 
posts mocking Tory chairman James Cleverly for 
his inept defence of the indefensible – namely, 
re-branding the Conservatives’ account as 
‘FactCheck UK’ – to outrage of Jacob Rees-Mogg’s 
contempt for the victims of Grenfell – my 
followees called them out, constantly – and rightly 
so. Contrast this with many parts of the ‘tradition-
al’ media, and my sense is that people may have 
experienced a different election altogether. 
Research by the Reuters Institute speaks to 
this: 52% of the over 45’s cite TV as their main 
source of news, compared to only 27% for those 
under the age of 45. Online, the picture looks 
different: 63% of under 45’s use online media 
as their main source, compared to only 26% for 
those over the age of 45. The role of traditional 
media, and TV in particular, matters: first, their 
research also suggests that those identifying with 
the political right prefer to get their news offline 
(58% combined for print and TV); second, because 
broadcast agendas are often set by the dominant 
role of partisan, pro-Conservative newspapers. A 
tangible example is The Sunday paper review on 
the Andrew Marr Show, where commentators – 
among those Sarah Vine, whose husband happens 
to be Conservative MP Michael Gove – debate the 
day’s headlines. 
And newspaper coverage matters, too: the 
two with the highest circulations, The Sun and 
The Daily Mail, both pro-Brexit papers, sell over a 
million copies a day. And although, as elsewhere, 
their circulations are declining (from 2010 to 
2019, The Sun’s dropped from 3m to 1.4m, while 
The Daily Mail’s fell from 2.1m to 1.2m), they 
are still significant in shaping public opinion. In 
its October 30 leader column, for example, The 
Daily Mail wrote: “Labour was devising ever more 
elaborate ways to pick your pocket and flatten the 
economy … Just take a moment to think of that 
gruesome prospect”. The Sun went much further: 
four days before the election, in its three-page 
‘Dossier of Doom’, it referred to the Labour leader 
as “the most dangerous man ever to stand for high 
office”, before declaring: “Waking up to Corbyn as 
PM on Friday the 13th would just be the start of 
a… NIGHTMARE”. Such highly partisan coverage 
was also a staple in the 2017 election.
Of course, these are just two examples from 
the two highest-circulating newspapers in the UK. 
Yet, research by Loughborough University, which 
measured positive and negative coverage across 
several papers, suggests that they are emblematic of 
a wider malaise: in the four weeks of campaigning, 
coverage was overwhelmingly hostile towards 
Labour, while the ruling Conservatives were 
portrayed favourably. Left-leaning exceptions 
to that rule include The Guardian and The Daily 
Mirror, but there was little they could do to offset 
that trend. In ‘traditional’ media, Labour seemed to 
have lost the battle from the outset. 
But when we look online, a different picture 
starts to emerge: here, as in 2017, smaller, alterna-
tive outlets left their mark, too – many of which 
came out in strong support for Corbyn. These 
include The Canary, Evolve Politics, Novara Media, 
Skwawkbox and Another Angry Voice. The latter 
is particularly interesting: operating as a ‘one-man 
show’ (the blog is written by Thomas G. Clark, an 
English tutor from West Yorkshire), its accompa-
nying Facebook site consistently achieves levels of 
traffic usually expected of mainstream media. His 
post on election night has, at the time of writing, 
attracted 13k interactions (‘likes’, comments and 
shares combined), while his take on Johnson’s 
repetitive ‘get Brexit done’ soundbite (‘Get Boris 
done’) has attracted more than 2k on the same day. 
The only other two ‘alt-media’ on the right-wing 
spectrum include Guido Fawkes and Breitbart – 
both however attract lower engagement levels. In 
the mainstream media, the Guardian’s excellent 
‘Anywhere but Westminster’ series provide 
an alternative viewpoint, too – away from the 
Westminster bubble and the Commons chambers. 
Yet, despite their value, we know now that 
they were unable to cut through the noise of 
Johnson’s ‘get Brexit done’ soundbite. The last 
week of campaigning even saw Johnson break 
through a foam wall with a bulldozer carrying the 
phrase to ‘break the gridlock’. The following day, 
the stunt featured heavily on the two conservative, 
Eurosceptic newspapers, the Daily Express and 
The Daily Telegraph. Often featured, but less 
often scrutinised, in an election campaign that 
sowed confusion and peddled misinformation, 
he, ultimately, got away with it. Lesson learned? 
That despite the rise of alternative outlets, it’s the 
mainstream media that continue to set the agenda. 
The demographic divide, and the different media 
diets we consume, may well explain why this was, 
perhaps, a tale of two elections. 
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Despite more women party leaders contesting 
general elections in recent years, campaign 
strategists and journalists alike seem to repeatedly 
replicate the same-old tropes about leadership 
expectations. Throughout the campaign gendered 
notions of political leadership still abound, and 
in some quarters appear to be accelerating. This 
was neatly illustrated by the copious examples of 
politicians such as Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage, 
and Jo Swinson posing in boxing rings during the 
early weeks of the campaign. Here I will consider 
the gendered nature of campaign, focusing on 
portrayals of Jo Swinson and Boris Johnson. 
During the 2017 campaign, I argued that 
Theresa May’s highly personalised campaign 
centred around her own competence and lead-
ership was extremely risky for a female leader. 
Academic research has shown that personalised 
campaigns are fraught with the risk of reinforcing 
stereotypical assumptions about the incompatibili-
ty between traditional femininity and conventional 
ideals of political leadership. Political leadership is 
often associated with traditionally masculine traits 
and behaviours such as combativeness, strength 
and assertiveness, and furthermore my own 
work has shown that media coverage is crucial in 
reinforcing these ideas. The disappointing election 
campaign for May’s Conservative Party should 
perhaps have served as a warning to any subse-
quent female party leader. Nevertheless, the Liberal 
Democrats in 2019 seemed content to emphasise 
Jo Swinson’s leadership at every opportunity, 
even branding the party as Jo Swinson’s Liberal 
Democrats on their campaign bus. This decision 
seemed particularly ill-advised given that her own 
parliamentary seat was very precarious, an irony 
not lost in the commentary on Twitter. 
An illustration of these risks came when 
Swinson was asked on ITV if she would consider 
using nuclear weapons. Her one-word reply 
was interpreted as far too enthusiastic by many, 
and she was openly criticised by SNP leader 
Nicola Sturgeon for answering the question so 
lightly. Sturgeon’s remarks show the inherent 
risk in embracing the temptation to engage in 
traditionally masculine politicking. She claimed 
that “it is sickening to hear this question asked 
and answered as if it’s some kind of virility test and 
without any context”. The use of the word ‘virility’ 
in this context shows Sturgeon’s disapproval of 
unthinking masculinised rhetoric, but also serves 
to undermine Swinson’s efforts to present herself 
as a strong leader by drawing attention to the fact 
that as a woman she cannot be considered ‘virile’. 
Crucially, Sturgeon’s response is also critical of the 
willingness of news media to portray politics in 
simplistic and uncomplicated ways. 
Male leaders, on the other hand, do not 
necessarily face the same risks. However, that is 
not to say that gender is irrelevant in their political 
appeal. Boris Johnson’s leadership style has 
proved to be combative and at times aggressive. 
Many accused him of threatening European 
Union officials over the withdrawal agreement, 
for example, while he and his staff also intimi-
dated and coerced his own MPs, expelling those 
who disagree with him politically. This style of 
leadership has been characterised by some media 
commentators as highly problematic conse-
quences of ‘toxic masculinity’ in politics whereby 
political cooperation is seen as a weakness 
rather than as a necessary aspect of national and 
international politics. A number of journalists, 
moreover, showed themselves to be willing 
accomplices in indulging this aspect of Johnson’s 
political persona, with some gleefully reporting an 
anonymous briefing that Johnson would compare 
the Labour leader’s approach to Brexit to mas-
turbation in a key speech.  Central to Johnson’s 
performance of masculinity is his misogyny. 
There were numerous occasions throughout his 
first few months as Prime Minister that illustrate 
this, ranging from the more subtle, such as the 
revelation that he described political rival David 
Cameron as a ‘Girly-swot’ at one end of the 
spectrum, to the more troubling, such as when 
police had been called to a ‘domestic disturbance’ 
at the home of his partner Carrie Symonds. 
Johnson’s domestic arrangements are perhaps 
the riskiest aspect of his gendered political 
persona, in contrast to other politicians who 
openly discuss their families. Johnson’s history 
of extra-marital affairs, and consistent refusals 
to confirm how many children he has fathered, 
contributes to his perceived lack of trustworthi-
ness for some. It also reinforces his upper-class 
background, reflecting old-fashioned embarrass-
ment about fathering ‘illegitimate’ children. The 
resurfacing of disparaging remarks about single 
mothers from his days writing for The Spectator 
moreover emphasises the double-standards that 
he embodies. Coupled with the Jennifer Arcuri 
scandal, all these factors could have undermined 
his relationship with potential voters presenting 
him as out-of-touch and dishonest. Predictably, 
though Johnson could rely on his most enthusiastic 
media commentators to dismiss the suggestion 
that his private life detracts from his suitability to 
lead. The 2019 campaign reminds us once again 
that gendered politics is integral to campaigns, and 
their reporting, which candidates ignore at their 
own peril. 
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Pollsters were, not unreasonably, pretty content 
with their performance in calling the result of this 
election. Barring a little reflection on why YouGov’s 
much-touted MRP poll erroneously showed a 
narrowing electoral contest, the big beasts of the 
industry were happy to share the proximity of 
their final share projections to the actual result. No 
soul-searching methodological enquiries needed 
for this election.
But voting intention polls are well developed 
and very different from political opinion polls that 
are often used – and abused – by press interests 
wishing to promote a specific political agenda. We 
have seen plenty of evidence of this over the last 
three and a half years, particularly during some of 
the dramatic political upheavals of 2019 (now, of 
course, consigned to history). There is a dangerous 
complacency in assumptions that polls stand as a 
scientific barometer of public opinion.                                             
A perfect example of the problem emerged 
in mid-August during the parliamentary Brexit 
gridlock, when Johnson floated the idea of 
proroguing Parliament. The crucial political 
calculation (beyond whether or not it was lawful) 
was whether it would alienate voters.
Luckily help was at hand. The Daily Telegraph 
– newspaper turned propaganda freesheet 
for Johnson then and throughout the election 
campaign – produced stunning evidence that 
the public were onside their front page headline 
declared “Public backs Johnson to shut down 
Parliament for Brexit” (image here). Predictably, 
as broadcasters love their front page reviews, this 
was repeated by Newsnight’s Emma Barnett and 
other newspaper reviewers. Polls are science, right? 
What’s the problem?
In fact there were multiple problems with 
the poll and the paper’s distorted reporting. 
The headline emerged from a question which 
invited respondents to agree or disagree with 
the statement “Boris needs to deliver Brexit by 
any means, including suspending parliament if 
necessary, in order to prevent MPs from stopping 
it”. Not only a double question (which every first 
year undergraduate knows is methodologically 
unsound) but cuddly “Boris” rather than PM 
or Johnson; and an explicit “explanation” that 
MPs were intent on stopping Brexit rather than 
preventing a no-deal Brexit. 
This inherent question bias was exacerbated 
by the Telegraph’s deliberate distortion of data 
to produce their dramatic headline. The public’s 
“backing” was deduced by ignoring one in five “don’t 
knows” to produce a “majority” – despite only 44% 
agreeing with their seriously dubious statement.
This deliberate distortion of apparently 
scientific surveys to further a newspaper’s political 
agenda is dangerous because it creates momentum 
– as it is designed to do. Spurious conclusions 
are woven into broadcast stories rather than 
systematically dismantled or, even better, ignored 
altogether. It is a perfect route for a predominantly 
right-wing press to offset declining circulations by 
driving the news agenda online and on screen. And 
it is dangerous because it deliberately manipulates 
“the popular will” to fit that publication’s narrative. 
What can be done? To some extent, the horse 
has bolted: despite the popular vote of the last 3 
elections (2 generals and 1 euro) demonstrating no 
majority for Johnson’s hardest of Brexits, we leave 
the EU with the myth intact that he is implement-
ing the popular will. But distortions in pursuit 
of a political agenda will happen again, and the 
polling industry should take some responsibility 
for scrutiny. 
There is some hope on the horizon. In 
November, the Market Research Society teamed 
up with Impress, the small press regulator, to 
produce a document on “Using surveys and 
polling data in your journalism”. For publishers 
that belong to Impress and those polling 
agencies which are members of the MRS, it 
provides guidance to best practice.
But there lies the problem. While the MRS 
takes a dim view of poor survey design and has 
robust procedures in place for complaints, many 
pollsters – including ComRes, authors of the 
Telegraph poll – eschew the MRS for the British 
Polling Council (BPC). Te raison d’etre of the 
BPC is “to ensure standards of disclosure that 
provide consumers…. with an adequate basis for 
judging the reliability and validity of the results.” 
In other words, as long as sampling, questions 
and data are published and transparent, there is 
no quality control. 
As for the big press publishers, they want 
nothing to do with an independent regulator set 
up to follow Leveson’s guidelines, and continue to 
promote their puppet regulator IPSO as a genuine 
arbiter of press standards. Given its abject failure 
to implement its own code of practice, it is scarcely 
likely to find such misbehaviour problematic. 
For the moment, polling and publishing 
industries will continue to take advantage of lax 
standards. It will be left to responsible broad-
casters, academics, and ordinary members of the 
public, to scrutinise political polls and call out 
manifestly bogus claims about public opinion.
Press distortion of public opinion polling: what 
can, or should, be done?
Prof Steve Barnett
Professor of 
Communications at the 
University of Westminster.
Email: S.Barnett@westminster.ac.uk
Twitter: @stevenjbarnett
104
Prof Dominic Wring
Communication, 
Centre for Research in 
Communication and 
Culture, Loughborough 
University.
Email: D.J.Wring@lboro.ac.uk
Election endorsements are important because they 
represent self-conscious attempts by newspapers to 
distil and convey their partisan preferences. While 
acknowledging most titles declare allegiances, it 
is also important to examine how and whether 
they qualify this support. Table 1 demonstrates 
that this was, in press terms, a highly polarised 
election with the Tory dominated, paid for daily 
print market overwhelmingly exhorting readers to 
vote Conservative. But the same figures also reveal 
that there has been a sharp decline of 25% in hard 
copy sales since the last, relatively recent election 
of 2017. If this trend continues it will be interesting 
to see what remains of the print market in the next 
election expected in 2024.
Press coverage of the 2019 campaign was 
characterised by its fierce partisanship. Having 
relentlessly attacked him in 2017, The Daily Mail 
had been invited by the Labour leader to do so 
again at the following election. The Mail duly 
responded with negative coverage that culmi-
nated in a frontpage declaration for “Boris”. The 
Express followed suit with a cover photograph of 
the Prime Minster captioned “Brexit and Britain 
in your hands”. The Sun also declared voting 
Conservative would “Save Brexit” and “Save 
Britain” from “Red Jez” and his “extremists”. The 
quality Telegraph emulated the more polemical 
tone of its counterparts in warning against the 
election of a ‘Marxist’ government. The Times, 
the other member of the Tory press, adopted 
more measured language in acknowledging 
“Remain minded liberal Conservatives” faced 
a dilemma before warning the Brexit Party 
threatened Boris Johnson’s chances of victory.  
The five non-Conservative newspapers each 
took a distinctive editorial line. The Mirror, 
Labour’s only stalwart press supporter, excoriated 
a ‘lying PM’ as a ‘cheat and charlatan’. Giving 
lukewarm backing to Labour, the Guardian 
scolded Corbyn’s leadership before concluding 
the party was “not perfect but progressive”. 
The anti-Brexit Financial Times offered tepid 
support to the Liberal Democrats, despite their 
“poor campaign”, because their larger rivals were 
“populist”. Although very different publications, 
The i and the Star both promoted their non-parti-
sanship and encouraged readers to make up their 
own minds when voting. But the latter couldn’t 
resist deriding the two main parties as “clowns to 
the left of us, jokers to the right”.
As part of Loughborough University’s real 
time audit of national news coverage of the 2019 
General Election, all election items were graded 
according to their positivity and negativity for 
the main political parties. Figure 1 aggregates the 
weekly scores for each party when positive and 
negative print items are combined and weighted 
by circulation. The size of anti-Labour print media 
coverage is pronounced and demonstrated by the 
large red minus bars’ size. The weekly analysis 
shows how these intensified throughout the 
campaign, becoming most evident in the final days 
of the campaign. 
The non-red bars are modest in size because 
of the relative lack of print interest in other parties.  
Although Johnson received negative press during 
the campaign over issues like health, the Conserva-
tives were the only party to enjoy positive coverage 
throughout the election. Some of this reinforced 
Johnson’s ‘get Brexit done’ narrative. And whereas 
print reporting of the 2010 and 2015 elections 
demonstrated greater interest in potential coalition 
partners, notably the Liberal Democrats and SNP 
respectively, there was little commentary about 
them this time. Like 2017, 2019 was overwhelm-
ingly represented as a binary choice. A huge 
circulation advantage ensured that if voters bought 
a newspaper over the counter, they would be more 
than likely to read pro-Conservative material. 
While how and whether this factor might have 
had a bearing on this campaign is one issue, the 
sharp decline of print sales since 2017 also raises 
a further intriguing question: will 2019 be the 
traditional hard copy newspapers’ final meaningful 
electoral verdict?
The final verdict: patterns of press partisanship
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Class war dominated this election. Of course, 
psephologists, academics, columnists, voters and 
non-voters will point to multiple reasons to explain 
the overwhelming Conservative majority: Brexit 
fatigue, Corbyn’s leadership, a bloated Labour 
manifesto, cultural realignment and media bias. All 
of these contribute to the ‘complex picture’ that lies 
behind the result.
But none of those explanations undermine 
the fact that the 2019 General Election was won 
by a party wholly intent on waging war against the 
(rather modest) redistributory policy proposals 
of Corbyn’s Labour Party. In the face of a climate 
disaster, public health emergency, education 
meltdown and housing crisis, the Tories – bank-
rolled by hedge fund cash – mobilised their troops 
to launch an offensive to defend elite power and 
privilege. This involved both vilifying and ridicul-
ing Labour policies on these issues. 
The Sun dubbed the Labour manifesto a 
“declaration of class war” which would “destroy 
property rights, the job market and the economy.” 
Fraser Nelson in the Telegraph described Labour’s 
environmental proposals to create a low-carbon 
economy as “class war”. Robert Peston asked his 
viewers on ITV to take a side in “this election’s new 
class war”.
It was, however, only Labour’s proposals to 
redistribute resources that were seen in these terms; 
Tory attacks on public ownership and higher taxes 
for the rich weren’t seen as class war but a necessary 
defence of incentives for wealth creation.
But this was, most definitely, a class war 
election. The problem is that the left weren’t able to 
fight this war with the same ruthlessness, visibility 
and insurgency as their opponents. The Tories 
flooded Facebook (especially in the last week of 
the campaign) with ads, 88% of which, according 
to First Draft, contained misleading claims about 
the NHS, tax cuts and Labour policies. Their 
ideological allies in the press, meanwhile, ensured 
that news coverage of Labour was unremittingly 
and increasingly negative with even online push 
notifications skewing heavily against Labour and in 
favour of the Tories. Billionaire proprietors waged 
war on behalf of their political representatives.
To what extent did broadcasters, blessed with 
a privileged viewing platform and the obligation 
to respect impartiality, rise to the occasion? While 
they may have been scrupulous in giving the two 
main parties equal airtime, they weren’t quite so 
balanced in the stories they highlighted. TV news 
agendas were dominated by Brexit, the economy 
and taxation (all comfortable issues for Boris 
Johnson) with health (Labour’s preferred topic) 
coming in fifth and the environment not featuring 
at all in the top five. Moreover, unencumbered by a 
responsibility to tell the truth, Johnson simply lied 
on air about Tory plans to build 40 new hospitals 
and about Corbyn’s threat to scrap MI5 knowing 
that by the time the fact checkers got around to 
challenging their veracity, the damage was already 
done. Never has ‘stopwatch politics’ and stilted 
impartiality so clearly failed to capture the wider 
issue agenda or to hold elite power to account. 
The BBC, due to its high trust ratings and still 
dominant grip on news consumption in the UK, 
holds a special responsibility in this regard. Yet this 
was a disastrous election for the BBC – twice being 
forced to apologise for misleading editing that 
showed Johnson in a good light, failing to honour 
the promise allegedly made to Labour that the 
prime minister would be scrutinised by Andrew 
Neil, repeating Tory spin verbatim, highlighting 
allegations of anti-semitism against Jeremy Corbyn 
over those of Tory Islamohphobia and generally, 
as Peter Oborne put it, “behaving in a way that 
favours the Tories”.
For example, when Labour revealed 
documents that showed that the NHS would 
be part of a trade deal with the US, the BBC’s 
main radio and TV bulletins on the Saturday 
night before the election led not with a detailed 
discussion of the allegations themselves but with 
the ‘threat of foreign interference’. The headline for 
BBC News Online was “PM: We must find source 
of UK-US trade document leak”. Stenography 
doesn’t constitute good journalism at the best 
of times but during an election, it’s particularly 
pernicious and anti-democratic.
Many weapons are used in class war but media 
power is a central part of the generals’ arsenal. 
Highlighting systematic media bias is neither 
conspiratorial (despite what the BBC argues) nor 
simplistic. Indeed, ignoring bias is precisely one 
of the privileges of media power (which is why it’s 
perhaps not surprising that the Guardian’s article 
on “five reasons why Labour lost” didn’t even 
mention the media). 
Until we address the reasons underlying this 
bias – including concentrated media ownership, 
Oxbridge-dominated executives and elite capture 
– any radical opposition will have to be prepared 
for sustained vilification and misrepresentation 
and will need an insurgent movement to face this 
down. Polarisation is often seen as a dangerous 
element in today’s politics but in a class war, you 
need to take sides.
The class war election
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Since 2015, British politics saw not only the 
emergence of Jeremy Corbyn as a political force, 
but also the “rise of the alt-left British media”. 
These online sites, through their significant social 
media followings, have provided an alternative 
brand of left-wing news and comment. After 
Labour’s resounding election defeat in 2019, 
many will now undoubtedly expect their decline. 
However, alternative online media exist within 
a complex media system and closer inspection 
suggests that predictions about their imminent 
demise may be premature. 
Alternative online media have spent years 
building their audience and influence. During 
the 2017 General Election, Buzzfeed claimed 
that articles by left-leaning sites including 
Another Angry Voice, The Canary, Evolve Politics, 
and Skwawkbox were being shared more than 
material produced by MSM sites. Our analysis of 
Twitter data (see fig. 1) collected during the 2019 
campaign indicates that alternative online media 
have maintained their significant reach. During 
the campaign, for example, Evolve Politics content 
was retweeted more than 164,500 times, surpass-
ing Guido Fawkes’ total of 154,200. Similarly, 
Skwawkbox and Another Angry Voice more than 
doubled their number of retweets from 2017. 
Meanwhile, items about the election campaign 
on the Facebook pages of Another Angry Voice, 
Evolve Politics, and Skwawkbox were shared 
thousands of times each day. One Another Angry 
Voice post received over 19,000 shares (see fig. 2). 
As our campaign analysis demonstrated, left-lean-
ing sites appeared to reach more users on Facebook 
than their right wing alternative media equivalents.
But despite their apparent reach, it is difficult 
to determine their impact on the outcome of either 
of the two previous elections. It seems unlikely that 
these sites will now simply disappear, although this 
reach may decline if those reading and supporting 
the left-wing sites lose enthusiasm for their 
particular brand of political news and comment.  
In contrast to the UK’s right-leaning 
mainstream press, alternative online media skew 
predominately to the left, with the exception of 
Conservative Woman, Breitbart London and Guido 
Fawkes. Faced with a UK press system that is 
consistently hostile towards Labour’s policies and 
personalities, left-leaning alternative online media 
function as a “self-perceived corrective”, as they 
seek to promote an alternative political ideology. 
As our earlier findings suggest, they adopt a 
combative tone. 
In our view, the presence of these left-leaning 
alternative media can be understood as a dialec-
tical reaction to a largely right-leaning press and 
their online influence. While Jeremy Corbyn may 
be emblematic of the alternative left, he is not a 
fundamental prerequisite for the alternative media 
that support a left-wing ideological position. We 
anticipate that these sites will now reposition 
in support of a new leader from the left of the 
party - and will continue to aggressively promote  
left-wing partisan politics in order to compete 
with right-wing alternative media competitors 
and newspapers.
Critiques and attacks on the MSM were a 
defining feature of both right and left-leaning 
alternative media before and during election 
campaign. In 2017, for example, then Evolve Politics 
editor Matt Turner explained that criticism of the 
BBC was the site’s largest driver of traffic. During 
the 2019 election and its aftermath, attacks on 
the MSM - especially the BBC -  were again a 
significant theme. In recognition of the influence of 
left wing media, pundits such as Ash Sarkar from 
Novara Media featured prominently on broadcast 
media but this exposure may now be in doubt 
(see fig. 3). We expect alternative online media to 
continue attacking the MSM, blaming its general 
failure and political bias for Labour’s election result. 
There are two main reasons we expect 
left-leaning alternative media to continue beyond 
Jeremy Corbyn’s demise as leader. First and 
foremost, they are still ideologically opposed to the 
Conservative government, the coverage of politics 
on mainstream media and some of the likely 
contenders for the leadership of the Labour Party. 
Secondly, they continue to attract many who are 
disaffected by mainstream politics. 
The UK’s left-leaning alternative media must 
now react to the damaging election result and find 
a new, post-Corbyn political identity. We believe 
it is premature to assume they will fold any time 
soon, since many of the conditions that led to 
their creation will undoubtedly continue and even 
intensify under decisions made by Boris Johnson’s 
Conservative government. The possible abolition 
of the licence fee and the future of Channel 4 and 
the BBC, for example, will also undoubtedly attract 
their attention. 
An uncertain future for alternative online media?
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As a 2019 General Election became an inevita-
bility, one of the main news stories focused on 
the MPs who would not be standing. In total, 
74 MPs decided not to contest their seats in this 
election; not a record number by any means, but 
a significant figure given that this was the third 
election in only four years. We propose that there 
were pertinent reasons why those standing down 
became the specific focus of media attention, 
and that by readjusting our focus toward those 
choosing not to campaign as MPs, significant 
characteristics of the current atmosphere of UK 
political culture are revealed.
Our title above first refers to the ‘tuning in’ of 
politicians, not only in the retelling of personalised 
stories of constituents, but tuning in to their own 
emotionalities in public debates. Parliament has 
heard personal testimony from MPs, talking about 
their own domestic abuse or confessional experi-
ences of abortion. But emotional exposure is risky. 
When female Labour MPs expressed concerns 
that the threats they had received echoed Boris 
Johnson’s own rhetoric on Brexit, he dismissed this 
as “humbug”, sparking commentary on some of the 
‘angriest scenes’ witnessed in the Commons. Abuse 
of MPs is just one of the reasons they are ‘turning 
away’ from their parties and parliament. This 
turning away is a political action in its own right; 
on a party level we have seen turbulence as MPs 
leave one party, create new alliances, have the whip 
removed and join their old adversaries. Amongst 
this fracturing, others decide to ‘drop out’ entirely. 
Into this mix, the related media coverage 
often provided a platform to probe far beyond 
the clichéd ‘wanting to spend more time with the 
family’ mantra. Nicky Morgan cited both public 
abuse and the fact that she’d never attended her 
son’s parents’ evenings as her reasons. The BBC 
came under fire for giving ex-Labour MP Ian 
Austin leading coverage in his appeal for voters 
to back Boris Johnson over Jeremy Corbyn as 
he stepped down as an independent MP. On 6 
November, Austin was interviewed on Radio 4’s 
Today programme by Nick Robinson, who paused 
and said, “I’ve known you for many years…I hope 
you don’t mind me saying this, you’re not finding 
this easy are you? This is quite an emotional day 
for you.” Inserting his own emotionally-attuned 
reading of his interviewee’s emotions here served 
to authenticate Austin’s position. 
Heidi Allen is further example of an MP 
choosing to turn away. Announcing her decision 
on 29 October, she noted that the abuse suffered as 
an MP had been “utterly dehumanising” and that 
her decision to stand down was “heartbreaking”. 
The emotionality evidenced here raises key 
questions about abuse and a broken parliament. 
Allen’s movements – from the Conservative Party, 
to leading Change UK, and finally to the Liberal 
Democrats – exemplified, for some, a political 
inauthenticity. Yet, viewed another way, what such 
movements may reveal is a clear sense of political 
homelessness. 
Allen, of course, is not alone in moving 
parties and the rise in MPs turning away 
from one party and turning toward another, 
is politically prescient. Perhaps what we can 
read through such shifts is a broader and more 
critical change in UK political culture – an 
unmooring from party allegiance and a rea-
lignment toward personal or, more accurately, 
persona-based constancy. If this reading is right, 
then the place of emotionality is central to this 
new order.
While emotion and strength of feeling have 
always been understood as a consistent marker of 
party politics, the space that emotion now takes 
up in the mediation of contemporary political life 
can be understood as a point of difference. In the 
context of those MPs standing down, emotion 
and the performance of it, has shaped their 
public personas and is one of the key contexts 
through which agenda-setting, image-building 
and image-breaking take place. Despite the public 
discourse around separation between political and 
ordinary lives however, perhaps what Allen’s case 
exemplifies is the emotional proximity rather than 
the distance between MPs and citizens. When a 
traditional structure is undergoing seismic change 
in shape, space and cultural place, those who are 
most vulnerable are likely to be the first to be swept 
away. In nominating her exhaustion, Allen implies 
that she can’t ‘hang on’. 
Following their research into the intimidation 
of elected representatives, Sarah Childs and Rosie 
Campbell pertinently asked: “Who would want to be 
an MP, and especially a woman or BAME MP?” The 
paradox is that, as with the 2017 election, a record 
number of female MPs have been elected again. 
Labour will have more female than male MPs. In 
this new parliament, we wait to see whether the new 
contingent of representatives together cultivate a 
shift in parliamentary culture, and how they employ 
emotional registers in doing so. 
Tune in, turn away, drop out: emotionality and 
the decision not to stand
Dr Beth Johnson
Associate Professor in 
Film and Media at the 
University of Leeds. 
Research interests include 
politics, social class, 
television and poverty.
Email: b.l.johnson@leeds.ac.uk
Twitter:@BethLJohnson
112
Prof Cornel Sandvoss
Professor of Media and 
Communication and
Head of Department of 
Media and Performance 
at the University of 
Huddersfield. 
Email: C.Sandvoss@hud.ac.uk
Twitter: @Sandvoss
Over the course of the last three General 
Elections I have sought to document how fan-like 
engagements have increasingly shaped political 
participation. In 2015 I highlighted the centrality 
of polysemy in political messaging in FPTP-elec-
toral systems; a theme echoed in the content-light 
slogans of the 2019 Conservative campaign 
focusing on process (getting Brexit done) rather 
than substance (what Brexit is). Two years later, I 
suggested that the affective investments in Corbyn 
among supporters that facilitated a particular 
reading of Labour’s 2017 defeat likely spelled 
future electoral calamity.
In the 2019 General Election campaign I, 
alongside my colleagues Benjamin Litherland, 
Joseph Smith and Niki Cheong, took to the field 
for in-depth interviews with 47 Jeremy Corbyn 
supporters across the North West, Yorkshire and 
the Humber, and the East Midlands. While my 
2017 prediction proved accurate, our interim 
findings suggests that the grounds on which it was 
made failed to sufficiently account for important 
differences between supporters.
The decline of the Labour leader’s popular-
ity and capacity to serve as fan object since the 
heydays of Glastonbury revellers’ “Oh Jeremy 
Corbyn” chants documented in BES panel studies 
since 2017 coincided with a period in which the 
‘constructive ambiguity’ (in other words polysemy) 
of Labour’s Brexit position grew unsustainable. 
Already strongly disliked by 2016 Leave voters 
(nearly 60% of whom rated Corbyn 0 out of 10 
in the latest BES data) Corbyn’s wider appeal had 
been much more strongly tied to the Remain cause 
than Labour frontbenchers past and present have 
been willing to admit.
Notably, many of the Corbyn supporters we 
interviewed described the 2016 EU membership 
referendum as catalyst of their engagement 
in politics and subsequent support of Jeremy 
Corbyn as disappointed Remainers. Those who 
by remaining Corbyn supporters were included 
in our sample, negotiated this seeming contra-
diction through strategies of textual selection and 
distinct reading positions: from those unaware 
of Corbyn’s Euroscepticism to those interpreting 
his recent conversion to offering a People’s Vote 
as a manifestation of him upholding principles 
of fairness. Others saw the values that had driven 
their Remain support translated into an agenda 
that they felt was advanced by Corbyn beyond the 
question of EU membership, namely questions 
of fairness, greater equality and the protection 
of the NHS. While these strategies succeeded in 
maintaining an affective bond for our interviewees, 
to many former Corbyn supporters they did not.
Yet more significant for the future of the 
Labour Party and to a broader reflection on the 
impact of the fanisation of political participation 
is the recognition of widely diverging practices, 
readings and affective investments among 
supporters. The clusters of different fan groups 
that emerged in our research map closely onto 
fan groups across the spectrum from audiences 
to petty producers identified by Abercrombie 
and Longhurst: fans whose media use is generally 
broad (and often still broadcast-centred), as is their 
fan object (commonly being the Labour Party, 
translating to emotionally invested support of the 
current leader); a second group whose fan object 
is defined more narrowly (specifically Corbyn 
rather than Labour) and whose media engagement 
is more specific and tied to social networks both 
online and offline; and enthusiasts whose fandom 
is embedded in a tight social network through 
organisations such as Momentum and the use of 
niche media such as The Canary or Novara Media; 
and whose fan objects shifts towards their own 
activity, as was reflected in the focus on friendships 
and campaigning achievements in Momentum’s 
first reaction to Labour’s defeat. Crucially, while all 
groups share an affective bond with Corbyn as fan 
object and regard their readings as reinforced by 
being part of a broader movement, their reading 
and understanding of shared terms – and with 
it their visions of the future they strive for – is 
widely divergent. While almost all participants 
described themselves as socialists their definitions 
of socialism ranged from ‘being sociable’ and 
caring about others (among the most casual fans), 
via broadly social democratic ideas of a stronger 
welfare state, to support for expansive forms of 
nationalisation coming closest (if not close) to 
an orthodox reading of socialism among some 
Momentum members. 
Rather than a sense of a shared positive 
agenda, what tied Corbyn supporters together was 
thus a shared dislike of the Conservative party and 
Boris Johnson in particular, much as, it seems safe 
to assume, such anti-fandom of Jeremey Corbyn 
drove the Conservative vote to a yet higher degree. 
In the UK’s post-referendum participatory political 
culture antipathy and anti-fandom hence function 
as key denominators around which fans and voters 
coalesce – a theme that not only marked Corbyn’s 
rise (with his initial attraction to most respondents 
being not any of the three other, better known 
leadership candidates) and fall from power, but 
likely to shape the Labour leadership election, too.
Last fan standing: Jeremy Corbyn supporters in 
the 2019 General Election
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The two head-to-head televised debates between 
Jeremy Corbyn and Boris Johnson in GE2019 (the 
first on ITV on 19th of November and the second 
on BBC on 6th December) offer an opportunity to 
examine the linguistic strategies and tactics each 
leader deployed to convey their message. The genre 
of the televised debate is one in which politicians 
must perform with strength and authenticity in 
order to be perceived as the winner. While more 
sophisticated augmentative models of consensus 
and reasoned debate are no doubt available, the 
televised debate continues to be conducted in 
competitive terms.
Gains can be made in televised debates 
by simply occupying the floor more than an 
opponent, and this relies on interactional power. 
First, a politician needs to speak for longer than 
an opponent and Johnson achieved this, speaking 
for approximately eight minutes more than 
Corbyn across both debates (three minutes more 
in the ITV debate and five minutes more in the 
BBC debate). This gain is significant as the length 
of speaking turns is strictly controlled by the 
moderators (Julie Etchingham in the first debate 
and Nick Robinson in the second). Johnson gained 
time by resisting the moderators and breaking the 
timing rules. This can be seen right from the first 
one-minute turn of the first debate where Corbyn 
speaks first for just under 60 seconds, and Johnson 
speaks for 70 seconds. Johnson resists four appeals 
by the moderator to stop speaking and gains ten 
extra seconds. This pattern is repeated throughout 
the debates, with Johnson ignoring and resisting 
the moderators’ enforcement of the timing rules 
and accruing time for himself.
Speakers can also gain the floor by violating 
the opponent’s speaking turn and both Corbyn 
and Johnson interrupt each other. However, 
Johnson interrupts Corbyn much more, and more 
successfully while Corbyn interrupts rarely and he 
allows Johnson to continue speaking afterwards. 
Johnson’s interruptions are not only much more 
frequent but also more intrusive and consistently 
wrest the speaking turn away from Corbyn. 
Johnson also dominates both debates throughout 
by taking the moderator’s role and directing the 
proceedings himself by asking Corbyn questions, 
particularly about Corbyn’s stance on Brexit. This 
tactic has many advantages as it allows Johnson 
to achieve the interactional upper hand by taking 
charge and pointing to the opponent’s weaknesses, 
but it also serves as an evasion. In both debates 
Johnson responds to critical questions about his 
own policies by immediately directing critical and 
derisive questions towards Corbyn.
Apart from interaction and the floor, televised 
debates are also characterised by adversarial 
language and personal attacks. Here Johnson 
seems to have a consistent ad hominem approach 
to Corbyn by portraying his leadership style as 
“dither and delay”, his ideas as “crackpot” and his 
policies as “Bermuda triangle type stuff ” saying 
“it’ll be little green men next”. Johnson also uses 
single-word interjections like “nonsense” with 
accompanying theatrical shrugging gestures and 
head-shaking to undermine Corbyn’s points.  In 
contrast, Corbyn does not use personal attacks at 
all but only attacks Johnson on his political record: 
on promises he made during the Brexit referendum 
campaign and on his plans for possible trade deals 
involving the NHS. 
Corbyn’s consensual style in these debates 
and also in other adversarial speech events such 
as Prime Minister’s Question Time (PMQs) 
with Theresa May is highly unusual. He not only 
contradicts the accepted confines of the genre, 
but also defies gendered expectations as the 
competitive displays are stereotypically viewed 
as masculine.  Conversely, Johnson, like Donald 
Trump in debates with Hilary Clinton in the 2016 
US election, performs an overtly hyper-masculine 
version of adversarial interactional dominance.  In 
practice, both men and women political leaders 
draw on a range of adversarial and consensual 
styles but in this case neither Johnson’s or Corbyn’s 
two extremes seem to be the most successful 
approach to adversarial speech events. Alternative-
ly, these debates can be performed with warmth 
and humour, as shown by Nicola Sturgeon in 
the General Election debates of 2015, who used 
interruption, adversarial quips and wisecracks to 
great effect while avoiding some of the negative 
aggression of direct personal attacks. 
Johnson’s interactional dominance of the 
head-to-head debates of GE2019 gave him more 
of the interactional floor than Corbyn, and his 
personal attacks showed Corbyn in a negative 
light. Although Corbyn arguably gave better 
answers to some of the ‘quick-fire’ questions, he 
was framed as the weaker participant by Johnson’s 
adversarial stance. This shows how carefully 
politicians must manage the combination of their 
own personal approach with the demands of the 
speech event genre. Whether in PMQs or televised 
debates the gains and losses of adversarial speech 
seem to be preserved in the proceedings and 
formats of the events. It is therefore possibly 
too risky for a leader to reject adversarial norms 
without either changing those formats or devel-
oping more sophisticated strategies to deflect and 
soften their negative effects.
Linguistic style in the Johnson vs Corbyn televised 
debates of the 2019 General Election campaign
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“It’s a circus, isn’t it? But, well, a fun circus. And 
the best thing about this circus is the speaking 
master: John Bercow.” 
On October 27, the Dutch satirical news 
show Zondag met Lubach spent a 7-minute item 
on the popularity of the Speaker of the House of 
Commons and his omnipresence in the Dutch 
news media. Throughout 2019, Bercow was the 
object of much press coverage, was interviewed 
on television and appeared in a live talk show 
twice. Clips that showed him screaming “Order! 
Order!” regularly popped up on television and 
went viral on news sites and social media. The 
phrase became an emblem for the particularities 
of British politics. It was amusing to European 
audiences but at the same time a symbolic marker 
of the otherness of the UK. 
Bercow’s “Order! Order!” became a daily 
incantation that afforded an international public 
to relate to the political spectacle in Westminster. 
However, it also became the epitome of increasing-
ly desperate attempts to avert political chaos in an 
ongoing political pandemonium. Both through its 
literal meaning and its repetitiveness it provided 
ritual stability to a political process that became 
increasingly hard to comprehend in the media 
coverage of the Brexit debates.
Providing order in Parliament and safeguard-
ing its procedures and rules of debate is the main 
task of the Speaker. He needs to assure that “the 
rules laid down by the House for the carrying on 
of its business are observed”, as the House states 
itself. The function of Speaker is therefore key to 
the democratic process. When accepting office, 
Speakers resign from their party and during 
elections they do not campaign on political issues 
but stand as the “Speaker seeking re-election”. As 
laid down in the regulation of the House: “The 
Speaker must be above party political controversy 
and must be seen to be completely impartial in all 
public matters”.
The Speaker does not take a stand on political 
issues and has merely a procedural, ceremonial and 
ritual function. He needs to perform the written 
and unwritten rules of parliamentary politics. By 
using ritual phrasing and performing ritual acts he 
safeguards the integrity of the democratic process 
without interfering in the political content. We 
could therefore hypothesise that public attention 
for the role and person of the Speaker, especially 
in politically turbulent times, is limited, and even 
more so compared to political leaders. 
However, the extensive media coverage from 
the Westminster theater has turned the Speaker 
into a lead actor on the political stage. Bercow 
became a celebrity politician. 
When we take the number of visits to the 
English-language Wikipedia lemma about Bercow 
as a proxy for public interest, we see that through-
out 2019 it attracted on many days a similar 
amount of visits as the lemmas of Theresa May, 
Jeremy Corbyn and Boris Johnson – and regularly 
more. There is a clear relation with events in 
which the Speaker interfered, such as Bercow 
deciding that the House could not vote twice 
on an agreement between the government and 
the EU. Numbers then spiked to 51,276 visitors 
on October 21. Moreover, and even more when 
examining the number of visitors to lemmas about 
Bercow in other European languages, there is also 
a clear relation with press coverage. After Bercow 
had been a guest in the Dutch talk show Jinek in 
April and September, for example, there was a 
steep rise in the visitors to the Dutch language 
Wikipedia page.
Similar patterns are observed in the data in 
Google Trends. Although these don’t provide 
absolute numbers, it allows for the analysis of the 
relative importance of search terms. Moreover, it 
gives insight in the geographical distribution of 
search queries. This shows that searches for Bercow 
are more numerous in countries in which there was 
also more press coverage. The Netherlands, again, 
scores particularly high here. The Dutch public 
broadcaster NOS even reported in April about 
Bercow’s fame under the headline: “Mr. Speaker 
(from order, order!) attraction at Schiphol”.
The substantial public attention for Bercow 
on the one hand aligns with a trend towards 
celebrity politics and representing politics as 
a spectacle. It provided foreign media with a 
narrative and an angle that appealed to a mass 
audience. The Speaker, and the phrase “Order! 
Order!” in particular, thus became a recurring 
trope in an unfolding and – at least for an outside 
audience – increasingly chaotic and incompre-
hensible political situation. Coverage was colored 
by the irony of the outside observer describing an 
unfolding tragedy.
The public attention for the Speaker also 
points to the importance of rituals in politics. 
They not only provide stability to the political 
process, but also provides something to hold 
on to in political reporting.  Rituals function to 
produce order out of chaos – even where order is 
hard to find.
Order! Order! The Speaker, celebrity politics and 
ritual performance
3. Google searches for “John Bercow” between Sept. 19 and Dec. 18, 2019 (Google Trends)
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Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn have dominated 
the media coverage of the election, with each 
receiving 30+% of the coverage in the last days of 
the campaign.  Much of the coverage of Corbyn 
was negative, demonising him in any number of 
ways (e.g. ‘Cor-bin’ in The Sun or ‘Apologists for 
Terror’ in the Daily Mail), but what of the Prime 
Minister? How was Johnson portrayed, beyond the 
faked familiarity of ‘Boris’ and ‘BoJo’?
Matthew Wood and his colleagues used Boris 
Johnson’s London mayoral campaign and career 
to illustrate their notion of the ‘everyday celebrity 
politician’. This figure, they argued, was a product 
of an era of anti-politics and of the new modes of 
communication made available via social media 
and other non-traditional media platforms. The 
everyday celebrity politician evinced an image of 
‘normality’, ‘spontaneity’ and ‘authenticity’. 
This analysis seemed to capture exactly the 
strategy adopted by the Conservative Party and 
Johnson’s advisers. The pictures of Johnson pulling 
pints in a pub, delivering milk, or operating factory 
machinery, together with the predictable primary 
school and hospital photos, all served to represent 
him in ‘everyday’ contexts.
The celebrity dimension was captured in the 
party election broadcasts that bookended the 
campaign. The 12 Questions video that began the 
campaign has had, according to YouTube, more 
than 250,000 views. (The best viewed Labour 
equivalent, Mean Tweets with Jeremy Corbyn, 
received 86,000 views). 12 Questions borrows 
from Vogue’s 73 Questions. Both evince an air of 
spontaneity as the subject responds to a series of 
serious and not-so-serious enquiries. It begins as it 
goes on: “Hey, Boris, you alright? … What’s been 
on your mind today?” He is then asked about why 
he’s called the election - whether he likes Marmite 
(“yes”), what challenges face the country, and 
which is his favourite band (The Rolling Stones) - 
while he wanders a corridor and makes himself tea. 
The campaign ended with a parody of a scene 
from Love Actually (itself a parody of Bob Dylan’s 
video for ‘Subterranean Homesick Blues’ from 
1965). Instead of Andrew Lincoln on the doorstep, 
confessing his love to Keira Knightley with a series 
of hand-drawn posters and a cassette of Christmas 
carols, Johnson serenades a voter with his promise 
to “get Brexit done”. It was viewed 440,000 times 
in the two days before December 12th. Here was 
Johnson, playing the lovable rogue, framed by the 
glamour of the movie world. 
Both of these videos, in their different 
ways, represented Johnson, in the words of 
James Brassett and Alex Sutton, as the “world’s 
first self-satirising politician” – a claim further 
underlined by the sight of Johnson driving a JCB 
through a wall of polystyrene bricks to convey his 
determination to get Brexit done.  
The self-satirical pose provided a device for 
eluding criticism, and for securing media endorse-
ment.  Leo McKinstry wrote in the Daily Express 
of “the jovial atmosphere inspired by the Prime 
Minister”, of Johnson’s ability to “[bring] smiles” 
and his “unique capacity to amuse and entertain 
the public”. Other journalists translated his style 
into some notion of ‘authenticity’ that established 
his credentials as both a representative of his 
electorate and a leader of them.
Brassett and Sutton quote the TV and film 
satirist Armando Iannucci saying that politicians 
“no longer act like real versions of themselves. 
Instead, they come over as replicants of an 
idealised, fictional version of what they think a 
politician should be. They perform politics rather 
than practice policy … We’re left watching an 
entertainment rather than participating in a state 
of affairs”. It is a description that fits both Johnson 
and his representation in this campaign – the 
everyday, self-satirising celebrity politician.
But there is more to be said. First, in adopting 
the ‘everyday’ approach, Johnson was refusing 
the kind of superstar celebrity persona adopted 
by Donald Trump, whose political style has 
been compared to that of rock stars or stand-up 
comedians. And second, there is the question 
of what kind of entertainer or entertainment 
Johnson is borrowing to confect his everyday 
persona.  To recall Love Actually, it seems as if the 
plan is for Johnson to channel the humility and 
charm of Hugh Grant’s fictional PM, although, 
to some, surprised by his appearance on their 
doorstep, he might more resemble Grant’s sleazy 
villain from Paddington 2. 
What is Boris Johnson?
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At the end of his big BBC interview with Nigel 
Farage on 4 December, Andrew Neil thanked his 
guest, turned to the camera, and castigated Boris 
Johnson for evading scrutiny. “There is, of course, 
still one [leader interview] to be done”, said Neil, 
before listing a long list of “questions of trust” that 
he wished to put to the elusive Prime Minister. He 
concluded: “There is no law, no Supreme Court 
ruling, that can force Mr Johnson to participate in 
a BBC leader’s interview. But the Prime Minister 
of our nation will, at times, have to stand up to 
President Trump, President Putin, [and] President 
Xi of China. So, it’s surely not expecting too much 
that he spends half an hour standing up to me”.
It was a powerful set-piece, by a big beast of 
the BBC who saw his own reputation as a fearsome 
interviewer grow amid the collective breakdown 
of his employer, and quickly became canonised as 
one of the defining moments of a fraught election 
campaign. Yet, as a political punch, it didn’t leave 
a mark on the Prime Minister, and it almost com-
pletely overshadowed the interview with Farage, in 
which Neil came out fighting but which the Brexit 
Party leader and celebrity politician par excellence 
won on points.   
Neil’s opening line: “Nigel Farage. This election 
should have been your finest hour. Instead, you’ve 
barely got a walk-on part. What went wrong?” 
A little later: “You’re going nowhere. You’re 
marginalised, irrelevant in this election”.
Later still: “Just after the European elections 
you were puffed up enough to talk about a complete 
realignment of British politics. Now you might 
not win a single seat and you’re not even standing 
yourself. It was complete hubris, wasn’t it?”
Neil kept swinging, piling pressure on to 
Farage, whose vulnerabilities had been increasing 
in previous weeks. Having taken the controversial 
decision not to run as an MP and having stood 
down 317 Brexit Party candidates in key constit-
uencies to give the Conservative Party clear runs, 
Farage should have been reeling. He had also 
reportedly fallen out with his benefactor, Arron 
Banks, over party strategy. And just hours before 
the Neil interview, Farage had been “humiliated” 
as four Brexit Party MEPs had left the party and 
advocated that voters back the Tories, amid polls 
that were moving in the wrong direction for 
Farage’s party.
Yet, the only point during the interview at 
which Farage looked vaguely rattled was when 
Neil read out some racist quotes from Brexit Party 
candidates, to which Farage parried, countered, 
and moved on. And despite what at first glance 
seemed like a terrible election result for the Brexit 
Party, their winning not a single seat, Farage 
emerged unbowed. Fuelled by a celebrity persona 
that far exceeds Westminster, Farage understands 
power in the age of social media in ways that 
most other politicians don’t, and is playing an 
extra-parliamentary long game where he manipu-
lates the media and other institutions into winning 
the game for him. 
Having forced David Cameron into calling the 
2016 EU referendum, and now having re-shaped 
the Conservative Party (“We set out to make the 
Conservative Party conservative again - and it’s job 
done”, he said), Farage’s influence has, over the last 
generation, outstripped that of pretty much every 
elected politician in the country.
“Every party I lead shifts the centre of gravity 
in British politics in a very dramatic way”, he told 
Neil, when confronted with his own electoral 
failure. To an audience in Doncaster on the eve of 
the election he said: “If we hadn’t set The Brexit 
Party up, Mrs May would still be Prime Minister, 
Brexit would be stuck in the weeds, and a second 
referendum would virtually be upon us by now. We 
reset the political agenda…in a very dramatic way 
and we have dragged the Tory party kicking and 
screaming into a different position”. To Neil: “What 
we did in a sense was to create Boris Johnson”.
Not many people, surely, would be proud of 
such a thing, but for Farage the means justified 
the ends, as they had done in the past. It was 
also another way of cultivating his transatlantic 
bromance with President Trump. Whether he 
inadvertently overstepped the mark in creating a 
Tory monster with an unexpectedly large majority 
– one which may, under its own opportunistic 
leader, now pivot towards a One Nation position 
– remains to be seen. But Farage is not going 
anywhere. “I’ve spent 25 years trying to get us out 
of Europe. It looks like I might spend about the 
next 25 years trying to reform our political system. 
But I won’t be going away”. So said the most influ-
ential electoral loser of the modern political era. 
Creating Boris: Nigel Farage and the 2019 election
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As Jeffrey Alexander argues, we tend to measure 
the success of a political performance by its 
authenticity. There are three key challenges to 
achieving this that Johnson has so far in his 
political career solved particularly well by stepping 
in the footsteps of other populists. And the 2019 
election crystallised these populist solutions.
First, a politician cannot perform a character, 
as an actor may, that he leaves behind him when he 
steps off stage. He must be seen to be at one with 
his persona. At the same time, he must appeal to 
a media environment that feeds on spectacle and 
soundbites and is forever watching to see whether 
he remains consistent in, and at ease with, every 
situation – from formal parliamentary debates to 
eating bacon sandwiches. 
Populists have found a solution to this 
challenge: they bring what the sociologist Erving 
Goffman termed their otherwise private backstage 
character onto the front stage. Johnson’s bumbling, 
clownish performance of non-professionalism 
and communicative incompetence does just this 
through means of symbolic production such 
as hairstyle, hesitation (“erh-erh-erh”) and an 
ever-present self-ironic smirk. And, as Jeremy 
Vine recently related, this is a studied performance 
of incompetence. Such a persona may not fit the 
norms and formality of political institutions. 
But, like other populists, Johnson has made 
this discord between performative form and 
context his very message: the political system and 
establishment need shaking up! Norm breaking 
has become an act of rebellion against formality 
and political professionalisation. It exposes and 
delegitimises the scripted political correctness 
of the Janus-faced, Machiavellian elite for what 
it is – more insincere masquerading, hiding the 
truth from public view! In the same sweep, it 
delegitimises any social powers that might curb 
the populist performance of The Truth. For 
Johnson, this was until recently parliament. The 
delegitimisation of such power structures that 
stood in the way of the people’s will in turn gave 
him a mandate to remove the obstacles to better 
control his performative resources.
Second, an authentic performance requires 
the audience to psychologically identify with the 
performed persona so they become receptive to 
the political actor’s message. Johnson’s backstage 
persona allowed him to identify as one of 
the ordinary people and not a member of the 
establishment. Somehow rows with girlfriends, 
questionable favouritism in his relationship 
with American businesswoman Jennifer Arcuri, 
unknown numbers of legitimate and illegitimate 
children, and other divergences from the path 
of righteousness only reinforced the audience’s 
ability to project themselves onto his otherwise 
indeterminate and malleable persona. In any story, 
it is easier to identify with a flawed hero.
The typically populist binary of the good, 
ordinary people versus the evil, deceptive elite 
served to polarise and homogenise. But the good 
people in this divide consisted of a heterogeneous 
mix of conservatives, non-conservative Brexit 
voters and anti-Labour voters who would never 
agree on a left- or right-wing solution to current 
social problems. ‘One Nation Conservatism’ 
became as malleable an ideological platform as 
Johnson’s own character, promising everybody 
what they wanted, from public service spending 
to curbing immigration; it morphed into ‘The 
People’s Government’. Johnson thereby replaced 
an ideologically coherent utopian vision with a 
mythical past that we can supposedly ‘go back to’ 
through the gateway of Brexit. And we had better 
go back to the future quickly – no dither and delay! 
– as the impatience of populist time dictates.
Third, a successful political performance 
demands that the audience collectively invest 
their affect. Johnson could not easily appeal 
to hope and passion, which require a shared, 
forward-looking idea that unites citizens. 
And so instead he appealed to reactionary or 
backward-looking emotions – anger against a 
deceiving elite; fear of a scapegoated ‘other’; a 
nostalgic longing for a mythical Great Britain; 
and, as Candida Yates recently argued, pleasure in 
being allowed to feel resentment.
Johnson, like most populists, may not have 
a consistent ideology. His performance, however, 
enacts a level of consistency between its form 
and content that populists achieve particularly 
well. It brings his message into being through the 
disruption of democratic form, which becomes 
a pleasure that needs no longer be guilty. And 
so the good populist performance showcases its 
undermining of the structures and norms of liberal 
democracy as we know it and frees the performer 
of previous restraints. But Johnson’s ideologically 
blank character, of course, does not reveal to us to 
what ends he will direct his newfound powers.
Boris the clown: the effective performance  
of incompetence
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When Donald Trump ran for president in 2016, 
his billionaire tech supporter Peter Thiel scolded 
the media for taking Trump’s outrageous speeches 
literally. Thiel’s theory was that “a lot of voters 
who vote for Trump take Trump seriously but not 
literally”. The worry for the Conservatives going in 
to the 2019 UK General Election was that voters 
would take Boris Johnson neither seriously nor 
literally. For Boris was essentially a comic persona 
before becoming Prime Minister, having used 
humour to distinguish himself from his political 
peers. Literalness is hardly his forte either – he 
extended the Brexit negotiating deadline despite 
promising to die in a ditch before doing so. Hence 
the challenge he faced when campaigning in the 
role of serious statesman was whether his carefully 
crafted reputation as a joker would be an electoral 
asset or a liability.
Charming the Conservative Party membership 
into handing him the keys to 10 Downing Street 
was nothing compared with the task of winning 
enough swing voters to gain a parliamentary 
majority. The general election was thus the acid test 
for the Boris method of trying to be taken seriously 
while laughing off any criticism. One bad omen 
was the ITV studio audience openly mocking 
Johnson’s response when pressed on his relation-
ship with the truth. By conspicuously avoiding an 
interview with the fearsome Andrew Neil, Boris 
betrayed the limits of his ability to appear as a 
composed public performer. 
What the election result ultimately demon-
strated is the limited importance of being earnest 
in what has been dubbed a Berlusconified public 
sphere. The post-referendum political climate in 
the UK has been marked by high levels of cynicism 
and distrust. Professional integrity, expertise, and 
independence of individuals and institutions alike 
have been impugned for the sake of point-scoring 
in the battle to settle unfinished arguments about 
whether Brexit is the right solution for a badly 
divided Britain. 
Seen in this context, the issue of Johnson’s 
problematic relationship with the truth – he lost 
a court case effectively brought on the grounds 
he misled the Queen – is revealing about the true 
political cost of being ridiculed. Boris did not suffer 
really as the butt of a thousand jokes from friends 
and foes alike at home as well as abroad. That brand 
recognition got him elected mayor of London and 
was no hindrance to leading the UK’s diplomatic 
service as Foreign Secretary, before eventually 
unseating Theresa May as Prime Minister. Rather, 
in the words of the great satirical novelist Jonathan 
Coe, the greatest trick Boris Johnson ever played 
was to “become his own satirist”. Humour was 
Boris’ strategy for rising to the top; it was a calculat-
ed means of deflection designed to ensure that 
others laugh with him and go gentle on his glaring 
mistakes, untruths, or moral failings. 
Johnson’s cautiously rationed public perfor-
mances during the campaign suggest he was not 
seeking to rely too much on playing the fool to 
win. Yet his successful weaponization of political 
humour was always available to be deployed at will. 
Time and again, Jeremy Corbyn and other Labour 
figures quoted Johnson’s own words – culled 
from the stream of consciousness journalism that 
rewarded the Prime Minister handsomely – at him. 
But for so many voters this was water off a duck’s 
back; they did not expect comedy Boris to write 
seriously and were puzzled about taking offence 
after the fact. Of course, it is no coincidence that 
the rise of populism in the West is nested within 
the “culture wars” over the right to cause offence, 
especially by breaking the supposed taboo of 
political correctness. Brexit itself is in many ways 
an extension of this struggle to arbitrate acceptable 
political discourse, as illustrated by the expression 
“it’s not racist to talk about immigration”. 
In comedy as in politics, issues of power are 
never far from the surface. By laughing about 
some of his weaknesses – something the extremely 
serious and at times petulant Jeremy Corbyn was 
incapable of doing – Johnson turned comedy in to 
the currency of his political power. Corbyn turned 
out to be the perfect, if unwitting, foil: the straight 
guy in the 2019 electoral double act. The more 
the Labour leader could be attacked for his moral 
seriousness and literal-mindedness, the easier it 
was for Johnson to escape accountability on those 
fronts with the complicity of a media ecosystem 
that lapped it all up.  In this way the use of humour 
was a central plank of the strategy for winning 
an electoral mandate to undertake the serious 
business of Brexit. What comes next, however, is 
bound to be less funny. Not because the stakes are 
higher, but rather because it is harder to turn the 
details of fisheries policy or level playing field re-
quirements in to comic material needed to distract 
from the consequences of Johnson’s choices. 
Political humour and the problem of taking
Boris seriously
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Humour can be a powerful tool in both political 
communication and resistance. Joking articu-
lates dissent in a way that disarms opponents, 
and can provide a protected space to raise risky 
concepts. A funny idea can spread like wildfire, 
its inherent enjoyableness uniting support 
around its core message. 
It seems that political parties have not yet 
mastered the craft of comedy. Witness the Liberal 
Democrats’ short-lived puppet gag: a pair of 
videos satirising Johnson and Corbyn which were 
released online then removed from view after they 
met with virulent criticism, including from within 
the party’s own support base. Johnson’s joking 
has often been controversial: sometimes cited as 
highly appealing to voters, his sense of humour has 
also brought him accusations of unstatesmanlike 
behaviour, ‘dog-whistling’ and bigotry. Humour is 
widely theorised as a way for minority and margin-
alised perspectives to challenge the dominant and 
powerful, so we are perhaps inherently suspicious 
of top-down approaches to joking.
In this Election, the more captivating uses 
of humour were to be found in the grassroots 
campaigns which sought not to serve power and 
officialdom, but to tease, jab and question it. The 
Prime Minister’s constituency, Uxbridge and South 
Ruislip, was one target of the Votey McVoteface 
campaign, which encouraged itinerant boaters 
to choose marginal constituencies as the place 
to register their vote. The strategy was extended 
to sofa-surfers and others of no fixed address. 
The campaign’s name mirrors an act of collective 
mischief in which the public voted to christen a 
polar research ship RSS Boaty McBoatface. In ref-
erencing this gag, the Votey team could reasonably 
hope to replicate that spirit of collective comedic 
action. No data is currently available to determine 
whether a significant number of boaters really 
did participate; certainly they did not succeed in 
overturning Johnson’s majority. It seems likely, 
though, that the campaign’s good use of humour 
was an important factor in gaining excellent 
mainstream publicity (from the Guardian, i news 
and BBC, among others).
Johnson’s constituency was also the target 
of several candidates who stood either as a joke, 
or using humorous names and costumes to draw 
attention to a marginal position or issue. These 
included Lord Buckethead (a recurrent character 
this time appropriated for the Monster Raving 
Loony Party), Count Binface (who shares a 
well-publicised personal rivalry with Buckethead), 
Yace ‘International Time Lord’ Yogenstein and 
Bobby Elmo Smith. None of these candidates made 
a significant dent in Johnson’s 52.6% vote share. 
The joke candidates’ modest impacts ranged from 
125 votes for Buckethead to a miniscule 8 votes for 
Elmo, in comparison to Johnson’s 25,351. It is easy 
to dismiss these apparently flippant candidacies as 
an irrelevant, ineffective nuisance. This, though, 
would disregard a significant tradition of protest.
The nomination of joke candidates is a 
political tactic with its own history. Examples 
include the Yippies’ nomination of Pigasus (an 
actual pig) for President of the USA in 1968 and 
the cat that polled well for a Siberian mayoral 
post in 2015. Putting animals up for election, 
like the positing of a fictional persona, asserts 
that conventional candidates have fallen into 
contempt. Usually operating with tiny budgets 
and minimal campaign teams, joke candidates 
get attention through imagination and mischief. 
Receiving a negligible number of votes, they 
do not generally threaten to topple traditional 
candidates nor electoral systems. This is not truly 
their purpose. Rather, they function as a small but 
notable presence, demonstrating and critiquing the 
operation of power. 
The formal campaign in Uxbridge and South 
Ruislip was largely discussed as a two-horse race 
between Johnson and the Labour candidate Ali 
Milani, but media attention also went to the 
Buckethead vs Binface dispute. Although the tone 
of Johnson’s victory speech at his constituency 
was triumphant, the pomp of the occasion was 
certainly called into question by the theatricality of 
this alternative contest. Buckethead was positioned 
directly behind the podium as the Returning 
Officer read the results, so his reactions were 
televised. As Binface’s result was read out, Bucket-
head conspicuously turned to face him, directing 
his audience’s attention to this specific rivalry. 
Buckethead jeeringly held up both middle fingers 
at Binface as his own victory was confirmed. So, 
the public were presented with a parodic parallel 
two-horse race, characterised by pettiness, 
personal animosity and narcissism, which 
mirrored some possible, cynical interpretations of 
the formal campaign.
The Lib Dem puppet videos sought to win 
power rather than critique it; the same is true of 
Johnson’s humour. Such top-down efforts arguably 
undermine the joy and function of joking. 
Humorous campaigns, by contrast, do what joking 
is celebrated for. They throw into question the 
dignity and legitimacy of those who seek power, 
and the very systems by which power is managed, 
distributed and won.
Joking: uses and abuses of humour in the 
Election campaign
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The problem with satirising the election  
Journalists claimed it was  the “most important 
election in a generation”, so their ability to provide 
balance and scrutiny was imperative in helping 
inform the public.  But since the election period 
began, concerns were raised about “biased 
coverage” and the breaking of electoral law and 
broadcasting rules.
America has become well versed in some of 
the problems the UK is experiencing in its political 
news coverage and one of the ways they are 
tackling it is through the critical voice of TV satire.  
Over the last 20 years, satirists like Jon Stewart 
and John Oliver have become dominant social 
commentators who have taken the media to task 
for poor political news reporting and lambasted 
political institutions for their undemocratic 
policies.  These figures have also been commended 
for their critical and context driven approach 
to news reporting that encourages audiences to 
question dominant political discourses.   
While American TV satire’s sophisticated 
analysis of contemporary politics continues to 
grow, UK TV satire has been largely absent from 
our screens.  In September, we were promised 
a new series of Spitting Image but it did not 
materialise in time for the General Election. BBC’s 
The Mash Report had an opportunity to provide 
a weekly satirical critique of party exploits and sub-
sequent news coverage, yet it was nowhere to be 
seen.  A staple of UK television satire – the trusted 
panel show format of Have I Got News for You was 
regularly aired but the programme just doesn’t 
exude the same level of critical and investigative 
flair found in US satirical platforms.  
One of the reasons why the UK has not been 
able to master the US’s successful model of TV 
satire is the issue of due impartiality – a broadcast 
rule that ensures the news is reported in a fair and 
balanced manner.  While TV satire might not fall 
under the definition of news, Ofcom’s broadcast-
ing rules on ‘Elections and Referendums’ stipulates 
that “due impartiality must be maintained across 
all programmes giving coverage to the Election”. 
This may explain why TV satire was so 
thin on the ground because the rules of election 
impartiality are not conducive to satire practice.  
Afterall, satire is meant to draw attention to the 
failings and vices of powerful figures but applying 
this strategy to all political parties for the sake of 
balance may not be applicable or funny, and could 
weaken its overall potency.   
While the rules of impartiality have created 
a precarious media landscape for satirists and 
comedians, some have not been afraid to embrace 
this challenge.  Take The Last Leg, Channel 4’s 
live, late-night comedy talk show.  It might not be 
in the same league as US TV satire programmes 
like Last Week Tonight but its host, Adam Hills, 
confidently manoeuvred around broadcast rules 
and delivered a series of fourth estate inspired 
stories on the General Election. 
Drawing parallels with the democratic role of 
the news media and the citizen surrogate approach 
of many TV satire programmes, The Last Leg pre-
dominantly reported on stories that came directly 
from its audience who used the show’s Twitter 
hashtag #isitok? to raise topics of discussion.  Such 
questions were used to unpack and discuss why 
Boris Johnson was taking part in soft interview 
programmes like This Morning but avoiding a 
much harder hitting interview with Andrew Neil.  
Impartiality was a key feature in The Last 
Leg’s approach to critiquing the main party 
manifestos.  While the show’s hosts agreed that 
Labour’s policies on broadband, and the 4-day 
working week had major benefits, they also 
debated Corbyn’s ability to sell good ideas given 
his low level of popularity with the electorate.  The 
show also paid close attention to the Conservative 
manifesto and how the document had more 
pictures of Boris than disabled policies. 
Neither of the main parties came off particu-
larly well in the show’s weekly discussions.  This 
is often the case with satire and political comedy, 
but it can be problematic as the tone of coverage 
could potentially encourage cynicism and apathy. 
The Last Leg attempts to overcome this issue by 
consistently promoting advocacy journalism strat-
egies.  In my article Provoking the Citizen I found 
that TV satirists are increasingly adopting this style 
of reporting to encourage citizen engagement in 
the political process. Throughout the election cycle 
the host, Adam Hills does just that by drawing the 
audiences’ attention to the importance of casting 
their vote.
There was potential in this General Election 
for more satirical voices to challenge and con-
textualise media and political discourses.  But 
evidently, the rules of election impartiality created 
obstacles that prevented such voices from being 
heard.  The Last Leg shows us that TV satire can 
overcome these issues by combining comedy with 
the conventions of normative journalism practice; 
specifically avoiding partisanship, holding power 
to account and prioritising the views and needs of 
the audience.     
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Sounding Off: music and musicians’ 
interventions in the 2019 election campaign 
When Tony Blair’s former constituency of 
Sedgefield fell to the Conservatives for the first 
time since 1935, the Tory campaign headquarters 
blasted out ‘Things Can Only Get Better’, the 
theme song of his 1997 landslide victory. It harked 
back not only to a bygone electoral terrain, but a 
musical landscape long-gone.
2019’s fragmented media landscape compared 
to Blair’s musical and electoral heyday continued 
the trajectory away from keynote ‘campaign songs’. 
But music was abundant even if, for much of the 
campaign, as a secondary feature in the messaging 
from the parties themselves. With a gamut of 
source genres and instrumental palettes – from 
plangent piano and strings, through guitar infused 
rock, to electronica – Party Election Broadcast 
music was largely relegated to underscore that 
could have easily sat within adverts, film trailers or 
corporate training videos. 
This seemed partly related to the plethora 
of content, election broadcasts co-mingling with 
dozens of social media videos produced by parties, 
individual candidates and activist organisations. 
The increasing emphasis on social media meant a 
hunger for content – Momentum’s production staff 
were supplemented by hundreds of volunteers – 
and the number of backing tracks required would 
always militate towards loops and small-scale 
production on a quick turnaround. 
The online, referential, meme-aesthetic also 
drew from other media. Some of the more familiar 
musical interludes harked back to television – as 
in the SNPs use of music from Tony Hart’s art 
programmes and Countdown – or Labour’s 
sardonic underscoring of Boris Johnson interviews 
with snippets of Heinz Keissling’s light entertain-
ment music (better known now from the sitcom 
It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia). Copyright being 
a factor, library and public domain music were 
also features. Indeed, when Momentum spoofed 
a 1990s Coca Cola advert, they were subject to a 
cease and desist letter in short order. Inevitably, 
the December timing of the election played into 
its soundtrack.  The culture of cross-references 
inflected ‘Christmas themed’ outputs, like 
the twinkles and bells of the SNP’s take on  A 
Christmas Carol, and the ostensibly diegetic sound 
of a portable stereo playing ‘Silent Night’ in the 
Conservatives’ parody of Love Actually. Exemplify-
ing the fast-moving, interconnected web of content 
across different types of producer, this was an idea 
lifted from Labour candidate Rosena Allin-Khan’s 
video for her campaign in Tooting, and images 
of Johnson from the Tory advert were quickly 
repurposed to critique him. 
But popular music culture beyond the fluidity 
of internet remixing loomed large via musicians’ 
interventions. There were different levels of 
endorsement, such as Liam Gallagher’s and Chris 
Martin’s support in passing for the Greens and 
Liberal Democrats, respectively. The large majority 
of artists who weighed in enthusiastically, however, 
did so for Labour or at least against the Conserv-
atives, – as with Madness’s dig at ‘The Bullingdon 
Boys’ – and from across the generic spectrum, up 
to and including the heart of the pop mainstream, 
in Little Mix. This added pop firepower to the 
closing stages of Labour’s campaign. Emeli Sandé 
permitted the use of her song ‘You Are Not Alone’, 
while Clean Bandit released an emotive Radiohead 
cover, and Brian Eno an uncharacteristic comedy 
number, backing Labour. 
Several parties promised support for music 
venues – tax cuts from the Conservatives, an exam-
ination of funding from the Liberal Democrats and 
a community-oriented pledge in Labour’s ‘Charter 
for the Arts’. This also drew on pop luminaries, 
its launch featuring Lily Allen, Sandé, MIA and 
Clean Bandit. If Ken Loach’s role at the launch, 
given his previous controversial remarks on the 
history of the Holocaust being ‘for all to discuss’, 
was hardly likely to assuage Labour’s tensions with 
the Jewish community, that fraught aspect of the 
campaign also highlighted the broader popular 
musical leaning towards Labour. A stark critique of 
Labour’s record on anti-Semitism from literary and 
interfaith figures in The Guardian drew a response 
in the music press as the NME ran a letter with a 
host of both British and American musicians in 
addition to longstanding, habitual signatories of 
pro-Corbyn missives.
Shorn of household-name musical endorse-
ments, the Conservatives tried to burnish their 
pop-cultural credentials. Boris Johnson cited the 
Rolling Stones and, somewhat oddly given their 
political emphasis, The Clash as his preferred 
listening while Michael Gove’s attempt to parry 
Stormzy’s support for Labour by tweeting the 
rapper’s lyrics almost inevitably backfired and left 
him at the centre of a social media storm.
Labour’s musical campaign emerged from 
an early glut of unremarkable background sound, 
woven through the now characteristic mixture of 
official and activist generated content, as the clear 
leader in terms of pop presence. Momentum’s 
national co-ordinator claimed 70 million views 
for their videos, but the result revealed limitations 
to the rush of social media likes and stardust of 
popular musical acclaim. Musical culture and 
electoral culture are increasingly entangled, but 
the reliably effective deployment of the former in 
service of the latter seems some way off. 
123
Dr Ellen Watts
LSE Fellow in 
Qualitative Research 
Methodology, The 
London
School of Economics. 
Her research interests 
include celebrity, popular 
culture,
representation and 
citizenship. 
Email: e.watts@lse.ac.uk
Twitter: @ellenfelicity 
Stormzy, status, and the serious business of 
social media spats
When is a ‘spat’ more than just that? Like many 
other performers, Stormzy used Twitter and 
Instagram to implore followers to register to vote. 
While emphasising these were “MY views” and 
encouraging readers to do their own research, 
the rapper and singer made his own conclusions 
clear. Corbyn was “committed to giving power 
back to the people”, while the prospect of 
continued premiership for a man who admitted 
nervousness on seeing a “bunch of black kids” 
was “extremely dangerous”. 
It didn’t take long for a Conservative to be 
called on for a response to Stormzy’s “sinister man” 
depiction of their leader. On talkRADIO Michael 
Gove claimed Stormzy had made his “political 
views” clear by wearing a “stab vest” on stage at 
Glastonbury. “All I would say”, Gove concluded, “is 
that he’s a far, far better rapper than he is political 
analyst”. When Labour’s Angela Rayner retorted 
that Gove was “crap at both” Gove curiously 
co-opted Stormzy’s own lyrics to clap back, 
tweeting: “I set trends dem man copy”. 
While this “embarrassing” episode in the 
campaign seems surreal it’s not something new, 
and not just because we have previously been 
subjected to Gove rapping. This ‘spat’ and the 
media commentary around it feels like a familiar 
form of boundary policing, questioning whether 
a celebrity has the status to make political state-
ments. We also saw this explicitly in 2015 with 
David Cameron’s dismissal of comedian Russell 
Brand as “a joke”, something he made emphatically 
clear that electoral politics was not. Gove’s use of 
Stormzy’s lyrics to double down on dismissing 
his political knowledge reinforces the sense it is 
not just that he is a celebrity that matters, nor a 
musician, but a rapper. 
I have argued that celebrities’ status in the 
political field is grounded in claims to represent 
citizens. Being seen to speak to a large audience 
– for example when spikes in voter registration 
among younger people were attributed to Stormzy 
– is most important for working class celebrities 
associated with genres attributed lower cultural 
capital. While Michael Gove appears to have some 
liking for rap we can assume he and Stormzy 
disagree on many things, one of these being what 
“political views” Stormzy was signalling by wearing 
Banksy’s Union Jack stab vest at Glastonbury. 
But it is broader perceptions of what Stormzy 
represents – what he speaks for, and who he speaks 
to – that make this spat something more meaning-
ful. While The Guardian’s Jonathan Jones argued 
Stormzy spoke “for England” at Glastonbury he is 
generally not seen to have such generic reach, nor 
to speak for some faceless group demonstrated 
through social media stats. Stormzy routinely does 
what is often demanded of celebrities who talk 
politics: he puts his money where his mouth is. 
The Stormzy Scholarship supports black students 
to study at Cambridge, and he has emphasised 
the importance of using the word “black” rather 
than framing awardees euphemistically as  “un-
derprivileged”. His #Merky Books collaboration 
with Penguin publishes the stories of young writers 
“that are not being heard”, and the description of 
his own book proclaims him “a true spokesman of 
black empowerment”. Stormzy makes continued 
connections across multiple social fields to a 
community he is seen to represent, a constituency 
that is largely young, black, and excluded from 
formal politics. 
Beyond Stormzy, in this election we continued 
to see celebrity used to draw battle lines between 
the two main rivals. While as in 2017 celebrity 
endorsements were not at the core of Labour’s 
campaign, their Instagram feed showcased 
several famous faces in the final days. Labour 
candidates also continued to accept celebrity 
support on the campaign trail, even if this time it 
was often tactically anti-Tory.  The Conservatives 
in contrast continued to be a celebrity-free zone; 
aside, of course, from their leader. But the divide 
established in 2015 continues, as the Conservatives 
distance themselves from celebrity while seeking to 
undermine the authority of Labour’s star support-
ers. Here Gove’s comments can be seen in broader 
context: following the 2015 election he joked that 
those who had seen celebrities as “the voices of the 
silent majority” had been proven “marvellously, 
and hilariously, wrong”.
The use of Stormzy to make a point about 
political authority in this campaign may have 
deeper implications than previous celebrity spats. 
Reflecting after polling day, Stormzy argued “you’re 
just a rapper” is a “weaponised tactic” to “reduce 
us to whatever they need us to be and dismiss it”. 
Whether the celebrity divide continues into future 
elections, this particular dismissal may reinforce 
perceptions of who there is and is not a place for in 
electoral politics.
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